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R E S T R I C T E D

AIR HISTORICAL BRANCH

TRANSLATION NO. VII/109

THE DIEPPE RAID, 19th AUGUST, 1942.

Contemporary appreciations by

Headquarters, Luftflotte 3

ISSUED BY

AIR MINISTRY, A.H.B.6

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G.315469/PAR/3/52/50

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Luftflotte 3 Headquarters,
Operations Staff/Ia Ops.,
No 8655/42 - Top Secret.

28th August, 1942.

British Large-Scale Landing Operation at Dieppe
First Appreciation

1. The landing took place in daylight at a time that could not be considered very suitable.

"All officers and men will therefore remain constantly on the alert for any eventuality; the most improbable courses of action are possible - landings during the day, towards evening, and even at low tide."

2. The enemy made extensive use of smoke from ships, landing craft and with aircraft putting down screens and dropping smoke generators. Ground visibility was reduced considerably for some time and was down to a few metres in some places. Until about 1000 hours some of the troops were firing straight into the smoke.

"Check whether predetermined lines of fire for action at night and while smoke is being used have been marked out for all weapons - machine guns, light and heavy AA - and for all alternative positions. Exercises will be carried out at night and with smoke. Arrangements will be made with local Army headquarters. Luftgau Headquarters Belgium is testing firing at smoke-covered targets at sea with radar."

3. All coastal and AA positions will be again checked to see whether there is an adequate field of fire for ground action, against targets at sea and to support infantry in front of the main defence line.

All AA positions (also at airfields) will be checked to see whether strong infantry attacks can be held in view of their siting and all-round defence. All necessary improvements will be effected immediately.

4. In air attacks on an Army battery position enemy fighters set cartridges on fire, thus forcing the gunners to deal with the fire while an enemy infantry attack on the battery was in progress.

Damage or losses can also result from enemy fire on AA ammunition, thus reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of the guns. All ammunition, including gun-site ammunition, must be protected from enemy fire. All ammunition storage arrangements will be checked.

5. Immediate counter-attacks, even by small determined groups, have proved to be very effective.

"All unit commanders, including subordinate commanders, must have reserves, however small these may be. However, defensive strength must not be reduced beyond bearable limits in favour of holding back reserves. The assembly and employment of reserves must be calculated exactly according to time, direction and task. Reserves must not be committed prematurely."

6. High rate of ammunition expenditure by troops without battle experience:

Shortage of machine gun ammunition; one company had already expended its ammunition during the morning. An army battery fired 1,300 rounds in half a day's action. Of three AA ammunition issues available, an average of one issue was expended.

"Troops must be trained to use ammunition economically; uncontrolled defensive fire without proper targets must be stopped. Even ammunition in adequate supply must be also used sparingly so that worthwhile targets, which appear frequently in landing operations, can be subjected to maximum fire. A large reserve of AA ammunition is also necessary for the eventuality of positions being encircled for some length of time."

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7. Using various aids, the enemy also climbed up cliffs thought to be inaccessible. In mixed gorges he used the sides to make his approach.

"All points are threatened and any eventuality must be expected. Positions behind steep cliffs, particularly special signals installations, will be checked again; footpaths up cliffs and the edges of cliffs will be wired and mined wherever this has not already been done (co-operation with the Army). The faces and tops of cliffs will be covered, by automatic weapons if possible. Observers must be posted at these positions during operations. Do not think that nothing can happen there."

8. 29 tanks were landed on a front of about 1,000 metres by four, or at most five, landing craft. 24 were immobilised by fire and sank into the deep shingle on the beach; only 5 reached the promenade.

Shingle on the beach proved an excellent obstacle to A.F.V.'s. Blocks on approach roads to the promenade and town were also very effective.

"Approach routes to positions with special equipment, gun positions and airfields which cannot be circumvented will be blocked or barricaded. Narrow gaps will be left in these blocks or barricades so that man and transport can pass through. Barriers will be held in readiness to close these gaps."

9. The enemy has very good maps of the sector under attack, showing practically all the defence installations, minefields, AA positions and installations with special signals equipment.

"More dummy installations must be set up, and these must be located within the effective range of our fire. Maximum state of alertness must be maintained against espionage."

10. Enemy Tanks Identified:

- (a) Churchill I with one 4 cm and one 7.5 cm gun.
- (b) Churchill with one 4 cm gun.
- (c) Churchill III with one 5.5. cm gun.

All the tanks were of the latest types. They had the following armour: front 76 mm, sides 64 mm, rear 51 mm. Double-layer armour with 5 mm gap - external layer thicker than internal layer.

Evaluation

The majority of the tanks received hits of all calibres up to 7.5 cm, but there were only two penetrations by medium calibre ammunition. Great effect on tracks which are apparently made of a very brittle material which breaks easily. Range for firing at tanks should not be too great.

Luftflotte 3 Headquarters,
Operations Staff/Ia Ops.

28th August, 1942.

British Large-Scale Landing Operation at Dieppe

Second Appreciation

1. Aircraft Ammunition:

All the 20 mm aircraft cannon ammunition had been expended by the late afternoon of 19th August. During the night 19/20th August 25,000 rounds were brought from Luftgau Holland by M/T. On 20th August 24,000 rounds were brought from Fuerstenwalde to Beauvais by air (4 Ju 52's) and a further 100,000 rounds were sent by express transport to Watten-Eperleques.

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Supplies of aircraft ammunition could not be brought up in time for operations on 20th and 21st August. There was no shortage of other types of ammunition or bombs.

"To overcome difficulties in bringing up ammunition and fuel in critical situations, GAF equipment depots and supply services must be extremely mobile. Formations, station commanders and Airfield Regional Commands must be put in requests for supplies as early as possible.

Stocks of 20 mm ammunition in the Luftflotte 3 area are still too small. High Command requested to send supplies as quickly as possible. Luftgau headquarters will report requirements directly to Luftflotte H.Q./Q.M.G., who will request High Command to send adequate supplies as quickly as possible "

2. Aircraft

Do 217 losses were made good by the immediate dispatch of 27 aircraft from the Luftflotte aircraft forwarding centre. To replace lost Fw 190's, the last 18 aircraft were released from the forwarding centre at Welvegheim.

By the evening of the day of the landing only 70 of approximately 230 fighter aircraft available in the morning were still serviceable. By the morning of 20th August serviceability had risen again to 194 aircraft as a result of repairs carried out and replacements brought up during the night.

If the operation had been extended over several days, the operational strengths of fighter and bomber formations would have been reduced considerably, as there were no further Luftflotte reserves available.

3. Fuel

All airfields had adequate supplies. To replace expended stocks, 4th Abteilung Q.M.G. arranged for three Q.M.G. trains to be sent for day-to-day consumption.

Although the discussions with 4th Abteilung Q.M.G. took place on 19th August, the trains could not leave Germany until the morning of 20th August as the locomotives could not be made available earlier.

Fuel expended during 19th August could therefore not be replaced until the trains arrived on 22nd August.

"Increased supplies for the occupied western areas of the Luftflotte command must be urgently requested."

4. The imposition of a secondary degree of readiness for action throughout Luftgau Belgium - Northern France by the detention of all foreign civilian workers and the suspension of all work in workshops and repair installations resulted in a considerable dislocation of the maintenance and armament industries.

"Whenever an obscure situation at the beginning of operations necessitates the imposition of a state of readiness for action, ability to continue work in all Luftwaffe maintenance and production installations must be assured.

Work will be stopped only in the event of a direct attack on an installation, and the German workers will man the defences."

Luftflotte 3 Headquarters,
Operations Staff/Ia Ops.

28th August, 1942.

British Large-Scale Landing Operation at Dieppe

Third Appreciation

1. With the following exception all planned defence measures were carried

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out without a hitch:

The Luftwaffe Ground Defence regiments provided as Army Group reserve were at first given the following order by 10th Fliegerdivision: "Remain at half an hour's readiness to move off."

This might have resulted in a considerable weakening of the ground organisation at a critical moment.

If these regiments are withdrawn the remaining forces are inadequate to guard airfields and operate against airborne troops or partisans in defence of the vital ground organisation. It has been agreed with C-in-C West that the Luftwaffe Ground Defence regiments provided as Army Group reserve will be used with Army formations only in an emergency. These regiments are to be alerted and moved from airfields only upon receipt of special orders. This matter will be settled by an order from Luftflotte Headquarters.

2. Digging-in of guns and quarters proved very effective. In spite of very heavy enemy fire in places, German fire was not stopped. Guns in elevated positions were soon put out of action.

Guns, installations and quarters will be dug in in the coastal defence zone and wherever possible elsewhere. However, within strong points single guns at least must be able to move into alternative positions.

3. The enemy soon disrupted most of the telephone lines in the Dieppe area. A signals construction platoon of Luftgau Signals Regiment, Belgium, stationed in Dieppe, entered an Army strong point and was employed by the Army sector commanders as infantry and was thus not available for repair and construction work for 24 hours.

Supplementing of telephone communications by means of radio and runners must be increased. An order will be issued regarding the establishment of signals reporting centres at the rear of the main defence zone of the coastal area with assured communications to rear headquarters. Signals breakdown squads, construction units etc. are to be used primarily for the repair of communications and will be used as combat troops only in an emergency. Heavy AA batteries will be issued with R/T sets to control fire. Luftgau Headquarters Belgium will test the possibilities of using radio battery receivers as auxiliary R/T sets. A report is to be sent to Luftflotte Headquarters as soon as possible.

4. Known deficiencies of captured 7.5 cm batteries were confirmed. The fact that only time fuse ammunition is available is a particular disadvantage.

Re-equipment with 8.8 cm guns cannot be carried out at short notice. Luftgau Headquarters, Belgium, Holland and Western France are requested to submit opinions as to whether it is possible to exchange all captured 7.5 cm AA guns in the coastal area for 8.8 cm guns from the rear areas.

Luftflotte 3 Headquarters.
Operations Staff/Ia Ops.

31st August, 1942.
2140 hours.

British Large-Scale Landing Operation at Dieppe

Fourth Appreciation

Tactics of British air units - operational experience of German fighter pilots:

1. Fighters - Spitfires:

(a) According to signals intelligence, approximately 50 squadrons of 11th and 12th Fighter Groups participated in the operation. The maximum effort at any one time was made by about 15 - 20 squadrons.

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As from 0610 hours there were strong fighter forces over the battle area. At 0730 hours there were about 16 squadrons in the area, and these were constantly relieved by 4 - 10 squadrons.

After a British fighter had reported German submarines off Boulogne (0833 hours), a fighter-bomber formation with fighter escort (strength five squadrons) flew along the coast from Boulogne to Abbeville an hour later.

At 1100 hours there was a strong fighter force of at least 15 squadrons over the Abbeville area.

1200 - 1400 hours: fighter sweeps with regular reliefs over the Dieppe area; strength 3 - 6 squadrons. These squadrons had the task of providing convoy-escort and of keeping a look-out for German bombers.

At this time the enemy apparently had only limited forces at his disposal for immediate employment. Several squadrons were ordered to return quickly to refuel and take on more ammunition.

At 1400 hours this weakness appeared to have been overcome and fighter operations in the Dieppe area were again maintained at a constant strength of 4 - 8 squadrons. There were violent air battles with German fighters.

1600 - 1700 hours: enemy fighter operations decreased in the Dieppe area, but there were 6 squadrons covering the shipping formation on course for Hastings 40 kilometres north of Dieppe. Fighter cover was maintained by 4 - 5 squadrons until 2000 hours, and then by 2 - 3 squadrons.

(b) Spitfires appeared in pairs, flights and squadrons. Altitude ranged from 30 - 13,500 feet, but usually formations of only two to five aircraft operated at low level, and to intervene in the ground fighting. A large formation between the coast and the formations of shipping operated at 4,500 to 6,000 feet.

(c) The capabilities of the Spitfire pilots varied greatly. Some units showed very good teamwork, kept good formation and were very aggressive. Other formations flew like novices and, aided by the weather 95 - 8/10 cumulus at 2,400 feet), it was not difficult to make surprise attacks on them.

The well-trained formations weaved a great deal and kept a good watch to the rear. German attacks were generally recognised while the run-in was still being made. When the enemy observed the attack he turned skilfully and attempted to meet it head-on. Other units attempted to escape under cover of cloud.

Enemy fighter cover over shipping was well-disciplined and stubborn. Enemy pilots attempted to evade attacks by German fighters by banking without leaving the shipping. It was very difficult to disperse the close enemy formations owing to their numerical superiority.

Many of the British units operated in starboard echelon, one formation covering the other.

The Spitfires showed no perseverance in pursuit and seldom penetrated south of Dieppe. The best time to attack was when the enemy fighters were making off for the English coast in close formation without taking evasive action.

(d) A number of Spitfires had 4 cannon and strikingly pointed wings and were painted light grey. Most of the Spitfires had two cannon.

The Spitfires' visibility to the rear did not appear to be particularly good. Enemy aircraft were fired on from the rear from some time before they took any evasive action. When the enemy aircraft were hit by well-aimed bursts from 50 - 300 metres they always caught fire, broke up and went into a dive. German aircraft were often damaged by pieces breaking away from the wings and fuselage of enemy aircraft. In very rare instances the enemy pilot was able to bale out. When this was being attempted the Spitfire spiralled upwards.

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If the German pilots were not on the alert, this sudden movement easily resulted in a collision.

The Spitfires fired from all angles, but without particularly successful results.

2. The Mustang

(a) A few Mustangs were observed among the enemy fighters. This aircraft's tactics were similar to those of the Spitfire. Only one German Squadron engaged Mustangs, several encounters taking place at low level.

(b) The Mustang carried out very tight turns at low speed (300 kilometres per hour) which the Fw 190 could not follow. However, at greater speeds the 190 could follow the Mustang in a turn.

The rate of climb of the Fw 190 is superior to that of the Mustang.

A Mustang flying at low level was pursued from Dieppe almost to Eastbourne by an Fw 190 A 3. Although the German aircraft was only 500 metres away and flew at full throttle it could not overtake the enemy aircraft. Another Mustang exploded after being hit by a short burst of fire in the left wing tank.

3. There were frequent reports of attacks by British bombers on German ground troops in the Dieppe area.

Six Bostons in close formation, apparently about to attack German positions at Dieppe from 4,500 feet, were engaged by German fighters. The enemy aircraft jettisoned their bombs on open ground and flew out to sea at top speed under cover of a smoke screen. They maintained good formation even while taking evasive action.

Enemy aircraft attacking German ground troops were not distracted from their purpose even when German formations were simultaneously attacking enemy landing craft less than 100 metres away.

Luftflotte 3 Headquarters,
Operations Staff/1a Ops.

5th September, 1942.
2015 hours.

British Large-Scale Landing Operation at Dieppe

Fifth Appreciation

Evaluation of Fighter and Fighter-Bomber Operations.

1. In spite of the enemy's numerical superiority, the aggressiveness and better training of the German fighter pilots resulted in very successful operations.

2. Owing to the transfer of the formations back to night dispersal airfields they could not be used in full strength in the early hours of the morning. It was not possible to move all the formations forward at first light or at dawn owing to bad weather.

The orders for night dispersal have been modified and concern only airfields located in the direct vicinity of the coast. A special directive has been issued.

3. An officer equipped with a radio and sent to Dieppe from a Fighter Headquarters (Jafu) as advanced observer was very useful. He could have been even more effective if he had been ordered to act as fighter control officer. Owing to low visibility

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and the use of smoke by enemy ships, low-flying aircraft could not always be observed by German fighters operating at high altitudes. Fighter Headquarters are to provide at least one fighter control unit each (with vehicle and radio for communication between itself, the aircraft and fighter control), and these are to be alerted for immediate employment in any coastal sector under attack.

4. It was almost impossible to set landing craft on fire with aircraft gunfire. Only after 50 - 60 runs had been made and hits scored on the engine in the stern of the vessel was fire observed.

There was no defensive fire from landing craft, but fire from the four-barrelled guns and heavy AA of destroyers and other warships in the vicinity was very heavy.

The actual effect of aircraft gunfire on landing craft was probably greater than was apparent from the air. Notes should be exchanged with ground troops to ascertain to what extent landing craft were damaged from this cause.

5. The Fw 190 proved itself as a close support fighter at low and medium altitudes, and stood the great test of 19th August well.

Minor technical faults which came to light were soon remedied, thanks to great efforts on the part of the technical personnel. Ground supply and maintenance were good. Lack of uniformity in the equipment of squadrons with types C and D engines made it more difficult to keep the formations in the air.

6. Fighter-bomber squadrons, particularly 10/J.G.2, did splendid service although they had been in action against continual "terror" attacks since 2nd August.

The linking of the fighter-bomber squadrons with a definite fighter group (Jafu2) proved very favourable for fighter-bomber attacks. If there had been no smoke it would have been necessary to attack by diving out of the sun, at the same time using other fighters to carry out feint attacks on other ships in the formation.

A surprise attack by fighter-bombers was successfully carried out on ships further out at sea, off Brighton, at a time when the main British fighter effort was being made in the Dieppe area.

Successes:

2 ships of 2 - 3,000 tons sunk and a third badly damaged and halted.

In these operations eight of the ten aircraft were hit, mostly by machine gun fire. The propellor of one aircraft was hit by a 4 cm shell, but in spite of severe damage to the propellor and engine, this aircraft succeeded in returning to base.

The Fw 190 is in every way suitable as a fighter-bomber. However, it needs additional armour without reducing its manoeuvrability and speed.

1 - 2 fighter-bomber squadrons are not sufficient to deal with strong naval forces.

At least two full-strength fighter-bomber squadrons are urgently required for each fighter command area. Employment of the other fighters as fighter-bombers is not possible owing to their numerical weakness and the many other tasks they have to carry out.

The fighter-bomber has proved so effective that its radius of action should be increased to 400 kilometres as soon as possible.

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Luftflotte 3 Headquarters,
Operations Staff/Ia Ops.

6th September, 1942.
2015 hours.

British Large-Scale Landing Operation at Dieppe

Seventh Appreciation

1. Telephone Communications:

All telephone lines at the Dieppe aircraft reporting centre were destroyed very early in the operation by a direct hit.

Lines essential for the control of operations were disrupted by air attacks on Abbeville-Drucat airfield.

Aircraft reporting centres at airfields and special installations, particularly those located in the vicinity of the coast, must be dug in as soon as possible. Luftgau Headquarters will arrange for this work to be put into effect with all possible speed.

In view of their signals installations, fighter headquarters and sector battle headquarters will also be dug in as soon as possible. Until this has been done, all existing battle headquarters will be protected against aircraft gunfire and bomb splinters as much as possible by improvised methods.

With the exception of the above instances, there were no serious dislocations in the telephone network.

2. Radio:

In general, fighter radio communication was carried out without a hitch.

Luftflotte 3 Headquarters,
Operations Staff/Ia Ops.

8th September, 1942.

British Large-Scale Landing Operation at Dieppe

Eighth Appreciation

Bomber operations, co-operation with the Army and
co-operation between Bombers and Fighters

I.

After incessant day and night operations over England the bomber crews were very enthusiastic about the change in task and carried out non-stop sorties with great daring. Attacks on the enemy transport vessels which had returned to Portsmouth were continued into the night. At one time they were able to see the enemy and the effect of their bombs and, disregarding the large number of enemy fighters and intense AA fire from the ships, dived boldly and fearlessly on to their targets.

II.

1. Co-operation with the Army was only of an indirect nature. Bombers and fighter-bomber operations were concerned exclusively with shipping and landing craft at sea or with these targets and troop concentrations on the beach, where they were clearly recognisable, as long as the enemy was engaged in landing or was clearly in possession of the beach.

Fighter tasks included operations against enemy fighters and bombers and the provision of cover for German bomber formations. Cover and support for the Panzer division which was moving up was not put into effect as the operation had already reached its conclusion before the division appeared.

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2. The ground troops should have used visual signals (smoke indicators and ground panels.) In fact they made no use of these signals whatsoever. Not a single Swastika flag was to be seen on vehicles in the entire Dieppe area.

The use of ground signals in the first few hours following the enemy landing would have been very useful as at this time most of the communications network had been put out of action and a detailed picture of the ground situation could be formed only with difficulty. Apart from a few positions on high ground, German troops could not be recognised from the air, and in spite of repeated attempts aircraft were rarely able to provide ground troops with direct support.

Investigation of a report stating that German troops had been attacked by their own bombers revealed that a British flag laid out on the beach had not been removed although German troops had already retaken the area in a counter-attack.

German bombs which fell on or in the vicinity of a flak position were jettisoned by the aircraft concerned during an air battle.

3.

(a) Ground troops must make extensive use of visual signals. They need have no fear that in so doing they will reveal themselves to the enemy. If ground troops do not easily make themselves recognisable, heavy losses in bombing attacks by our own aircraft are inevitable.

(b) German aircrews must realise that there are lengthy delays involved in submitting reports on the ground situation through channels, and that local situations can change very quickly. The front line given before the commencement of operations can therefore serve only as a rough guide. Crews can recognise the actual front line only by means of visual signals. Attacks in direct support of the front line may therefore be carried out only after German troops have been clearly identified by visual reconnaissance and a bomb line has been specified.

III.

4. Co-operation between Fighters and Bombers.

(a) Bomber formations of Fliegerkorps IX had carried out an operation during the night of 18/19th August. Owing to the pressing situation on the morning of 19th August, elements of the bomber formations had to be sent in piecemeal as soon as they were serviceable so that the enemy could be hit when he was weakest. Waiting for larger formations to become serviceable would have delayed the first operation too much. This necessarily affected subsequent operations, these being carried out at intervals of not more than 45 minutes by formations of up to 11 aircraft,

The bomber formations had first of all to come up from their base, which was situated several hundred kilometres away from supporting German fighters, and elements transferred to airfields in France immediately after the initial operation.

(b) The very heavy enemy air activity by fighter and bomber formations which commenced at dawn over the Dieppe area necessitated the immediate employment of strong German fighter forces to protect ground troops. Owing to the enemy's great numerical superiority in fighters the necessity for maintaining German fighters at maximum strength over the battle area continued throughout the day as the German fighters would otherwise have been confronted with an impossible task and the enemy would have retained air superiority at all times.

(c) For the reasons given in paragraphs (a) and (b) it was not possible to provide the continually arriving bomber formations with direct escort in view of the inadequate number of German fighters available. Moreover, to ensure that bombers and fighters linked up, the bomber formations would have been obliged to pick up the escorting fighters over their bases and, in view of the distances involved and the varying directions of approach, this could not have been accomplished without great difficulty and loss of time. If this procedure had been followed most of the

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German fighters would have been left waiting on their airfields instead of carrying out operations over Dieppe.

If the fighters had been separated into one force for direct escort and another for fighter cover over the battle area, the number of aircraft available for either task would have been inadequate. Fighter cover had to be provided indirectly by clearing the enemy from the area which the bombers were to attack at Dieppe. Co-operation between bomber and fighter formations and the possibility of building up a concentration by the non-stop employment of aircraft by fighter control should have been ensured by providing fighter control with constant and prompt information on the times of attack and altitudes of the bomber formations. Headquarters IX Fl. Korps had been instructed to co-operate directly with fighter control (Jafu 2).

5.

(a) The bomber units' views about fighter cover varied. In the morning most reports were favourable, but as the bombers' field of operations extended at midday and during the afternoon reports were naturally increasingly unfavourable. However, by this time German fighter strength had already fallen noticeably. During the afternoon therefore, Luftflotte Headquarters stopped bomber attacks on enemy ships moving away far out in the Channel and, exploiting a bad weather front and the approach of nightfall, sent bomber formations to attack Portsmouth.

In some instances German fighters operated at high altitudes and were involved in air battles, while German bomber formations were attacked by enemy fighters at lower altitudes. In other cases German fighters escorted the bombers to the vicinity of the target and then flew off. The exact reasons for this could not be established; in some cases it may have been due to attacks by enemy fighters, in others, to lack of fuel.

In one escort operation which J.G. 2 had been ordered to carry out at 1145 hours the 8 Do 217's arrived 8 minutes too early. The fighters were able to carry out their task only because they had also arrived over Dieppe very early. They took up a covering position 900 - 1,200 feet above the bombers and escorted them a short distance inland after the attack. The escort operation was thus fulfilled satisfactorily.

Occasional remarks by some of the bomber crews gave the impression that, in their uncontrolled enthusiasm, a number of crews sought targets out at sea beyond German fighter cover. These men, who simply wanted to "have a go" and flew into swarms of enemy fighters in full knowledge of what they were doing, showed an exemplary spirit. It was not, however, a wise thing to do and some of the losses which occurred must be attributed to this cause.

Fighter escort operations were not made easier by the varying tasks of the German bomber formations, combined high and low level attacks, the weather and the inconspicuousness of the markings on German bombers.

(b) To appreciate the situation correctly, it should be realised that 206 German fighters were employed, each of them carrying out three of four sorties (some aircraft flew as many as six sorties). On the other hand the enemy employed 1,000 fighters (according to wireless intercepts at least 50 squadrons were engaged, the aircraft flying from one to four sorties. Moreover, the number of 1,000 was confirmed by prisoners' statements).

At this point it should be mentioned that the enemy is referring to Dieppe as the greatest air battle yet fought in the war. Bomber losses must be attributed to the enemy's great numerical superiority in fighters, the intense AA fire put up by the ships and the impulsiveness of the bomber crews. However, the percentage of losses sustained by bomber formations over Dieppe was lower than in some of the night operations carried out recently.

In the opinion of Luftflotte Headquarters the German bombers and fighters carried out their tasks as well as could be expected in view of the situation.

7. However, all possible improvements must be considered:

(a) The best solution for the protection of bomber formations is the subordination of fighters for escort operations to the headquarters controlling the bomber formations.

However, in view of the existing strength, this will be possible only in the case of formations which are particularly vulnerable to fighters (e.g. - Stukas).

(b) The most effective way of providing fighter cover is by the bomber formation picking up the fighters at their base. However, this seems to be possible only when the bomber formations operate at intervals of some length. If, as at Dieppe, the situation compels German bomber forces to be used against the enemy in waves operating at short intervals while at the same time a constantly strong fighter effort must be maintained over the battle area, a very large number of fighters would be required and these could be counted on only in rare instances.

(c) If it has sufficient fighters at its disposal, the Luftflotte Headquarters will therefore make an effort to subordinate aircraft for direct escort to the headquarters controlling the bomber formations.

Whenever aircraft strength and the air situation allow, fighter formations detailed for direct escort will be picked up over their bases by the bomber formations.

(d) If it is not possible to subordinate fighters to the bomber headquarters or to pick up fighters over their bases and, as at Dieppe, the fighters have to provide cover primarily by clearing the enemy from limited areas and by establishing air superiority over these areas, the following measures must be taken to improve the fighter effort and to provide direct cover while bomber formations are operating:

(aa) Bomber headquarters will present its demands for fighters and give details of the number and type of bomber to be used, the target, time of attack and altitude, and outward and return courses as early as possible and not at such extremely short notice as was sometimes the case in the Dieppe operation.

(bb) Fighter and bomber formations will arrange with fighter headquarters the time and altitude for a rendezvous as near as possible to the actual target. From this point the fighter formations will be able to give the bombers direct cover during the attack and until they are out of the danger area.

(cc) Fighter pilots must be made to realise that as long as bomber formations are in an area where enemy fighter attack is possible, their primary task is to protect the bombers.

(dd) Fighter control units (see Fifth Appreciation, Section 2) must be used for the direction of fighters to ensure that bomber and fighter formations link up and that the escort is carried out.

8. Some fighter and bomber formations found the lack of a close personal contact between the fighter and bomber crews to be a defect. This is caused by great distances, lack of fuel for vehicles and aircraft and bad railway communications.

The fact that the lack of close personal contact was noticed by the men proves to Command that the wish for mutual understanding exists.

Every effort must be made to support this wish. Bomber and fighter headquarters will make it their duty to ensure that personal contact between units and fighter and bomber crews is established. Difficulties preventing this must be overcome. The C-in-C considers this personal contact so essential that, as far as the situation allows, he will approve applications for M/T and special aircraft flights if railway transport is not available.

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IV.

9. Miscellaneous:

The code-words provided for special circumstances (e.g. "imminent danger" and "Langemarck A and B" in the Dieppe coastal sector) were not considered necessary by Luftflotte Headquarters in view of the situation and were not issued. Measures to meet the situation were provided for and issued in separate orders. This procedure proved effective.

Unnecessary movements and delays in taking action were avoided. There were no maintenance or loading difficulties.

10. The code-word "Dunkirk" was not issued by Luftflotte Headquarters until about 1030 hours, when the situation had been clarified to some extent. The assembly of the operational squadrons of Ju 88 and He 111 bombers was thereupon carried out without a hitch within the times provided, and the squadrons were operating against the enemy by the afternoon.

11. The defensive armament of German bombers is not powerful enough. The lateral armament of the Do 217 with M.G.15 is inadequate, and must be replaced by M.G.81. The replacement of the 2 cm guns with the M.G.131 in the nose of the aircraft has proved completely effective.

12. Do 217 bomber formations urgently require one-man rubber dinghies. Luftflotte H.Q./Q.M. will arrange for these to be supplied.

13. There is always a possibility that enemy landing attempts will be made early in the morning following a night attack by bombers. To reduce further the time taken to make aircraft serviceable, bombers will be serviced and refuelled immediately after returning from operations over England, including night raids. Ground personnel must bear the additional strain imposed on them by this measure.

14. The many detailed and excellent reports supplied in rapid succession by the wireless intercept service were of great value to the Command and formations. They were of a constantly high standard and provided a valuable picture of the situation on land, in the air and at sea.

A.H.B.6 Distribution
Same as for translation VII/104