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**AIR HISTORICAL BRANCH**

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**FIGHTER STAFF CONFERENCES**

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Translated by

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FOREWORD

The intensification of Allied air attacks on the German aircraft industry, in February, 1944, caused a serious loss of production but also stirred the Germans to greater efforts. The responsibility for fighter production was taken over by a "Fighter Staff" (Jägerstab) under Albert Speer, the Minister of Armaments and War Production, with Field Marshal Milch as his deputy and Otto Saur as the chief executive. The Fighter Staff functioned from March to June 1944, when Speer took over full control of the whole of the aircraft production programme. At the same time, the post of Director General of Equipment at the Air Ministry (held by Milch since December 1941), was abolished.

During its existence, the Fighter Staff was able to effect a remarkable rise in fighter production, in spite of the heavy Allied air attacks on the industry. This was achieved by taking drastic measures for the repair of damaged aircraft and for the protection of factories against air attacks, including dispersal of plant. A review of the aircraft production programmes was also undertaken, which led to a reduction in the number of aircraft types produced. From the standpoint of industrial organisation, therefore, the Fighter Staff achieved considerable success. The effect on the fighting strength of the Luftwaffe was, however, not very noticeable, as many of the aircraft produced were destroyed by Allied air attacks. It could also be argued that the German fighter arm would have been better served if the industry had concentrated its effort on the production of jet aircraft (the Messerschmitt 262 in particular). General Galland, the A.O. for Fighters put this point of view at this time when he said he would rather have one Me. 262 than five Me. 109's.

The translation which follows contains extracts from the verbatim reports of the Fighter Staff conferences, with particular reference to the effect of Allied air attacks. These reports are part of the collection of Milch documents which were captured at the end of the War.

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15 April 1944

SAUR: First of all I should like to welcome the new Fighter Staff member for aircraft armament, Herr Purucker. I wish to say at once that the discussions must be limited. In future they should not last more than two hours and should not be wholly attended by persons whom I do not know.

Last night we had another terrible setback. Lucht took up his new post, but has not yet returned, as the situation is even more serious than we originally thought. Aircraft wing production at Wiener Neustadt has been greatly reduced and most difficult of all, the enemy knows exactly where we are dispersing plant. There have been almost pointless attacks on the main works, but operations have been directed primarily against our dispersed installations. They have concentrated on four or five plants at Wiener Neustadt, and I gather from an American newspaper dated 16 March that they are right in the picture. This report stated that Germany was producing 1,800 aircraft (per month), of which approximately 1,000 were fighters. However, Germany was fully able to increase production considerably and it was astounding how quickly damaged factories (at other places) were repaired. For example, the completely destroyed factory at Wiener Neustadt had been rebuilt and had even increased its production, as was also the case at this plant and the other. There followed details of steel production and the measures concerning Steyr; measures regarding the ball-bearing factories had not yet been put completely into effect. Then came a series of other factories with details of the production figures, targets and types. And all this in a public American report!

One thing is absolutely clear to me: our decentralisation of factories, carried out under maximum pressure, has resulted in very little additional protection. Nevertheless we must complete this project as it will at least enlarge the areas of attack, repair work will be somewhat easier and targets will be smaller. However, this project has been of no real assistance. The only remaining matter for discussion, therefore, is that every possible effort be made to go underground. In this respect I must say that work of this type carried out hitherto is in no way adequate. I would even call it an absolute disgrace for us that I was informed yesterday morning of the existence of 45,000 plus 90,000 square metres of underground space in the Heilbronn district, and this, moreover, in areas about which I knew nothing until now.

I was also informed yesterday morning that Porsche's factory, in which the Fi 103 is being produced, not only meets the requirements of the Fi 103 but is already 250,000 square metres in area. This is an underground factory (iron-ore) in the Brussels area.

Late yesterday afternoon in Genshagen I learnt that there is another iron-ore factory ("Red Earth") in Lorraine, which can be extended to an area of 300,000 square metres. How is it possible that we can undertake the new projects with such incredible tenacity while there are possibilities within our grasp to go underground at little expense and at short notice, and this at a time when we can no longer discuss what we can do in six, eight or nine months but are faced with a most pressing situation. We must take immediate measures to help realise this aim.

I request that the Fighter Staff deal with the question of underground factories in a different way. I will not go on as before. Yesterday Schaaf told us how these matters are handled by outside organisations. If Schaaf, who is not normally responsible for this matter, can rouse himself for once, then it is high time that we devoted to this extremely neglected field the energy which is absolutely essential. I request that a practicable proposal for progress in these matters be worked out by this evening by Schlempp, Kammler or his liaison officer Legat, as well as a member of the Mines Authority and Professor Brokamp. Contact the underground factory staff, Stobbe-Detlefsen. The whole organisation there is incompetent. Give me the name of a man who will do nothing else but work day and night to get us underground. I know that there is still a great deal of opposition to moving in all quarters, and this must be swept aside once and for all. The

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people occupying underground factories do not want to give them up and those who are supposed to move in are reluctant to do so. The problem could be solved on a grand scale if it were possible to house Genshagen and other plant in one central factory such as "Red Earth". There is no other way and, in any case, we cannot continue as before.

The same situation exists with regard to the wing production plant at Wiener Neustadt, which has been completely destroyed. The factory buildings have sustained 80 - 90% damage and there is no question of repairing them. There are two possibilities: the first is to switch wing production to Erla and Regensburg and transfer repair facilities from Wiener Neustadt and the second is to carry out a thorough examination of possibilities in Hungary.

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14 April 1944

SAUR: Gentlemen, I have expressly requested that attendance at today's session be limited to the minimum. Please inform me whether there is anyone present apart from Fighter Staff members, Air Ministry department chiefs and chairman of main committees.

(The roll is called: Herr Saur permits representatives to deputise for Fighter Staff members and committee chairmen who have been prevented from attending.)

Gentlemen, I am obliged to reduce the size of this group. It is absolutely impossible for us to work in such a wide, unknown circle, which has been steadily enlarging during the last few weeks. We must realise that everything we have done to date has immediately become known to the enemy. There is not the slightest doubt of this. I am very well informed about the enemy press, broadcasts, events behind the scenes, the daily directives issued to embassies abroad by the British government etc. It is incredible what these people know. They are informed not only of the location of very single dispersed factory and what its production bottleneck is, as we have seen in information issued to the public, but they know about every single measure which is taken. Gentlemen, this information can only have been obtained from within our circle. I must therefore request every one of you to make much greater efforts than hitherto to ensure absolute security. Yesterday I gave you my views regarding the future tours. You have all clearly observed that in some way or other the enemy draws conclusions from these tours. I remember Brunswick, the journey from Brunswick to Oschersleben, the way enemy aircraft followed up our tour through Sorau - Posen - Marienburg - Gotenhafen etc. I recall the complete dispersal of main and subsidiary plants at Wiener Neustadt. This morning I read a number of other things which really scared me. I saw reports which stated that the enemy is fully informed about every single factory in Berlin, and of every type of production.

It is understandable that we cannot cover every loophole or keep out the hundreds of thousands of foreign workers acting as official and unofficial agents. However, there is much that we can do. We must exercise more caution ourselves. Yesterday I again received a list of all the lenses which have been requisitioned during the period from 28 March to 8 April with details of sizes, components, the manufacturer etc. I immediately telephoned to ask why in heaven's name this had been classified as state secret. Yesterday I discovered to my horror that our daily reports, which contain everything, had not yet been stamped secret. Yesterday evening I received these copies of the minutes of the day's meeting, again with no secret stamp. The original is probably lying around somewhere.

We must therefore impose a systematic check on material of this type and I would be grateful if the Air Ministry gave us a man from its own counter-intelligence department who would keep an eye on us at all times and issue the

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necessary instructions. However, he must be a man with normal common sense who will not be limited by rules and regulations. For this reason I am an absolute opponent of a rigidly systematic security code which is used in such a meaningless and stupid way that it is no more than a means of indicating something which is to be kept secret. However, we must train ourselves to keep silent about what we know and to keep such a close watch on written information that nothing can happen. For example, these things could be collected up again or some other kind of check made and in such a way as to impede work as little as possible.

I have therefore made this circle as small as possible. Only members or liaison personnel will be present; all the rest need not attend every meeting but will work in their offices.

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17 April 1944

SAUR: Now for the production figures! By the 15th engine production reached 36%, the target being 40%. The 211 reached 43%, the 213 15%, the CO4 12%, the 603 22%, the 605 38%, and the 801 38%, 40% and 32%, giving an overall average of 36%. All in all, this may be regarded as an appreciable success, although in some cases output was very low.

As regards the aircraft themselves, production has been far below our expectations. I have the figures for the 16th here. On the 15th our average output of new aircraft reached 18.5%, while repairs reached 26%. However, if we add the overlap of 111 aircraft to the 468 new aircraft we reach about 23% and if the 58 aircraft are added to the 159 repaired aircraft we reached about 33%. The situation then appears rather more favourable. In spite of these extremely poor figures, it is very gratifying that including production of new and repaired aircraft both from this month's target and last month's overlap, a total of 800 aircraft has nevertheless been reached. Of these, 579 are new aircraft. This total compares with about 410 in the previous month and the grand total of 800 with only 550. We have thus made a considerable improvement on last month's output. Of course, we must remember that this month's target is 2,700 compared with 1705 last month.

Moreover, there is one particularly gratifying aspect, this being yesterday's very high rate of production. Output was 32 new aircraft, 6 repaired aircraft, plus 6 new and 18 repaired aircraft of arrears, totalling 62 aircraft. This is the highest rate of production ever achieved on a Sunday. I found this all the more gratifying as I had feared that production might have slowed down to a certain extent by the 15th. Thus, the attainment of these figures on the 16th merits full recognition. Pressure on manufacturers, which has slackened by comparison with last month, must be increased considerably. We must face the fact that last month's production figures would never have been achieved if we had not put extreme pressure on the manufacturers. Unfortunately, such pressure has not been applied this month. An appreciably stronger line must therefore be taken with the manufacturers. Certain understandable signs of fatigue are evident, but there are also other aspects which I do not like. I therefore consider it absolutely essential that the necessary pressure be brought to bear on the manufacturers through the offices of Lange and the main committees so that we may achieve maximum production this month.

Unfortunately I do not have the graphs which Galland sent me last Saturday. These graphs were alarming. We discover to our regret that what was reported to us last Friday morning, i.e. that a maximum fighter effort was achieved, was not borne out by fact and that instead the number of fighters available for operations was reduced by half during the enemy's five-day offensive. Thus, if the offensive had lasted another five days, Galland believes that the remaining fighters would have been expended; in fact, this

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would probably have happened in less than five days and we could therefore not have withstood a second offensive of similar duration. We would then have been confronted by a situation which we all dread and which we do not want to materialise. We were reduced from 640 to 320 serviceable aircraft, the incidence of total losses in particular being very high. During the five days, only a fraction of the damaged aircraft were picked up by the repair services. I therefore consider that our principle task should be to make the repair services as mobile as possible during these difficult periods. The airmen told me that aircraft which were very slightly damaged were in fact returned within ten days, but that there was very little prospect of any aircraft coming back after ten days. The fact that only part of the aircraft which are repaired more or less on the spot are returned immediately and that other repairs take far too long represents a major deficiency. This is probably due to red tape to some extent. In any case I would be grateful if you would discuss this matter with Nobel and submit proposals which could result in a speed-up. You need not worry about infringing rights hitherto accorded to operational units. Servicemen are glad to renounce privileges if an objective can be achieved more rapidly.

REPRESENTATIVE NOBEL: We noticed this very early and have made an appreciable reduction in the duration of repairs.

SAUR: We must realise that all we can achieve by such measures is a total mobilisation of reserves and that when these are exhausted there will be little prospect of replacing them. Considering the conditions under which we live we must take this into account: everything depends on an immediate increase in production. I now have the figures read to me regularly and I hope that we have gained some ground in the last two days. We have produced an appreciable number of new aircraft and a considerable number of aircraft have been repaired so that in any case we must have added another 150 to 200 aircraft to our account in the last two days. However, I request that these output reports be closely compared with our figures.

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18 April 1944

SAUR: Here is a very unpleasant report which states that of twenty aircraft picked up by the ferrying service, eight were destroyed at the take-off alone as a result of burst tyres. This is due to the transfer of experienced pilots and their replacement by inexperienced newcomers who have not yet flown the 109.

Dornseifer, I believe this is a matter for you?

DORNSEIFER: Director of Supply; he is subordinate to us.

SAUR: There is also this recent story about thirty or forty aircraft which were delivered without radio equipment. I am not in favour of letter-writing for its own sake, but in cases such as this I am quite willing to sign letters submitted to me. If it transpires that the aircraft were delivered with full equipment and that the only components missing were those about which a decision had been made long ago in agreement with the General Staff, then a sharp letter must be written to the person concerned and he must be called to account. Delivery must be made in such a way that this kind of thing does not happen. This rumour about the inefficiency of delivering unserviceable aircraft, which we rectified two weeks ago, has again been brought to my attention.

I request that Nobel also be asked whether the aircraft really were delivered in a fully serviceable condition.

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FRYDAG: You may rest assured. No works inspection would pass an aircraft if the radio equipment were not installed, unless it had been removed by the proper authority. If it has been sent out without radio equipment it is in accordance with previous agreement.

HUEBNER: Today I received a report stating that the situation regarding radio sets is becoming difficult. At Rosenheim there are 72 Ju 88's which are fitted with wireless equipment, but with certain components missing.

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19 April 1944

LANGE: Damage was again caused at a number of places yesterday. Can we take any further measures about this today?

FRYDAG: One of the most heavily damaged places was Oranienburg. Nothing can be done there at present, except to send a construction company. This has been requisitioned but has not yet arrived. Neumaerker is making enquiries about its whereabouts. Hand extinguishers were most urgently requested as they have all been used.

(Interjection: They have been delivered.)

We had fantastic success in putting the fires out. Three workshops were ablaze, but the fire was restricted to a quite small area and extinguished with incredible skill. The fall in production for this month is negligible. Next month's prospects will be known when clearing-up work has been carried out. In any case, there is no need for assistance on a major scale.

Assistance is required at Arado-Rathenow. The machine-tool shops for the FW 190 have been destroyed. Kunze is supposed to provide fifty jig and tool setters. So far I have not been able to reach him.

LANGE: How are things in Lueneburg? Has anyone been there?

(Interjection: I have not been able to get through to them yet.)

FRYDAG: Several hundred high explosive bombs of various calibres were dropped at Lueneburg airfield (He 177). The Heinkel sheds were gutted and the administration buildings destroyed. Four He 177's were destroyed in one shed. Most of the Heinkel production plant had already been transferred.

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20 April 1944

DIESING: Two days ago an attack was made on the 177 works at Oranienburg. Members of the Fighter Staff were there and promised assistance. However, the trucks which were provided were withdrawn again this morning and apart from detaching sixty men from a construction battalion, nothing has happened. The question is whether the members of the Fighter Staff understand the situation. The Director General of GAF Equipment cannot help in this matter on his own account as all Luftwaffe resources are now directed and completely controlled by the Fighter Staff.

KROME: The damage at Oranienburg is such that everything can be cleared up without difficulty with the one construction company and the resources of a concern the size of Heinkel's.



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ANZ: There are 200 craters on the airfield and 500 metres of the runway have been put out of action. Flying must be recommenced at Oranienburg as quickly as possible as activity has also been stopped at Luenenburg. Several hundred men must be sent to Oranienburg for a period of four to five days.

DIESING: It depends on whether Schlempp can transfer them.

KLEBER: We contacted the concentration camp at Oranienburg an hour before Diesing rang up and were informed that a company and 1,000 prisoners are being sent. I believe that with these prisoners there will be no difficulty in levelling the craters.

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21 April 1944

SCHAEDE: Herr Schmelter, the matter of the 72-hour week must be discussed thoroughly. You know that a 72-hour week has been ordered for all principal firms and sub-contractors working on the fighter programme. Some of the contractors are now bombarding the inspectorates with queries and the inspectorates are checking up on the firms as to whether a 72-hour week is being worked. However, a number of plants are totally incapable of working a 72-hour week as they do not have sufficient materials. This very thing happened at my plant. It is my job to make a wing-flap for Messerschmitt and with my small staff I can do this in half a week. If I ordered a 72-hour week the workers would be sitting around twiddling their thumbs.

SCHMELTER: That is not a sound argument as there are 1,000 reasons why a 72-hour week need not be worked. There can be no hard and fast rules. I have always informed firms that they should try to work a 72-hour week. If they have finished all available work before the 72 hours are up then they should leave off so much the sooner. However, it may happen that workers will be withdrawn until a 72-hour week is in operation. Nobody will say anything if there should be a temporary shortage of materials and a 72-hour peak is not reached.

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21 April 1944

WERNER: The Junkers work at Kassel was only slightly damaged. There were two direct hits on surface buildings. Only twenty machines were affected, including several indispensable machines (precision drilling) which are difficult to obtain. A temporary solution to this problem must be found. There are several machines, mentioned by Herr Lange, which have already been given up by Junkers. Apart from this, Junkers will make no further requests. Fortunately, the fuel injection plant, which appears to be particularly indispensable, was not hit.

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25 April 1944

KROHME: The attack on the tiny airfield at Leipheim, where the final stage in the assembly of the 262 is carried out, proves that the British are accurately informed. The question of getting Me 262 production underground becomes more urgent every day. Attacks will be made not only on the final stage of assembly, but later on the other stages of production as well.

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However, no progress has been made yet in the intermediary stage. The matter must be pressed to the limit and the administration of the intermediary stage production must be compelled to make available as quickly as possible the area which has been promised by and demanded of it. There should be no hesitation even in making a sharp cut. The Field Marshal is aware that I am referring to the possibility of Ju 88 A4 production being suspended completely.

MILCH: I am of the opinion that it will have to be suspended, for it will not be produced this year.

DIESING: I informed Korten of this and he wishes to raise the matter again at today's meeting with the Fuehrer. He said that Saur must also state an opinion on this matter.

KROHME: It is a choice between the A4 in a year or the Me 262 in three or four months.

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27 April 1944

SAUR: We already have the report on the state of yesterday's production figures. According to this, yesterday's production amounted to 97 new aircraft, 31 repaired aircraft and 7 aircraft from the transit depot, i.e. 135 aircraft in all. Although this total production of 135 aircraft appears to be good, the fact still remains that in the next four days a total output of 1,000 aircraft will have to be achieved if this month's target is to be reached. I observed yesterday that for the next four days you, Lange, have been charged by me to concern yourself exclusively with the task of maintaining the closest contact with the factories through the channels of the factory directors so that any difficulty which may still arise can be dealt with and this target reached. In the last few days we have again been subjected to very heavy attacks. At one factory at Wiener Neustadt, for example, output has been reduced by 260 aircraft. If necessary, we will have to resort to special measures in this field.

For this purpose I invited Herr Lindner from Regensburg, works director Frank and, once again, Herr Schellhorn from Erla-Leipzig to attend today's meeting. I asked these gentlemen to come because Regensburg is the only remaining pillar of Me 109 production following the serious setbacks at Leipzig-Erla and Wiener Neustadt. Moreover, the efforts of management and labour at Regensburg have at last achieved the standard which must be demanded of a factory. I wish to emphasise that no disparagement of Wiener Neustadt or Leipzig-Erla is intended. Both plants have done their duty and have in fact done incredibly well. I must acknowledge that an almost impossibly high output would have been achieved this month at Wiener Neustadt if it had not been for a further enemy attack (the effect of the first attack was overcome in a few days). There are certain shortcomings at Erla and we realise that an effort must be made to rectify this situation. Circumstances are now such that we must attempt to overcome our present difficulties by making Regensburg the main producer of the Me 109, not only in a numerical sense, which is naturally a major consideration, but, in addition, the number of higher-quality aircraft fitted with the AS (Argus) engine must also be increased considerably. The character of air combat is being transformed to an ever-increasing extent from encounters between bombers and fighters to encounters between opposing fighters. We can win this struggle only if we have aircraft of superior quality.

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GAILLAND: I need not say much about the situation of the Luftwaffe. Unfortunately, you too are living with it every day. The problem which the Americans have set the fighter arm - and I am intentionally dealing only with the problem of the day fighters at this point - is quite simply the problem of air superiority. The situation is already beginning to be characterised by enemy mastery of the air. The numerical ratio in daylight operations is now approximately 1 : 6 to 1 : 8. The enemy's standard of training is astonishingly high. The technical capabilities of his aircraft are so manifest that we are obliged to say that something must be done immediately.

It is very unfortunate that the Fighter Staff's efforts to increase aircraft production must be carried out under the pressure of bombing and very heavy losses. I am convinced that the Fighter Staff will meet with success if its present efforts are maintained. It must succeed. It is the only chance; I might even say that it is the last chance. The concentrated effort which has been applied to the technical side of the matter is not evidence in our planning and training and in the exploitation of possibilities. Gentlemen, I have also noticed this in our circle. I must tilt at windmills in this matter.

In the last four months well over 1,200 day fighter pilots have been lost, including of course many of the best unit commanders. We are having great difficulty in closing this gap, not in a numerical sense, but with experienced leaders. However, this will also be managed. My only request is that if this circle can give me help by way of the Field Marshal, it should be given now.

I have often spoken of the last chance and the danger of the air arm collapsing. The enemy's numerical superiority has reached such proportions that we must realise that operations are beginning to become extremely unproductive for us, i.e. we can hardly manage defensive operations, let alone carry out offensive activity. Secondly, there is the fact that owing to the enemy's superior technical and tactical training we are still lagging behind. This is another point which I must emphasise.

What measures must now be taken to get out of this predicament?

First of all the numerical ratio must be changed, i.e. the industry must produce a guaranteed number of aircraft, which will enable the air arm to be built up, beginning with basic training followed by reinforcement of operational formations. For months past we have been considering whether every last aircraft would have to be transferred from training to operational formations if the situation were to be maintained at all. Following a decision that training would come first at all costs, even if operational formations could not be maintained, decisive progress was made for the first time this month.

Secondly, as we are numerically inferior and will always remain so - we have absolutely no doubts about this - the technical performance of aircraft must be improved. The very varied possibilities in this respect are known. I wish to emphasise that the improved performance which we require can be provided immediately by the AS engine or later by the jet engine. However, although we cannot base our plans for years ahead on the jet engine, it is clear that we must start using 2,000 horse power engines in the defence of the Reich.

I believe that a great deal can be achieved with a small number of technically far superior aircraft such as the 262 or the 163. This grading of fighters, which must serve as a basis if effective daylight operations against bombers over the Reich are to be carried out at all, is also largely a question of morale, and the enemy's morale must be broken. With the aid of these two components, quantity and quality, the operational effectiveness of formations is bound to increase and the standard of training will consequently be similarly affected. I do not expect that we will go so far as to achieve parity with the enemy, but merely that a reasonable ratio will once again be reached.

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If this numerical ratio and the experience of recent attacks are examined, it must be admitted that by day we have never, or hardly ever, succeeded in preventing the main enemy force from reaching the target or effectively upset their bomb-aiming over the target. If we allow this defence mechanism to run constantly at full speed and assume that enemy attacks continue to be directed against industry, the enemy will doubtless achieve two objectives: he will destroy further factories and he will destroy us even in the air. In order therefore to provide not only for the task of defending the Reich but also for the other tasks which will fall to the air force in the event of an invasion, we must adopt a more economical policy with regard to the operational employment and build-up of our formations. For example, daylight operations above solid cloud overcasts must be suspended, provided that the enemy cannot see without mechanical aids and that pin-point targets cannot be attacked. We will need even this 24-hour period if we are to reorganise and reinforce formations.

In each of the last ten daylight attacks we have lost on average over 50 aircraft and 40 pilots, i.e. 500 aircraft and 400 pilots in ten major operations. In view of the present state of training and the rate of these losses, formations cannot be kept supplied with fresh pilots. This is simply not possible. Replacements can be found in a purely numerical sense, but this will not give us organised formations. I again request that while the efforts to provide the required number of aircraft are extremely welcome, it be made absolutely clear that performance is of at least equal importance. Even if their number is limited, we need high-performance aircraft to restore the feeling of superiority in the air force.

To quote an example: I would at this moment rather have one 262 in action than five 109's. I used to say three 109's, but the situation develops and changes.

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27 May 1944

SAUR: Gentlemen, this morning we have called together representatives of firms whose programme is being endangered.....Following yesterday evening's report we can now state that the figure of 1681 new aircraft exceeds the March production total, which stood at 1666, 1669 or 1643 according to whether one includes the 210s and experimental aircraft. The April figures of 1851 or 1853 has, of course, not yet been reached, but it is practically certain that it will be passed.

My greatest worry at the moment is without doubt repairs, and we must go into detail about that later in this meeting.

But first of all I have something pleasant to tell you. Yesterday evening the Messerschmitt works at Regensburg reached its target of 500 aircraft five days ahead of schedule, and so achieved the best performance of any German aircraft works. I wish to express thanks on behalf of Goering to the management, engineering staff, works representatives and especially to the workers themselves.....It is an achievement without parallel. At the same time last month the works had turned out 254 aircraft; this month 500. This performance is all the more remarkable because nearly all the aircraft were produced in the firm's decentralised branches.

I am glad to take this opportunity to congratulate a member of our staff who has played a considerable part in the success. That is Herr Lange himself, to whom long before Fighter Staff days I entrusted the duty of aiding Regensburg - after the first catastrophe - and who even then guided the works along the direction which our present work is taking. I ascribe no small measure of this latest success to his activity.



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We now come to the other works. Taking the positive side first, the performance of Junkers must be classed as outstanding. With a total of 184 aircraft, or 88%, it occupies second place, and deserves special mention because of unique difficulties confronting the delivery department.....

As for the remaining figures, some works show very good returns, but in others there are regrettable breakdowns.

Let us first look at Wiener-Neustadt. Up to now Wiener-Neustadt has produced 44 aircraft out of an original target of 450 and a modified target of 250. Of these 44 aircraft the last 8 did not arrive until yesterday. That means 18% as against 60% in the previous month, 44 aircraft as against 163 at the same time in the previous month. That is an exceptionally low figure. I am not overlooking the difficulties confronting Wiener-Neustadt, not least of which is the heavy bombing. Nevertheless I do not have confidence in the works. I do now know the real reasons why we should have such a failure in this area.

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30 May 1944

SAUR: I am glad to see so many of you back from your holiday. Over the holiday period I missed numerous gentlemen and their representatives. I must say that I shall not take such a broad view of this in future. Yesterday there were no fewer than 8 members who were not represented.....

I am all the more grateful to those who saw this week-end through and made no fewer than five flights to individual scenes of damage. Perhaps some of you Whitsun holidaymakers have heard what has happened. Circumstances have again dealt us a heavy blow. No less than 14 works have suffered heavy damage and some are knocked out completely; Mimo, Leipzig; Junkers, Strasbourg; Junkers, Dessau; Junkers, Leipzig; Erla, Leipzig; Amelutter Repair Works; Cottbus; Sorau; Wiener-Neustadt; Tutow; VDM, Metz; ... (omitted) ..., Chemnitz. In addition four or five fitting out works have been completely knocked out. All possible relief measures have been started... There is an urgent matter about which I spoke to Oberst Dising to-day which must be seen to: namely where those works which have lost their airfields can make their test flights for to-day and to-morrow. Passau (?) cannot be used at all, nor Tutow, and as far as I know neither can Wiener-Neustadt. (Interruptions: It's alright! Tutow will have two runways ready to-day.).....

LUCHT: Jumo, Strasbourg could have been dispersed much earlier. There was no difficulty in the way. Now it will go without further ado. There will not be much loss of production. This month we shall have no loss at all; next month it will amount to 100 new engines and 150 repaired engines. But despite the dispersal all aid will of course be given. ...

The Maximal Company has suffered slight damage. It is interesting that they should want to transfer; it would be quite wrong in their case. They are scared of being bombed, they have lost seven good men.

LUCHT: In Wiener-Neustadt the last three hangars, the final assembly and parking hangar, have been virtually destroyed. Maybe there is a corner left in a hangar which might still be used. At the time there were 70 aircraft at the airfield. Sixty were in the hangar, only 10 outside. I issued a warning about it the time before, but orders were not obeyed.... I did not go into the town; there was not one responsible person with whom I could get in touch. I then took off again. Of the 70 aircraft 45 were so heavily damaged that they will have to be broken up. Of the remaining 25, 10 will be ready this month. Fifteen aircraft are up to 50% damaged and will have to be sent away for repair. These are losses which could have been kept down.

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Lutter did things the other way round. There they parked the aircraft properly around the perimeter. They escaped damage.

Wiener-Neustadt has done nothing about the pressing plant. As far as I can see, not a single press has been moved. I just cannot understand how this has been neglected after the steps taken by Herr Nagel....

In Amelutter all three hangars are virtually undamaged. One storage hangar in the town is burned out. One hangar has suffered a direct hit; some of the equipment affected is German, some of it is in store. An aerial photograph of the town revealed clearly that there were aircraft there. I was able to count more than 100 fuselages. It is absurd that camouflage should be neglected and things made so easy for the enemy.

SAUR: Herr Schnauder, you and Herr Wegner must create a control organisation to operate day and night .... A reporting service is most important.....

LUCHT: Material must be sent to Hornlutter (Amelutter?) at once. Atzkersdorf is completely burnt out..... The report on Tutow is that the test flying has not been transferred.

SAUR: There is a report that although the order for the transfer was given some time ago no effort at all has been made to carry it out.

LUCHT: Aircraft have been burnt out and seriously damaged in Wiener Neustadt.

SAUR: When we here with Goering and the Fuehrer recently and the Wiener Neustadt business happened, the question was immediately raised: "How is it possible that anything is left there?" Surely by now they are aware of the enemy's stupid tactics of hammering away at a target once they have decided on it. Every raid so far which has come from the South-East has ended in Wiener-Neustadt. Why are we so stupid as to have an aircraft depot there?

LUCHT: It would be essential to check how far the fighter programme has been affected.

SAUR: Whatever the fighter programme, we are responsible for aircraft production. Who is responsible for supplies? Herr-Krause, will you discuss the matter? The Wiener-Neustadt affair is of general importance.

DIESING: We still have various supply depots. That is something which Goering ordered six months ago.

LUCHT: The raids were mainly directed against this complex.

In Erla hardly anything has been done at the airfield. There is a large number of aircraft on the airfield, camouflaged. But you can still see from the air what it is. I feel sure that the enemy will return there soon. They are certain to attack the large hangar at Amelutter again because they have not achieved anything there.

SCHLEMPF: Nothing much seems to have happened at Erla.

LUCHT: In the Erla works a great deal has happened. Perhaps someone else has a report.

LANGE: I have been speaking with Schellhorn about it.

SCHLEMPF: The removal of presses to the bunkers has proved successful.

SAUR: Is everything else organised, the military establishment, the civilians?

HEYNE: The three central committees have not yet fixed a date for moving.

SAUR: How can that be? That makes the whole thing much more difficult!

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SCHNAUDER: We are pressing Himmler on the subject. I shall see General Biermann this afternoon. The Heads are agreed. The police school is also moving. The intermediary courts are being evacuated. Major Krause has offered a number of reception areas. It is essential that Field Marshal Milch or Herr Saur take up the matter.

SAUR: The Field Marshal must do that. Go to him at once and ask him to take the matter in hand.....

LANGE: At Erla it is the construction of jigs in particular which has been affected. A third had already been transferred. Two thirds were hit and destroyed completely. There was a timber shop in Heiterblick, where fuselage construction was affected and final assembly put out of action entirely.

LUCHT: It is absurd that two thirds of the jig construction should still be at the head works.

LUCHT: Then there was damage at Posen, Sorau and Cottbus.

SAUR: Let us look at the Ta 154 affair. I must say quite frankly that if we have been hit so heavily, is it not better to concentrate on the 190 rather than expend manpower, skilled staff, equipment and heaven knows what on the Ta 154. The 190 is finished if we lose Posen, Sorau and Cottbus and cannot build up this month; it will be a terrible disaster.....

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17 June 1944

SAUR: In the interests of fuel economy the use of aircraft should be restricted to a minimum. In future there will be no more flights to Berchtesgaden, instead the journey must be done by rail. A special train is running and sleepers can be attached to it. I request that in future my approval be sought before any aircraft are used for Fighter Staff purposes. I have heard that aircraft have been flown by people who have nothing to do with the Fighter Staff, and that they have been flown in instances where people could not even have obtained authorisation for a car journey.

DIESING: The construction supervisors have aircraft at the moment. There is room for economy there.

SAUR: In the arms industry so far we have had 23,000 tons of fuel. This month we get 14,000 tons. We must have this fuel for running in the engines in mass production, for repairs, for the development of engines and airframes, and for the testing stations. Fuel allocation has sunk to a half of the requirements for next month. We should require 28,000 tons and we are getting 14,000. We have had long discussions as to the form that economies should take. One possible place is in the running in of engines, where the time for the better engines could be reduced from  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 hours. Also, the run-off of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours must go. Experience with individual firms has shown that aircraft can be tested in 45 minutes to 1 hour. In some firms the old 111 was tested in a flight of 110 minutes. That no longer happens. I should like to make it an order. Further widespread economies could be affected by a change-over to gas. That would have practically no effect on the engines, but we should need 12 million cubic metres of gas a month. That must be settled with Pauly. All the engine contractors' testing blocks must be connected to the gas mains with pipes of large diameter and the field testing blocks even to the long distance gas supply.

(Interruption). We must set up a commission of experts to go into this question. I should like to draw your attention to the experience with tank engines. These engines are run in with a gas generator trailer attached to the vehicle. This procedure is certainly impracticable with aircraft, unless a glider is

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attached. But there is still much experimental work to be done in this field. I remember that at one time attempts were made to start Maibach engines on gas but it was declared impossible because the engines became exhausted. I propose that specialists be consulted, in particular specialists from the Rhineland who know all about the efficiency of domestic gas, compression and transport.

20 June 1944

GAULEITER HENLEIN: I declare this meeting open and welcome you as the representatives of Field Marshal Milch and Herr Saur, who unfortunately are unable to be present because of a sudden commitment. We are glad that you have come to speak to us. I can assure you that everything that our district can do to assist in your vital task will be done.

I wish today's meeting every success and call upon you now to deliver your address.

DIESING: Herr Gauleiter, Gentlemen: Field Marshal Milch regrets very much indeed that he is unable to attend to-day's conference. He and Herr Saur were suddenly called away this afternoon to Reichsmarschall Goering and may not be back in time for this meeting. He has therefore instructed me to outline briefly the aims and function of the Fighter Staff, which is stationed here to-day.

The Fighter Staff was created on 3 March, at a time when the need for a special drive in the aircraft industry had become obvious. You all know that at the beginning of the war the German Air Force, enjoying definite supremacy, had a decisive effect on the campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, Greece and Crete and on the beginning of the Russian campaign. Then, in the vast expanse of Russia, our Air Force was taxed severely and as a result our enemies in the West, drawing on immense reserves, succeeded in building up a prodigious Air Force. Perhaps we in Germany had not appreciated the decisive role which an Air Force can play in modern warfare. The enemy at any rate learned from our offensives and two years ago created a large aircraft industry which even then gave us cause for anxiety, with the result that we had to consider expanding our fighter production considerably.

This expansion was well under way when the raids on the German aircraft industry began last summer. The relentless continuation of these raids so affected output that by the winter we had failed to achieve any further increase in production. As more intensive raids were expected with the better weather in the Spring - and did in fact commence in February - some solution had to be found. The Fuehrer and Reichsmarschall Goering directed Herr Speer and Field Marshal Milch to institute a priority drive in fighter production and Speer and Milch appointed Herr Saur to the task.

The Fighter Staff did not consider that its duty was to function as a new Ministry. Instead, from the outset it went on travel to see for itself on the spot what was to be done. The Fighter Staff was made up of a number of active servicemen and the most experienced armament industrialists, who were each responsible for their own particular departments. If this happens to be practically the last district in the Reich which we have visited, the reason is not because we wish to belittle this district as regards production, but is rather an indication of praise in that we have not needed to come here before. Nevertheless, I feel it is necessary for the Fighter Staff to discuss those problems in the district which the central authority in Berlin cannot see. We will later thrash out any problems individually and try to find a solution.



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As a military man I cannot tell you very much about the technical problems. But I should like to say the following on the general situation. Since it was created, from the very first month the Fighter Staff has succeeded in bringing about a remarkable increase in German fighter production. Month by month production has risen substantially and last month that of single-seaters equalled the American and British together. But that is still not enough. Germany and the European theatre are too large to be defended by a fighter force only equal in strength to the enemy, who in the meantime is effecting economies and piling up reserves of material. But in the past year, at least in night fighting, where we were able to start to increase output somewhat earlier and also to introduce new equipment, we have managed to reduce the effectiveness of British night raids by a quarter.

In day fighters, too, our defences have already shown an improvement. But operations are still shouting for more and more aircraft, and with justification. For we have to combat not only enemy fighters but also the hordes of four-engined bombers, which, with their powerful armament constitute a formidable adversary, particularly during the day.

We must, therefore, far exceed our present production. The opportunity is there. But with the forcing of fighter production we have also pursued another aim. Apart from fighters, it is necessary to have bombing equipment at hand. We Germans could not achieve mass bombing operations on the scale of the British and American. We therefore had to hit upon a solution which gave us fighters and other aircraft. Hence the types which are now on operations, i.e. all our fighters are capable of being used offensively and of carrying bombs. That was done because in addition to the grave threat of the four-engined bomber to our homeland the danger of invasion was obvious. We are all aware that the fate of the war rests with the invasion.

The invasion has now been on for fourteen days. We should not be surprised at its happenings, for the great empires of Britain and America have been building up their forces for years. Now the enemy has a foothold on the Continent. But there is no cause for alarm. We must master the situation, and from what we hear it can be mastered, provided that we rapidly build up a front line airforce on a par with that of the enemy.

Yesterday I spoke with General Galland, who had come back from the front. General Galland stated quite clearly that as far as performance goes our fighters are adequate and indeed in most cases superior at the altitudes at which the invasion fighting is taking place - that is, between 5000 and 8000 m, but that unfortunately they were by no means sufficient in numbers. The morale of our fighter pilots, however, was high, as high as in the days of our great offensives on the Western and the Eastern fronts. A considerable number of enemy aircraft have been shot down. To name but one example, in the initial stages Oberstleutnant Priller had five successive kills.

The problem now is to provide the necessary numbers. We have taken over four main responsibilities in the Fighter Staff. The first is to guarantee production by rebuilding bombed factories, the second to organise surface and underground dispersal, the third to increase output (this is already showing good results) and the fourth, and most important, to improve standards. On this point it may be said that in addition to those aircraft which are at present operational and comparable to enemy aircraft, we are introducing a number of types which are definitely superior to enemy aircraft. If we can keep up a supply of these aircraft to the front during the next few months, I believe that we shall be able to force a decision in the air war. I believe that a decision must come this summer; so that everyone here should do his utmost to produce the maximum number of fighters of both the present and the new performance as quickly as possible. Our aircrews have the spirit to fly these fighters and they have faith that they can turn the tide of battle against our enemies in the West, however bitter the struggle.

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SAUR: I should like to postpone the question of petrol economy until to-morrow. Diesing is to make another report. We cannot replenish fast enough. It is a race against time. Unless we impose drastic restrictions on consumption we shall not be able to make ends meet. This brings me to mention a problem which we should have settled long ago. Petrol is continually being wasted on trips. I ask that we set an example by using a minimum of aircraft; only in extreme emergency, such as we have experienced in the last two or three days. Short trips must be made by car if there is no other way, otherwise by train. On our last journey we again noticed that despite strict warnings, far too many cars were on the road. In the end there will be no remedy but to halve the petrol allocation for all outside stations.

Discussion on the Me 262

SAUR: Gentlemen, we have great pleasure in welcoming General Galland here to-day. General Galland is - I should not say this too loudly - the real father of our Me 262 and so he is taking a lively interest in our measures to try and bring about a change in things. I do not know if you gentlemen have already been told that two days ago on the express order of the Führer another detailed discussion with him was held on the subject of the Me 262. Reichsmarschall Goering, Field Marshal Milch, General Bodenschatz and Minister Speer took part, and I also was present. At this conference the Führer clearly outlined the situation. For the benefit of those gentlemen who have hitherto not been members of our inner circle, I must emphasize that matters discussed here are not to be mentioned outside.

In its present form the Me 262 must be used in the first place as a very high speed bomber only. It must be produced earlier and in larger numbers than present planning has allowed for. The Führer has authorized that support for the implementation of this plan be drawn from the entire German arms industry. We are thus in a position to draw up a programme which, contrary to usual procedure, will be dictated not by certain basic conditions but by definite requirements to which the basic conditions will be made to conform.

Once again at this conference, at the special request of Goering, I gave the Führer a detailed account of the final development of the Me 262. I made it clear that these measures were dictated by the present military situation and that though the Me 262 would be available in sufficient numbers as a bomber in the first instance, with the arrival of the Ar 234 as THE jet bomber the Me 262 would revert to a fighter; so that experiments on the fighter side were being continued irrespective of the present function of the aircraft and constructional adjustments to the fighter part were being made in the transit depots. The Führer has no objections to the machine being quoted in the programme at 500 fighters and 500 bombers for the present.

It is now necessary to draw up a plan to get a clear picture of essentials but we must not lose sight of existing circumstances, so that we can master any difficulties that may arise. The Führer has been given the most varied accounts, which present a confused picture of the true state of affairs concerning this aircraft. I am thinking of the variations and of the story of the inspection, and that there were miscalculations. I have heard from another source that there have been no miscalculations. Then there was the business about the undercarriage, which was suddenly supposed to be not strong enough, then the nose - I was told recently that the nose would have to be changed after 10 flights because it split near the gun muzzle and the aircraft could not fly for more than 10 hours. Then the whole problem of the engine, the problem of 90% turbine blade failure. Then the recurring question: is the solid blade fully developed and can it be used, is it only a question of

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nickel or is it something requiring a large amount of work? Can the hollow blade be used freely or is it limited, or is the sole purpose of the hollow blade to avoid using nickel and so on?

There are so many different versions of the problems involved that I feel it is necessary to get the true facts and find out what the requirements are.

Then there is the question of whether it is true that the turbine blade is in itself a failure even before it is subject to any stress. I was told a day or so ago that it was at fault even before the last stage of manufacture. It is said that there is no sense at all in the idea of reducing the stress by 10% to obviate any difficulty, because the blades fail not as a result of the stress caused by the number of revolutions but as a result of the design, the material, the resistance to heat etc. Otherwise there would be no point in taking such care over these details.

It is for the engineers to find the answers to these matters. It is all dilettante speculation on our part which might lead to false conclusions being drawn.

I suggest the following plan. First a definite delivery schedule to be drawn up for the 262, a schedule based on the requirements of the front, which are incontrovertible. That is what I really want to talk about. Gentlemen, if we had had the 262 to make raids on enemy targets beyond the range of our other aircraft, then, according to the statements of both the Führer and Goering, the situation on the invasion coast would have looked different from what it does now. And we are open to the most severe reproach, namely that we broke our promise in September/October of last year and substituted a Utopian dream for the hard facts: I refer to the idea that by January/February we should have enough aircraft to carry out proper tests, by March 30-40 aircraft, by May 60, and then 75 and 80. Now it is June and we have not got a single aircraft. This is a reproach which must be levelled at us alone because we did not have the material to get on with the work at the necessary pace. In future I shall assume sole personal responsibility for these matters myself and I shall not rest until a change has been brought about.....

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HEYNE: As far as equipping the 262 fighter goes, everything is all right up to the end of June. There are no bottlenecks. I am, however, worried about one thing. I have tried, so far without success, to find out what equipment is required for the 262 as a high-speed bomber. As the first are being delivered as high-speed bombers, I should now be delivering the corresponding equipment.

BEHRENS: Goering has stated that there is to be no change in the existing series. The whole series is now coming out as fighters and will then represent high-speed bombers. The question of equipment, instruments, etc. is now being considered at Messerschmitts and has not yet been approved by A.O. Bombers.

SAUR: One more question which is essentially of a technical nature. During the conference with the Führer and Goering, I was asked whether in view of the urgent need to place a sufficient number of these aircraft at the disposal of the Air Force without further tests, the attendant dangers might not be obviated, if one did not demand such a standard of speed, which however must not fall in any circumstances below 750 km.p.h.

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BEHRENS: This figure is being lowered. As a result of poor construction, poor regulator equipment and surface friction, the company's speed estimate for all aircraft has been reduced by 40 - 50 km.p.h. In actual fact we can do 830 - 840 km.p.h. But with the 250 kg. bomb the speed is slowed up by 100 km.p.h. If I deduct that it comes to 740 km.p.h. The superiority which was formerly ascribed to the 262 is no longer true of it as a bomber. It has happened that Goering spoke of 900 km.p.h. We have produced graphs showing that it was only 750 km.p.h. That is something which must be pointed out. Everybody believes that they could fly at 800 km.p.h. or more with the bomb.

SAUR: Is the loss of speed due to weight or to surface resistance?

BEHRENS: The bomb and bomb rack on the jet propulsion affect the speed differently. At the slower speed i.e. with resistance I have a poorer operating efficiency. With the 500 kg. bomb we have a take-off loss of 70 km.p.h.

CAMBEIS: There is one thing I should like to point out. So far there has been much talk of deficiencies and relief measures and the picture actually appears rosier than it is. I should like to draw attention to difficulties in respect of quality. The defects in quality are partly constructional, partly to do with manufacture. On the constructional side there are defects, as has been announced, in the turbine wheel and also in the unit between the turbine and the jet casing, at the point where the turbine wheel revolves. That has already been discussed. There are a few small constructional defects also in the instruments. Relief measures have been instituted, with success.

Defects in quality are bound to arise with the transfer to a large number of completely new instruments. Crews will be inexperienced and the equipment still in its infancy...

There will be problems, too, in respect of quantity; not least because of the special plant required for producing the turbines, which cannot be made in the ordinary workshops. I am thinking of the large lathes, the heavy milling machines and similar things which are common knowledge.....

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27 June 1944

SAUR: But first there are one or two changes in organisation which I have to announce. Goering has issued the following decree effective from 20 June:

"The whole of Germany's industry must be concentrated in a special drive to expand the aircraft industry. To this end I have decreed that the Minister of Armaments and War Production shall henceforth be the responsible authority for equipping the Air Force in line with the tactical and technical requirements of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. Decisions regarding the carrying out of these plans should be submitted to be by 1 August 1944.

(Signed) Hermann Goering."

Another order has been received from Speer, dated 21 June:

"Following the transfer of responsibility for all aircraft production to the Minister of Armaments and War Production, I have requested Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering in his capacity as C-in-C of the Luftwaffe to place Field Marshal Milch at my disposal for the Ministry of Armaments and War Production. The Reichsmarschall has approved my request. I have appointed Field Marshal Milch to be Acting Minister of Armaments and War Production and Acting General Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the



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Four Year Plan. The authority which I have delegated to departmental heads to represent me within the sphere of their departmental activity will not be affected by this.

(Signed) Speer."

Gentlemen, these two directives are of very great significance. They represent the completion of preparations and developments which have been going on in recent months, or if you like in the past year. The necessary measures already ordered by the Reichsmarschall will be completed by 1st August and gradually carried out on the lines of the draft already approved by the Reichsmarschall. Unfortunately I do not have the draft here. The six or ten main clauses are already broadly settled. Numerical and technical requirements, as well as time limits, will be stated by C-in-C Luftwaffe. He will be responsible for estimating how far the technical requirements are likely to be fulfilled. He will also examine proposals submitted to him by the Minister of Armaments and War Production and by those independent authorities in the industry appointed by the Minister, and will comment on requirements and decide on necessary modifications; this will apply both to the technical requirements of the aircraft in question and to numbers. The supply will of necessity be regulated by both factors. Let us suppose that certain numbers of a fighter, a reconnaissance aircraft, a bomber, a long-range reconnaissance aircraft, and a night fighter with such and such a performance are required by a certain date. It will then rest with the Minister of Armaments and War Production to say: certainly with maximum effort it will be possible to meet the technical requirements, but at the expense of numbers or time limit; however, if I retard the technical requirements by such and such a percentage it will be possible to adhere to the time limits and perhaps also meet the numerical requirement for some types.

It will be our duty, that is the duty of the Minister of Armaments, to work out various possibilities from the complex of requirements and submit suggestions. The final decision will rest with the Air Force. Then it will be the exclusive responsibility of the Minister of Armaments and War Production to carry out the order speedily and efficiently.

I can tell you straight away that our programme is the very utmost that we can risk undertaking. It will be the full responsibility of the Ministry of Armaments to ensure the fulfilment of this programme. Close contact must be maintained while the programme is being carried out in order to check possible interference, whether on the part of the contractors or from any other source. There will therefore be a complete interplay of forces. We shall have to sit round the same table and get a clear picture of the maxima we can allow on the technical side and for numbers and time limits. From the point of view of organization there will be no substantial change from the procedure hitherto adopted in the Fighter Staff. In accordance with the last sentence in the directive, I am responsible to my Minister for all production instead of just the finished products of the arms industry as hitherto. My responsibility will extend to the sectors covered by the present three committees for airframes, aero engines and equipment. In these fields I shall continue what I have started in the past  $3\frac{1}{2}$  months. I shall endeavour to guarantee maximum output in finished products, as before.

The question of co-operation between the testing and acceptance and development branches of the Air Ministry and existing and future commissions set up by the Minister of Armaments and War Production will be determined by the Air Minister and the Minister of War Production in a special directive. We shall continue to pursue the course which has already proved so sound, namely that of forming a nucleus of scientific, economic and technical experts who will introduce new ideas, and produce in as short a time as possible numerical and technical superiority in the air.

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I see no difficulties in the way of realising this aim. I have requested that the activities of the Fighter Staff as officially laid down until 1 October be extended for at least three months and then perhaps some way be sought of bringing it within the general organization. For the time being we need not consider this, as other items seem more important.

30 June 1944

SAUR: Now for yesterday's damage. I call upon Lucht to report briefly.

LUCHT: I have no report on the Volkswagen works. Even yesterday I knew nothing. I must be informed before the next day. I shall have to straighten things out with the Main Aircraft Movement Report Collecting Centre and with Emmert. I don't know what the matter is.

The following have been attacked: Magdeburg, Oschersleben, Aschersleben, Bernburg, Köthen, Mimo, Wittenberg, Arado, Fallersleben, the Volkswagen works.

(Saur: Erla, Leipzig!)

- Was not attacked.

LANGE: One hangar was set on fire and the administration building hit.

LUCHT: That shows that the Reporting Service is one big muddle. There is no point in our being informed 24 hours later.

SAUR: Lucht, put in a recommendation with Diesing for it to be put right.

LUCHT: In Magdeburg damage was supposed to be heavy. There is no damage. One shelter wash it, there were fires round about, bombs intended for the Jumo works fell in the town. I fully expect something to happen there soon. I have heard from Mahnke that dispersal plans are proceeding. I would urge speeding them up.

From above Oschersleben looked devastated. All the sticks of bombs missed the target but incendiaries and canisters fell right on the works. Major fires were caused. Closer inspection showed that outside aid was not required. They will probably be able to carry on production except for small parts, where it is too early to tell. They have lost 10 to 12 aircraft. Four Mustangs were shot down and destroyed them on hitting the ground. Nothing else destroyed. The industrial gun detachment did their best to defend; the works representative was firing too. They brought down one raider, but that was all. That is the report.

I get the impression that the management is good at Oschersleben. Perhaps the sins of non-dispersal belong to the past. One gets that impression. It is regrettable that part of the locksmiths and the tool and jig shop is still at the works. The large press was definitely to be removed to safety. It is reported to be still there. The only thing that has happened is that some primitive anti-blast protection has been erected. It is important that the second press, which is smaller should be removed. The large one cannot go down the pit. I would recommend special action; perhaps Schlempp (?) can intervene.....

.... Junkers, Aschersleben was supposed to have suffered heavy damage. In fact, only one hangar was hit and burned out, with materials.

SAUR: There are three reports to hand: not touched - heavily damaged - completely devastated, reconstruction hopeless. Someone wrote the latter on the report.

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LUCHT: And there is practically no loss there.

SAUR: I have asked Lucht to speak to you, Diesing. The Report Collecting Centre is very slack. They are putting out some reports a day late.

(Lucht: We don't know about Erla even today!)

Things must be speeded up.

LUCHT: Five power current electricians are required for the Schierstedt Project "Mouse".

PAULY: Twenty station electricians are also required, as they are being exchanged on loan between the various Junkers works. After the damage occurred these twenty were called on by Junkers - in my opinion ten would have done - but anyway some will have to go. It is suggested that the Navy or other Services be approached and asked for assistance, as we have no more in the Air Force.....

LUCHT: Bernburg. Little damage. Two aircraft hit, one hangar wrecked. There was nothing in it, a small fighter hangar. A second assembly shop received four direct hits but today it will be fully working again. For the present they are working under the open sky, but they are slowly being roofed over again.

Köthen was reported to have been hit. It was not hit. From my air reconnaissance I would say that perhaps one bomb penetrated. It may have been an incendiary.

(Lange: One hangar was hit!)

Wittenberg-on-Elbe. As far as I can make out, apart from the Volkswagen works Arado is the worst hit. Production of the 177 has been affected, but not the 234. FW 190 main parts are made there, of various types, for the whole Arado concern; also unaffected. They are in full swing. The total number of dead was very small: in one case none, in another 16.

(Lange: 21 in Magdeburg!)

A shelter was hit there. A concrete roof one metre thick with a covering of earth and turf was pierced. The bomb penetrated where there was a partition wall, which just collapsed. A piece was torn out of the supports, and there were dead right and left. It is said to have been a 400-kg bomb, manufactured in 1938.

LANGE: It appears that they are using a new type of bomb, not mines, which explodes easily and creates a great blast. They mix these bombs in among deep-penetration ones. In this way they have obliterated various hangars. Where they could use incendiaries, they have dropped canisters, no H.E.

LUCHT: I am still not in the picture about Fallersleben. I am sending someone there today.

(Nobel: The power plant was hit!)

- Perhaps Lange can report on Erla.

LANGE: Director Fickert has been to see me. He left just after the raid. Sticks of bombs were dropped between Erla and Mimo. They could not see anything clearly because of the effective smoke screen and heavy A.A. fire. Six were brought down. Director Fickert himself took one American prisoner. One administration building was hit and one shop where the parts for presses are made was set on fire. The damage caused will have little effect on production because good precautions had been taken.

(Lucht: It was bad bombing!)

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SAUR: I regard yesterday as the most serious warning we have had in the past four weeks. I expect that today will go off reasonably well. We have had incredibly good luck, such amazing luck indeed that I begin to wonder. Imagine: if the raid on Allach on 13 June had been carried out under more favourable circumstances or if yesterday's targets - say Magdeburg, Mimo, Köthen, to name the three most important - had been effectively hit, then we should all be sitting here with a real headache. We should be reproaching ourselves bitterly that for the past  $3\frac{1}{2}$  months or so - 4 months come the day after tomorrow - we have been sitting here talking about evacuation and dispersal and finding underground space and finally claiming that our decentralisation is an accomplished fact, when in fact it was still possible for the enemy to strike us in the most vulnerable parts and inflict damage from which we could not recover for months. Gentlemen, for that reason I wish to drive home this warning today.....

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1 July 1944

LANG: Last month's results are extremely satisfactory, I might even say good. The increase on the preceding month's figures was the greatest achieved so far and an amazingly high output was reached. Herr Saur, who had to see Reichsmarschall Goering this morning, asked me to convey his thanks to you for what has been achieved this month, for each of you has made his contribution.

Output of repaired aircraft - I should like to make special reference to this - was rather behindhand at the beginning of the month, but managed to catch right up at the last moment. Yesterday, output totalled 244 new aircraft and 147 repaired aircraft. That is more than a quarter of the month.

All in all we have 5004 aircraft. Output of new aircraft in January 1944 totalled 2454, in February 2030, in March when the Fighter Staff started working 2622, in May 3027 and in June 3597. However, this includes all types - training aircraft, gliders, communication aircraft, etc.

The Fighter Staff figures alone show the following increase. Output of new aircraft totalled 1859 in April, 2225 in May and 2674 in June.

Output of repaired aircraft totalled 654 aircraft in April, then 553 and 802 in June. Output of repaired aircraft of all types totalled 708 in January, 742 in February, 988 in March, 1297 in April, 1237 in May and 1344 in June.

In June 5252 new and repaired aircraft were issued to squadrons. In previous months the figure was approximately 3800. The number of aircraft issued to squadrons provided by the Fighter Staff totalled 3718.

I believe that Herr Frydag can judge that best. Something has really been achieved lately. However, we have been fortunate with the weather, which we should not fail to appreciate, and also with regard to enemy attacks. We have had more opportunity to work in peace, even though we have done so beneath rubble. If it were not for all the circumstances which impeded our work there would have been a further appreciable difference in the figures.

(Mahnke: Do you have the comparative figures for engine production?)

No. However, engine output is excellent. I would not have expected it. There has been an appreciable increase compared with last month.

MAHNKE: Production of new engines was 5498 for the month before last and 5855 this time! That is an increase of about 350 engines.

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SAUR: Owing to the conference called by the Reichsmarschall on Saturday morning I was unfortunately prevented for the first time from thanking you on the first day of a new month for the outstanding achievement on the part of management and labour in the aircraft industry during the month of June. Production of new and repaired aircraft sponsored by the Jaegerstab is 710 above that for May. This output is 1500 above the monthly average from July 1943 to February 1944. This is a considerable achievement and has definitely helped to ease the exceptionally difficult situation which already confronted Germany this spring and which became unmistakably apparent this summer.

The figures which we have reached are in themselves by no means sufficient to really enable the Luftwaffe to do what the enemy is now doing to us, i.e. to give the fighter arm an effective and perhaps even a decisive influence on the course of operations.

It was for this reason that in addition to expressing to us their great appreciation, both the Führer and the Reichsmarschall set us the future task of finding ways and means of rapidly boosting the present rate of production. The immediate objective which must be reached is 5000 single-engined fighters, night fighters and twin-engined fighters. I believe that if we really get down to this task and regard it as absolutely essential - the means to carry it out are now available to us - we can achieve this objective in an incredibly short time. I am glad to be able to thank you once again on this occasion for what has grown out of this Fighter Staff organisation - the basis upon which this problem can be solved. I do not doubt that this group of men, drawn together by a singleness of purpose, will work with unparalleled devotion to achieve this task. Believe me - and you know this from your own experience - the people outside wherever they are - first mention must of course be given to the German worker and his comrades from allied countries - will meet our requirements unconditionally and loyally, but above all we have won the confidence of the whole of the Luftwaffe from staff officers down to corporals and it is of importance that we not only retain this confidence but also visibly justify it by fulfilling the tasks allotted to us.

If the possibilities open to us are examined it is found that they are absolutely adequate to enable in a short time the basis of the new production system to be created, i.e. the necessary retooling, reorganisation and the redistribution to major production drives of workers thus freed.

For this reason the main subject in Saturday's conference with the Reichsmarschall, which lasted practically five hours, was that production of the old version of the 177 should be quickly tapered off and discontinued and the whole labour force made available to fulfil the task allotted to us. It was further decided that the new version of the 177 would not be put into production at all, not even in small quantities, and therefore the whole machinery, the whole capacity and everything connected with it will be available for our purposes.

The 290 and the 390 have also been cancelled. All previous instructions have been superseded by an order to wind up production immediately. This also applies to the 153 and 254. Despite the extended tapering-off period which I discussed with the firm of Focke-Wulf, production will be suspended immediately and labour transferred to the other projects. This also applies to the Me 210.

Production of the He 111 will not be recommenced and will be wound up as planned. The 352 will be taken out of production immediately. The Ju 52 will continue to be produced in French factories to the limit of their capacity. Thus, the earlier order to wind up production of this type has been amended. Factories now producing this aircraft will continue to turn out as many as possible. Production of the 108 will be suspended immediately. Production of the Ar 96 will be converted to the 396 on the scale planned. The 196 will be

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taken out of production six months earlier than planned. Production of the Siebel 204 will be halved. The Do 24 and the Go 242 will be taken out of production altogether.

(Interjection: That's the first I've heard of it!)

The 410 and the 129 will go out of production as specified in the old programme and the Ju 87 can be dropped earlier. The 222, 238 and the Do 26 have been taken out of production altogether.

The 219 is being produced at the rate of fifty per month. This has already been duly ordered. I have already informed you about the Ju 52.

LUCHT: A decision has still to be reached about Ju 52 production in Hungary!)

What is the rate of production in Hungary and France?

ROWEHL: Output in Hungary is reported to be five or six aircraft per month. This is to be increased later to about ten aircraft per month. Has it already been suggested that the 388 should be produced in Hungary?

SAUR: Is there any sense in fiddling about like this in Hungary? I would transfer part of the work to France and turn out appreciable numbers of aircraft there.

LANGE: Planned output is 8 aircraft in July, 8 in August and 10 in September and October.

(Saur: What will be the actual output in July?)

One aircraft.

SAUR: For the last three months we have been saying that 50 109's have been produced each month, yet output has fallen every time. This is senseless.

(Lange: It should be taken out of production!)

It must be produced in France. Support must be given to France. We are tying down plant in Hungary which could be put to better use for turning out the 109. I am certain that we could boost 109 output in Hungary to more than 500 aircraft per month.

(Lucht: Plant producing the Ju 52 in Hungary must be safeguarded!)

Output of the Storch will be reduced to 35 aircraft per month. Production of the DFS 230 will be continued at the rate of ten per month. The 264 will be brought forward by one year as ordered. The 163 will remain in the programme with an output of 100 per month, and the 181(?) with 120 per month. Provision has been made to give the Ju 287 a production capacity of 100 aircraft per month and a materials quota for 50 aircraft per month. The final decision will be made at the beginning of 1945. The 262 will be converted to fighter production in proportion to the output of the 234 as a high-speed bomber, maintaining the total of 262's and 234's, thus giving us 500 high-speed bombers in all. First of all there will be a monthly output of 500 262's, but when the 234 is put into production and reaches an output of 500 per month - it has hitherto been scheduled in the programme for a monthly output of only 180 aircraft - 262 production will be switched entirely to the fighter version. Ultimately, the 234 will also be produced as a high-speed bomber.

The monthly output of the Fi 103 will be raised to 9000 as quickly as possible; 8000 will be produced on the basis of previous planning and 1000 will be taken over by Production Group A 4. However, the question of providing the means to this end - aluminium, explosives, fuel etc. - must be settled beforehand with regard to all these things which are to be put into operation, especially as since yesterday evening there has existed a reasonable

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prospect that considerable results with the V2 and V3(?) as well will be achieved shortly.

Fritz X and the Henschel 293 will be taken out of production altogether; production of X4 and the Henschel 298 will continue.

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6 July 1944

SAUR: I will give you a detailed account of the individual figures when Lange returns. In general, it appears that we have reached the following total figures with regard to the fighter arm and aircraft in this class such as day fighters, night fighters, twin-engined fighters, ground attack aircraft and close reconnaissance aircraft. These figures do not concern anybody outside this group, but you should know them.

Our gross production of new aircraft has been approximately 2,000 machines per month. Allowance must be made for rejects, which we have already discussed and which total about 200 per month. It may be assumed that from July 1943 to February 1944 we have produced an approximate monthly total of 1800 aircraft. This total varied by a few aircraft one way or the other. We rose above this figure for the first time to over 2400 in March, over 2800 in April, over 3000 in May to 3600 in June. Thus, we have practically doubled the previous figure. In so doing we have almost trebled fighter output, as we have even reduced production of other types to some extent.

These fighter figures, which have reached about 2700 to 2800 including twin-engined fighters, close reconnaissance and ground attack aircraft, must now be increased to 5300 by next June and the total output brought up to 7200 aircraft. This figure can be increased by 90% before this year is out. We estimate that output of fighter-type aircraft will reach 5100 by the end of this year and total output will be 6300 aircraft, so that all that really remains is to increase total output next year to between 7200 and 7300 aircraft. When we remember that last month alone the Americans produced 8700 aircraft - although their output is dispersed among quite different types which fortunately neither affect nor interest us, or at least only indirectly - then the figures mentioned will really bring us the appreciable relief which we need.

Now for the individual types! At present our principal fighter types are the 109 and 190. The performance of these two aircraft is approximately midway between that of present enemy fighters. During the past few weeks decisive flights to compare the performance of present enemy types with that of our aircraft were again carried out at a specialised testing and experimental airfield. It was found that the mass-produced 109's and 190's were about half-way between the four main enemy types, but that by using the Argus engine or water-methanol the speed of the German aircraft was superior to that of all the latest enemy fighter types. The 109 and 190 are also completely superior as regards armament and particularly with regard to ammunition. They are not superior as regards range. The enemy aircraft have a far better range than ours. There is a reason for this. He needs the range as his fighter arm would otherwise be useless, whereas it has never been necessary for us to operate at such long range. However, this is one of the difficult problems which must now of necessity be solved.

With reference to these fighters we will now have to take measures to ensure that, in addition to increasing the output of 109's and 190's, the installation of high-performance engines and the standardisation of water-methanol injection is pressed forward on a far more effective scale than has hitherto been the case. Every day this week I have sent for up to three of the new models together with all relevant modifications. The preliminary conference on the 152 is now in progress in the next room, that is the whole

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190 series, the 152 being an improved 190. We have already dealt with the conferences on the 262, 163, 88, 188 and the 388 and the preliminary conferences on the 234 and 335. A number of types have still to be discussed in the next few days. We are preaching the same thing everywhere: this task must be accomplished without more men, materials, machines or help from outside, but solely by concerted effort within the aircraft industry and the exploitation of all available resources. With this preliminary conference we have already established a general basis after the fundamental prerequisites in the materials situation had been assured by an incredible effort on the part of the Raw Materials Planning Department and the Armaments Supply Branch.

Gentlemen, I should just like to emphasise that in five years this is the first programme which has been adequately provided with materials at its outset.

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6 July 1944

SAUR: Your most important task and the real purpose for which you are here is to reach immediate decisions on which types are to discontinue.

The first is the 177, the heaviest German four-engined bomber, whose output we believed only a matter of weeks ago would increase from 50 to 100 and 150 to 200. This aircraft has been withdrawn completely from production. Gentlemen, although we regretted having to take this measure at first, we are nevertheless aware today of the incredible advantages which it has produced. Let us consider the following points: this aircraft would have gone into full-scale production in the middle of next year. However, the enemy would certainly not have remained at his present state of technical development and even his present numerical superiority would then probably be small by comparison. On the other hand, however, we must also understand the following point: what has the heavy four-engined bomber actually achieved in Germany? Was it really the heavy bombers which flew over our cities and reduced our capacity? I support an entirely different point of view. I even believe that if the heavy bombers had not come we would never have been able to put this aircraft programme into effect. Moreover, we would not have managed what has now been achieved. This fact alone made a pooling of effort possible.

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6 July 1944

SAUR: Let us now return to the individual figures! I will give you a general survey of what can be gathered so far from the tables.

The Ar 96, the training aircraft, will continue to be produced on approximately the same scale. We produced 102 of these aircraft in June. According to our planning, output will increase to 120 and 145 and will then fall from 130 to 115. However, it will subsequently rise to 396, but not until the beginning of next year.

Production of the 196 will be wound up completely during the next four months. Complete use will be made of the production capacity thus freed.

The Ar 234 is one of the most important of all our aircraft. Output will be 17 in October, 30 in November, 30 in December, 160 next June, 460 next December and finally 500 in March 1946. This aircraft, which will eventually

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be our highspeed bomber, is one of the greatest technical advances which has ever been achieved. In its qualities for the specialised tasks of a bomber it is far superior to the 262 jet bomber, which is now being used to fill the gap and will eventually return to fighter operations.

6 July 1944

SAUR: Production of the final training aircraft version of the Ar 396 will commence in September with one aircraft, rising to three in October, five in November and nine in December. Output will increase to 200 aircraft per month as early as June next and will finally reach 230 aircraft.

Development of the final heavy transport version of the Ar 432 is not of immediate interest and will not commence until December 1945.

Production of the 108 will be wound up completely within three months, output being six, four and two aircraft per month respectively.

In the next few months an all-out effort will be made to increase the 109, the main fighter in production at present, whose output reached 1,100 fighter-version aircraft in June. We have just had to order more than 400 extra aircraft for this month. This will involve difficulties, as you know from your experience, particularly with regard to delivery and equipment; for even if the material is still available it is really a matter of closing the gap this month only to have another gap in one or two months' time. This must not happen. It is essential, therefore, that the subsequent order be placed with the utmost speed and every facility with regard to transport and for putting the whole project on a firm basis be given so that it is not only a matter of reaching this peak production on one occasion but of ensuring a subsequent peak output. Output of the 109 fighter version will be increased to 2130 and 2430 so that the switch-over to the new fighter type may commence in October, but will then be reduced from 2430 to 2210 and will finally drop to the 500 still obtainable from Hungarian production. Factories will however commence production of the new types as they dispense with the old types.

Output of the 109 reconnaissance version will increase from 125 last month to 150 and 155 to reach 170 in October, but will likewise be reduced next year in favour of the new reconnaissance types. Output of the 110, which is only 109 aircraft per month at present, must increase to 140 this month, then to 180 and 220. It will remain at this level until we begin to wind up its production at the end of this year and suspend it altogether in the middle of next year. Further night fighters will be turned out as replacements.

Production of the Buecker 131 training aircraft, the 109 heavy fighter, the 110 heavy fighter and the 110 reconnaissance aircraft has been suspended.

Production of the Buecker 181 will continue at its present level, remaining practically constant. Last month's output was 103 aircraft and that for subsequent months will be 97, 97, 100, 105 and 120.

Production of the BV 138 C and the C4 45 training aircraft has been suspended.

Production of the CA 313, the Italian aircraft, which was 29, will continue in subsequent months at the rate of 26, 26, 28 and 30 and will increase to 40 until the middle of next year when it will be wound up.

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Production of the GFS 230, which was nine aircraft, will continue at the rate of ten per month, but the parts will not be assembled immediately. This type will be produced purely as a wooden aircraft and will therefore be turned out in parts. It will be held in readiness for special operations.

Production of the Do 17 and Do 18 has been suspended. Production of types which have been cancelled has already ceased.

Production of the Do 24 has been suspended. This will be a great help; output in the next three months will be only 6, 4 and 2 aircraft - this month it was nine - and the whole production capacity of men, machines and space will become available.

The Do 215 and the Do 217 have been cancelled and have already gone out of production.

The Do 315 - another aircraft which is to be turned out in large numbers - is coming into production. This aircraft is one of the revolutionary innovations with a propellor fore and aft. Production will begin in November with one aircraft and another one in December, but will then increase to 100 by the middle of next year and to 350 by the end of the year. This output will remain constant, but another model will be produced giving a total output of 470 and subsequently 525 aircraft. These figures refer only to the twin-engined fighter type. However, a bomber version will also be produced commencing as early as August with one aircraft, then 3 and 5, and reaching 120 by next summer. Production of a long-range reconnaissance version will commence in October with an output of 3 aircraft, then 8 and 15 and reaching 55 by the middle of next year. Output will be maintained at this level, thus giving a total figure of 525. Four trainer version aircraft of this type will be turned out and then production will be stopped.

Production of the 104 has ceased.

The 456 programme has been cut. Output will not be increased as had been planned, but will remain at about the present 30 aircraft per month. It will increase only to 37 and 40 and will then remain constant at 35.

The FW 58 and FW 189 have gone out of production.

Now we come to the important second fighter aircraft, the FW 190. Output of this fighter version must be increased from 540 in June to 710 in July and then to 955, 1200, 1288 and 1725. Production will reach its peak in December and then this type will be promptly converted into the Ta 152. Output will be down to 100 aircraft by next June and production will be wound up altogether in December. At present output of the ground-attack version is 395 and this should increase to 495 this month and then to 500, 600 and finally 650.

SCHAAF: I should just like to say that the Ta 152 is apparently no more than an unimportant development of the 190. However, it will require an enormous expenditure on new plant which must be set up as it must be put through other processes owing to its having a different engine. We are confronted by a very great problem in this matter.

SAUR: The Ta 152 should always appear after Focke-Wulf because Ta is Focke-Wulf. Do you have it down somewhere else?

LANGE: The list was supposed to be in alphabetical order.

SAUR: The Go 242, the Go 244 and the BV 138 C have been cancelled.

Now here is another great gain - the cancellation of the 111. Output will decrease from the 100 aircraft in June through 90, 80, 70, 50, 30 and 20, so that it will go out of production altogether at the end of December and the capacity will thus be freed.

The 115 C has also been cancelled.



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Now we come to the important point which I have already mentioned - the fact that the old 177 is going out of production and that production of the new version has not begun. Output of 177's was 79 this month. A further 80 aircraft will be turned out next month from made-up material then the figure will drop to 66 and the type will ultimately be taken out of production. This is the aircraft which is of great importance in enabling us to commence increased fighter production.

The He 219 is also very important. This is the first aircraft which has succeeded in shooting down Mosquitoes in the last two weeks. As the result of a special effort, this aircraft was re-equipped in an incredibly short time. Unfortunately, the main factory at Vienna and all the aircraft which should have been produced this month were completely destroyed. We therefore have only the 12 aircraft from the one source of production, but we must nevertheless turn out 28 this month, 34 next month and then 44 so that subsequently an output of 50 aircraft may be maintained. Incredible concentration and effort will be necessary if this project is to become a reality.

The Hs 126 has been cancelled.

The Hs 129 will continue to be produced as a ground attack aircraft. Output was 27 aircraft this month. However, it should be 40 aircraft and then increase to 48.

The Ju 52 will continue to be produced only in France; production at all other factories has been finally terminated.

The Ju 87 is to be taken out of production altogether. Output will fall from 90 aircraft this month to 70 in July, then 60, 30 and 25, and will go out of production altogether in November.

Output of the night fighter version of the Ju 88 must be increased from 253 this month to 280, 294 and 300, and this aircraft will then be replaced by the new type in the middle of next year. Output will still be 230 in the middle of the year, then 145 and only 110 in 1946 when production will be switched to the 388, which we will discuss later.

Output of the 88 bomber will remain at the same level for the time being - 75, 76, 60, 73, 88 and 73 - and production will be switched to the new bomber in the middle of next year.

The Ju 188 will also be taken out of production altogether. Output of the bomber version must first be increased from 26 this month to 68 and then reduced through 62, 59, 53, 43 and 38 and finally wound up. Output of the long-range reconnaissance version will increase this month from 45 to 73. It will then remain practically constant for six months - 61, 64, 69, 63, 50 - and subsequently be wound up. This type will be replaced by the 388. Meanwhile, production of the Ju 287 bomber has still to be commenced. However, output of this type will not begin until the middle of next year with 21 aircraft, increasing to 50 at the end of the year. The capacity is available to produce 100 aircraft, but only 50 will be turned out at first as we could not obtain the necessary quota and in addition test and experience reports must first be collected.

The 290's output was one aircraft this month and will be two in each of the following two months. Production will then be wound up altogether and the capacity can be fully exploited.

This also applies to the Ju 352, output of which will be 9 this month, 10 in July, 10 in August and finally 5 in September when production will cease.

Following the appearance of the prototypes at the beginning of the year, production of the Ju 388 close reconnaissance version will commence next June with an output of 60 aircraft. This will increase to 270 by the end of the year and reach 300 in 1946. In addition there is the twin-engined fighter

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version which will commence production with an output of 60 aircraft. The bomber version will commence production as early as this August with an output of 5 aircraft then 21, 29 and 65 and will remain constant at 150 by the middle of next year. Output of the long-range reconnaissance version will commence this month with one aircraft, then 4, 5 and 80 until the middle of next year when, as other types appear, it will drop again to a steady 40.

The Klemm 35 has been cancelled.

The 163 will increase from 5 to 10, 75 and 100.

The twin-engined fighter version of the 210 has been cancelled and will go out of production altogether this month. Its capacity can therefore be fully exploited.

The 262 is being produced first in the high-speed bomber version (Blitz-bomber), its output last month being 22, then increasing to 60, 150, 325 and up to 500. When output reaches 500 bombers production above this level and up to 1,000 aircraft will be switched to fighters. This also applies to the 234, so that when its peak output of 500 high-speed bombers is reached, all further aircraft will be turned out as fighters. Thus, output of both types will eventually reach 1,000 fighters. This programme for the 262, which should reach an output of 325 and 500 in the next few months means that although we have fallen far short of it the programme hitherto in force for this type has been doubled. We are lagging badly in the fourth month of production of this type. Nevertheless, we have attempted not only to carry out the old programme, but will also have to push through this doubled programme at all costs.

The 264 will not appear for a very long time. We are attempting to bring it forward by one year. Even then output will be no more than 3 or 4, or five at the most, and the aircraft will have to be built by hand so as not to tie down the whole of the plant to this type.

The 321 and the 323 have gone out of production.

Output of the 410 twin-engined fighter version will increase from 98 to 120 and will then be reduced next year as the new types appear. This also applies to the 410 long-range reconnaissance version which will increase from 14 in June to 24, then remain constant and later be taken out of production.

The Siebel 202 has finally disappeared.

Output of the Siebel 204 will remain constant, but this type will disappear next year in favour of the new training aircraft. The present output of 193 aircraft will fall to 98 and 95 and is thus in accordance with the programme.

The S 79 has been cancelled. The S 82 will remain in the programme for another six months and will then drop out.

Now we come to the aircraft which we have already briefly mentioned, the Ta 152. The conference to put this aircraft into production is taking place in the next room at this moment. We have had to draw up a programme which is really unique in the whole field of aircraft construction. This provides for an output of 10 aircraft in September rising through 30 to 75 in December, then to 1250 by June next and finally reaching a peak of 2400 next December. Thus, production of a completely new type will be started and raised to 2400 aircraft per month in one year.

This will be an incredibly difficult task for factories in central and eastern Germany. We have therefore decided that the 154 and 254, another two completely new types coming into production, will be cancelled this month and their capacity made fully available. This was a difficult decision, especially as these were the first German wooden aircraft and were to have

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eased our materials situation. Nevertheless, under the circumstances we could not undertake to put more than six new types into production and therefore reluctantly suggested to the Reichsmarschall that this cancellation be made. Both the Reichsmarschall and the Fuehrer have agreed to this measure.

In Italy the G 55 is still crawling along with an output of 20, 25, 30 and 40 aircraft and production should therefore even increase. I hope that the people in charge in Italy will succeed in securing this increase.

So much for the programme which, as I said at the beginning, will mean that this month's production of 3600 aircraft must be increased by 600 aircraft in July, 800 aircraft in August and 700 aircraft in September to reach a monthly output of 6546 aircraft at the end of the year. As essential retooling will then be in progress there will not by any substantial numerical increase in output for we will have the incredibly difficult task of switching over from the 6500 aircraft which will be reached at the end of this year to the production of modern types at the rate of 6700 by the middle of next year and reaching a peak of 7100 at the end of the year. However, I believe that it will be possible to achieve this output as by that time the factories will be organised and running more smoothly.

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31 July 1944

LANGE: Now for the completion of the programme. The present weather conditions are upsetting our calculations and reducing the prospects of reaching an output of at least 3,000 aircraft. However, measures have been taken and there are still a few aircraft to come. This morning I made out a balance sheet. A very conservative estimate shows that I am 28 aircraft short of the 3,000. Last month output was 2,800. We lost 250 aircraft as a result of bombing attacks. But for this we would have almost reached our target. However, we have had that now. Nevertheless, I hope that the figure of 3,000 aircraft will be reached or exceeded if the weather clears up.

THEOPHIL: Output of repaired aircraft is also approaching its target. Even more engines are needed at Riga so that a few more aircraft can be completed.

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1st August 1944

SPEER: Colleagues! On 1 March this year we set up the Fighter Staff as the result of a situation which probably could not have been more desperate and with a great deal of optimism and perhaps a little recklessly we have succeeded in overcoming a problem which was at first believed to be insuperable. While this Fighter Staff has existed we have more than doubled the output previously available to the Luftwaffe. You all know the rates of output up to the month of June and later Herr Saur will inform you of the result for July, which has far outstripped that of every previous month. Thanks to the Reichsmarschall's perception we have succeeded by means of the Fighter Staff in achieving our ultimate aim, that is to obtain a unified Ministry for Armaments and War Production. With the attainment of this objective we once again have fresh possibilities to exploit; the co-ordination of the entire armaments industry can again give us fresh potential.

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Now that the whole aircraft industry has been taken over by our Ministry the Fighter Staff in its old form is no longer really practicable. I have already spoken with Saur and expressed the conviction that the basic procedure which developed with the Fighter Staff and enabled us to work and come to decisions rapidly should be retained. With effect from today the Fighter Staff is dissolved; its place will be taken by the Armaments Staff. This Armaments Staff will operate on similar lines to the Fighter Staff but will now also deal with all of the most important programmes throughout the armaments industry and will ensure that output in all of the most important sectors is raised as quickly as possible without recourse to bureaucracy and by the old method of improvisation.

The Armaments Staff will first of all carry out the following tasks. First the Luftwaffe programme, the importance of which need not be discussed further at this point. Then the naval programme, about which I will make the following comments. In the industry which supports the naval programme we do not have the youthful energy which we have found or were able to arouse in other fields of industry. The naval armaments industry is obsolete and so steeped in its traditions that it will not of itself develop basically new ideas either in general or in particular which will enable us to achieve an appreciable improvement of its results to date. We have found in Merker, the chairman of the main committee, a man who has passed over all of these traditional hide-bound views with great courage and found new ways of carrying out naval armament. However, one man alone cannot succeed in face of the stubborn resistance which he will encounter not only from the naval armaments factories but also from the Navy itself. We must therefore overcome all this opposition on the broadest basis in one general assault so that with the resources which we have gained from the rest of industry we may show the Navy and the shipyard bosses what production really is. I am convinced that if we take this action on a broad basis we will succeed in bringing to full fruition the excellent beginnings which Merker has already made in naval armament.

The infantry programme is also part of the Armaments Staff's work. Moreover, it must be noted that it should not be particularly difficult for us to carry out the infantry programme if the situation remains relatively normal. The infantry programme was ordered by the Fuehrer at our request because during tours of front-line areas everywhere and according to all the comments which reached us from the front we were obliged to come to the conclusion that industry was not delivering weapons in the required quantity. We became aware of this deficiency - not from the competent authorities - and ourselves took the lead in pressing these demands, thus anticipating action on the part of those whose job it was to put them forward and who then associated themselves with these demands in a very energetic manner some months later. I believe that on the whole it will be possible to fulfil demands regarding infantry armament. We must always bear in mind that at the present moment the infantry programme is one of the most important programmes of all. If the release today of 1,000 carbines held by the Todt Organisation to the Army Chief of Staff is a matter of some importance because it is thus possible to equip 1,000 Marines in East Prussia, it indicates how urgently necessary it is that this side of production be increased in the shortest time possible. Later Saur will show by July's results that in this case we too have already created a satisfactory basis for the infantry programme in the shortest possible time. Difficult though it may be, it is essential that July's figures be at least maintained in August and even further increased if possible.

You are aware that the vehicle and assault-gun programmes are included in the infantry programme. You also know how important vehicles are. In this respect I should like to make special reference to the fact that the labour problem in the vehicle industry will be overcome in the next few weeks by the provision of 12,000 concentration camp prisoners, so that the components industry will probably be faced with exceptional difficulties and obligations. I request the components industry to contact Herr Schaaß in his capacity as chairman of the main committee for vehicles as he will otherwise wish to release and transfer to his own components plants workers from the 12,000 concentration camp prisoners to be sent into the vehicle industry.

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Furthermore, the Armaments Staff controls the tank programme, and no words need be wasted in describing the importance of this project, as well as the locomotive programme which must be assisted mainly by the improvement of engines. I am not convinced that everything which could be done in this programme is already being done. It is true that the Reichsbahn maintains that every effort is being made. However, Degenkolb, I believe that even more reserves could be made available if we exerted even greater pressure in this sector. I should be grateful if, with regard to locomotive repair, plans were quietly made in the next week or two for a general review of Reichsbahn repair installations, action then being taken upon the issue of a code word.

The flak and artillery programmes are further tasks for the Armaments Staff. In the last few months the flak has shown that in massed raids on cities even more enemy aircraft can be shot down than had ever been believed possible. It will acquire an ever greater importance. In view of the expected shortage of aviation fuel we do not know how defence will fare both at home and against enemy aircraft at the front. However, the flak will at least force enemy aircraft up to greater altitudes and reduce their aiming accuracy accordingly.

You are all aware of the importance of the artillery programme and I need not make special reference to it. You all have a detailed knowledge of what has to be achieved in this programme. In the case of the artillery programme it has been observed that as a result of the ability of main committee chairman Tix and also of our Weissenborn exceptional results have been achieved in the last few months. Today our artillery programme is far beyond the target originally set us by the Fuehrer. As Saur will learn later from the individual figures, we have again achieved production records in July which, in the case of all the important weapon types, is approximately equivalent to 8 - 10 times the figures for 1941 and even we would have regarded this rate of output as impossible if it had been demanded of us in the spring of 1942.

The V-weapon programme is to be incorporated into the Armaments Staff, which I believe has quickly brought it under a special committee. The effect of the V 1 is well known and this will be greatly exceeded by subsequent types which Degenkolb has taken so much trouble to bring in and which he regards with optimism.

The last to be considered is the repair programme. In this respect it must be especially emphasised that the provision of spare parts of all types for the front is of particular importance and has not been neglected by us. The activities of Herr Oesterreich, which are very highly appreciated by the servicemen, have resulted in more spare parts than before being allocated where they are needed. The nearer the fronts come to Germany the sooner will it be possible to distribute spare parts to those needing them according to a sensible system and through direct channels. In my opinion there are still exceptional possibilities in this sector and I should like to request that not only the delivery of spare parts but also the strongest condemnation of their misuse in any way at the front be considered as the objective of the repair programme.

The Armaments Staff has the same full authority previously vested in the Fighter Staff and may therefore make decisions in my name in any matter concerning the Ministry. I would next like to thank the Fighter Staff for the manner in which it has carried out its work in the last few months. During these months the Luftwaffe has remained unreservedly at our service and by acting unconditionally and without regard to matters of prestige was instrumental in making our work possible. We know from other branches of the services the number of difficulties which may arise where co-operation is concerned. In this case co-operation developed exceptionally smoothly from the outset. I also thank my friend and present representative Milch who, from the commencement of my activity, understood completely how to avoid the differences which would of necessity have arisen between the aircraft industry and the rest of industry.

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We all regret - and I believe this applies most of all to those responsible in the Air Ministry - that the solutions which we have found in recent months were not put into effect some time ago. We must learn from this example what serious consequences mistakes in organisation, which are basic, can have for the entire system. Although we now speak of our system of so-called industrial self-responsibility, I should like to add something fundamental on this occasion. In 1942 and 1943 we were often derided when we were establishing the system of committees, commissions and syndicates. To counteract this we were frequently rather inclined to laugh at ourselves and said that we were about to bring back the parliamentary state. However, this system of compulsorily bringing together everybody with something to settle had great advantages, for these meetings enabled frank discussion round a table of every type of basic difficulty existing in any particular sector of industry. I am convinced that such varied matters cannot be settled by rigid military procedure and this also applies to our organisation. We must provide the necessary safeguards in these sectors so that the errors which can arise in a system such as this can be immediately eliminated. Thus the system which we have established in industry provides one of the principal prerequisites which will make it possible to counteract the defects which can occur in an authoritarian system - and this also applies to the Wehrmacht system from its early beginnings. There is also the safeguard - and I ask that it be borne in mind by the main committee chairman assembled here - that this group is headed by a man who will permit full discussion of the pros and cons of every case, but who will finally reach a clear and expert decision and will also ensure that this decision is put into effect. Thus, the Armaments Staff will also operate in this manner. Essentially it is also intended to be one of these groups and although the thunderous voice of Saur will be dominant, unrestricted and frank expression of opinion and intensive discussion will nevertheless be its principle.

In the next few months we will doubtless be faced with exceptionally difficult situations. I believe that we cannot master these situations unless we expose the immense basic difficulties existing in other sectors and in so doing mobilise reserves as well. I am convinced that we will win the war if we make fewer mistakes than the other side and that the war will be lost by whoever makes the most mistakes. To date we have made a relatively large number of mistakes. In the organisations of the Wehrmacht and the State we have set up monsters which are apparently no longer under our control. One of the most important tasks of our ministry, having a deep insight into Wehrmacht matters on the one hand and into its economic relations with the state on the other; is that its members take active steps to ensure the removal of the colossal basic problems on hand. In this respect I must emphasise that at the present moment the removal of defects in all sectors in the shortest possible time is at least as important as our armaments production. I am convinced that for the very reason that Dr. Goebbels is not too well versed in administration - he knows just as little about it as I did about armaments when I started - he will find the right means if the right suggestions are submitted. At all events he has the nerve for the job.

I recently used the following analogy. If a factory is not paying its way an efficient director will first compare the ratio of productive to non-productive hours. Next he will eliminate non-productive hours which he probably cannot spare over a period of a year or eighteen months and thus by producing a more favourable ratio of productive to non-productive hours puts his factory on its feet again. We find ourselves in the same situation in the Reich today. The ratio of productive to non-productive hours is staggering. Consider the following figures! As you are all aware, we have 2,100,000 workers in aircraft production, 1,900,000 on Army production, 500,000 on naval production and about 2,000,000 in basic industries, totalling approximately 6,500,000 workers turning out the most important armaments and war production items. Agriculture and transport could also be added to these figures as productive. These three factors - agriculture, transport and armaments - are the only ones at present enabling the essential prerequisites for maintaining our fighting fronts to be provided here in Germany. All the rest are unproductive, serving only to maintain the productive section in one way or another. However, unproductive employment in the Reich also includes



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3,100,000 workers in administration, including the Wehrmacht administration, 3,200,000 in banks, insurance companies and home and foreign trade and 1,400,000 employed as domestic servants. These are a few figures and are not comprehensive in themselves. There is a large number of subsidiary trades which could also easily be counted as unproductive. Since 1942 we have repeatedly demanded of industry that a change be made in the ratio of productive to unproductive hours; we make this demand in every Gauleiter's speech. If now at the last moment there may still be a chance for us to push through extreme measures in this respect then we must continue to retain the initiative. For this purpose I need your suggestions in all of these matters. I believe that the way in which we have set up our organisation has been completely wrong in that we have with typical thoroughness brought in a large number of controls, some of which overlap, to prevent any possibility of the State being defrauded in any department, whether with regard to ration cards or the revenue. The system is undoubtedly excellent and I think that generally speaking it would be hardly possible to avoid this form of control. However, what we have forgotten is that the German people do not need this control at the present stage. The Minister of Finance happened to tell me that at Revenue offices where records had been burned, taxes were still being paid in full although it was known that the records were not available and this shows that confidence can and should be placed in the German people. If there were a total departure from this attitude which is characterised by the controls so far imposed and instead some measure of confidence were placed in the German people, this change in basic policy would in my opinion result in the redundancy of a million administrative employees.

In conclusion I should like to ask you all to be a source of optimism and equanimity as has been the case since the ministry was established. I remember with what drive we started in 1942 when there was a wave of depression throughout the Reich and the administration and how, simply by our almost excessively confident work, we succeeded in defeating this depression and replacing it with our optimism. We must not only continue with this policy but also intensify it by our relief in our future achievements so that we will demonstrate to the rest that we still have something in hand and that we will ultimately attain our objective. In the next few months the psychological task which we have to perform in this respect will be of at least equal importance to the actual task of increasing armaments production. We cannot give everyone a detailed account of what our output will be from month to month, nor can we discuss in detail the basic difficulties which have perhaps existed to date in the distribution of weapons and equipment and which will certainly be rectified in the immediate future. However, it is essential that by our morale we show that we are still the same and that we will achieve whatever is necessary to assure the future of Germany. I rely on you to maintain this old morale and never to abandon it whatever may happen in the next few months. As far as armaments are concerned we will be and remain a sworn society. I am convinced that just as there were societies which held together and surmounted every danger at the time of the war of liberation, so will our society constitute a very active centre of resistance together with the other centres of resistance which are developing everywhere. Capable men are now appearing everywhere and the rest are handing their work over to them. I name Himmler and Dr. Goebbels as the most important of these men. I am convinced that they will co-operate closely and that Germany's future prospects will be improved by these men.

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SAUR: Now for the crucial factor - the aircraft. For a whole week we have been making the greatest efforts with regard to aircraft sponsored by the Fighter Staff and this applies in particular to those of us who have worked at this task unremittingly and with fanatical devotion. Until yesterday morning we did not believe it possible that (fighter) output would reach 3,000 aircraft and we saw absolutely no prospect of a total output of 4,000

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aircraft. We still hoped to manage the 3,000 but there was really no longer any question of the 4,000. However, yesterday our final output reached 3,145 aircraft sponsored by the Fighter Staff, a total of 3,678 operational aircraft and a total of 4,675 military aircraft of all types. This enormous increase is 500 aircraft above output in June and 600 above that for May. Thus, production has increased by 100 aircraft in two months; fighter production alone has increased from 2,300 to 3,100, that is by 800 aircraft in two months.

The repair services have achieved a similar result. The number of repaired fighter aircraft has risen from 647 in May to 824 in June and to 936 in July. The total number of repaired aircraft of all types has risen from 1208 in May to 1328 in June and to 1532 in July. Supervision of aircraft issues from transit depots and conversion units has been inadequate this month. We should have issued 5,500 aircraft - 5530 to be exact - but only 5,312 have been sent to squadrons. This means that there are 230 aircraft at conversion units and depots.

It is gratifying that deliveries of single-engined day fighters have been made in full. There is no deficit here, but there is an appreciable deficiency with regard to night fighters, twin-engined fighters and close reconnaissance aircraft. I request that this matter be dealt with immediately.

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A.H.B.6 Distribution

Same as Translation VII/128