

Viewpoints

After the Surge: Implications of Strategic Shift in Afghanistan and Beyond

By Flight Lieutenant Alexander McKenzie

*'Mobilise it is urged a nice field force, and operate at leisure in the frontier valleys, until they are as safe and civilised as Hyde Park... Only one real objection has been advanced against this plan. But it is a crushing one, and it constitutes the most serious argument against the whole "forward policy". It is this: we have neither the troops or the money to carry it out.'*¹

The typically sage words of Sir Winston Churchill reflect the persistent policy conundrum posed by the 'frontier valleys' that span the Durrand Line, dividing the tribally heterogeneous Pashtun populations of contemporary Afghanistan and Pakistan. The latest iteration of the policy dilemma in the region, the much lauded US led, NATO surge in southern Afghanistan will largely be complete by this time next year. Naturally, it is too early to begin to assess the extent to which it has succeeded in terms of clearing populated areas of Taliban influence and replacing it with a degree of governmental control directed, however nominally and temporarily, from Kabul. Predictably and indeed commendably, there are the optimists among us who sense a tipping point in the campaign.²

At the same time there are more cautious judgments to be found amongst seasoned and justifiably

sceptical commentators.³

Highlighting the folly of Hitler, in opening a disastrous second front in 1941 with myopic faith in the ubiquitous virtue of Blitzkrieg, Professor Huw Strachan recently warned of the dangers associated with the assumption that success in one theatre can easily be transposed to another.⁴ Afghanistan is not Iraq.⁵ Of course, the Afghanistan campaign plan is more nuanced than a simple replication of 'what worked' under General Petraeus' tutelage in Iraq. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to mistakenly invest in linear and paradigmatic visions of future defence requirements based on the contextually unique tactical effects of one campaign. Especially so given the apparently paradoxical logic that equates short term tactical gain with longer term strategic uncertainty. Despite the 'Petraeus effect', 'a stable and secure Iraq remains a difficult and perhaps distant goal'.⁶ Indeed, there is a wider, strategic, relevance to this, largely operational, debate that is germane to the British military community and is the focus of this article. That question is as follows: whilst the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan is rightly the MODs 'main effort'⁷, the looming change in focus of the US, and therefore NATO, mission doesn't necessarily support the current force

posture in Afghanistan as a sound foundation for our future financially constrained armed forces.⁸

We Are Where We Are

The assessment of this paper reflects the apparently prescient thoughts of our own Service chief.⁹ It is based, *inter alia*, on political noises in Washington concerning the strategic direction of the US military¹⁰ and more fundamental questions about the efficacy of Western COIN approaches against contemporary insurgency and takfiri extremism.¹¹ Indeed Alex Marshall has recently questioned the utility of Western COIN operations from a historical perspective, arguing with some conviction that modern COIN doctrine is predicated on a 'liberal lie' that fosters a 'comfortable but dangerous intellectual illusion' amongst policy makers with little practical experience of such endeavours.¹² Highlighting the Russian rediscovery of 'less constrained' COIN principles from the 19th century, Marshall reminds us that effective local administrators supported by an inflow of federal cash and local combat fatigue associated with significant levels of repression has been successful in the respect that it achieves all COIN doctrine can ever achieve.¹³ In contrast, in the case of Afghanistan, Western liberal restraint divorces the grammar of COIN doctrine from its inescapable political logic. Indeed it creates the 'postmodern challenges for modern warriors' that General Kiszely so convincingly articulates.¹⁴

Such challenges to Western policy appear to be compounded by the looming age of austerity and the understandable domestic political

considerations that necessarily condition governments. Given such fiscal and political constraint this analysis suggests that any future Afghan commitment will have to eschew extant COIN mantras and entrust legacy operations to mentored indigenous forces whilst a combination of airborne capable Special Forces and combat ISTAR will focus on gathering intelligence on and interdicting any Taliban and Al Qaeda nexuses that are deemed a threat to the Afghan government, specifically, and wider region, implicitly. Of course this should be no surprise given how the threat of 'takfiri terror' and broader, possibly related radical Insurgency is currently dealt with in Pakistan, the Horn of Africa and now Iraq not to forget the IDF and Mossad's protracted efforts in the Levant.¹⁵ Indeed whilst 'victory' is a misleading and unhelpful term when evaluating the success of such a strategy it nonetheless could reasonably be described as adequate in providing a more advantageous outcome than would otherwise be the case: in other words by doing nothing or by sustaining unaffordable regional policemen and large COIN footprints.¹⁶

Importantly, the debate has never been more topical as we approach the publication of the new Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The SDSR is scheduled to be published at the zenith of the campaign effort in Afghanistan, specifically in the south of the country. Consequently the defence community, in the widest sense, must guard against the association of the contemporary image of the Afghan campaign with the likely requirements of future contingencies

both in Afghanistan and other areas of the world, wherever our parochial or communal interests are threatened. Technology, when sensibly employed, remains our comparative advantage. Whilst it is no panacea it may turn out to be a more effective and necessary long term investment than enduring and equally expensive COIN forces: more so if we can't afford to resource a full range of capabilities. Indeed despite the significant expense involved in sustaining sizeable COIN forces, an understandable lament by commanders in the field is that they could always do with 'more'. Mass is critical to such endeavours and, as CDS informs us, comes at a premium.¹⁷ This paper will invest in the notion that a flexible and adaptable military instrument, judiciously employed, will offer greater strategic utility to policy makers than a bespoke COIN construct, particularly if the efficacy of the latter option is questionable.

The aim of this paper is not to provide a polemic, even less to provoke either inter or intra service debate (indeed given the breadth of the air components employment, the intra service debate stands to be just as fierce) instead it is to propose cold headed consideration of how the Afghanistan campaign may look in the future and what the implications are for the British military. From the outset it should be noted that there will inevitably remain a requirement for capabilities that in Secretary Gates words, 'can kick in the door, clean up the mess and rebuild the door.'¹⁸ Moreover, the complexity of the future global (in) security environment is likely to require simultaneous employment of light and heavy forces, mass with

technology, as an integral part of joint forces in a combined environment. As Michael Evans notes, war is likely to retain 'chameleon' like qualities, manifesting itself in 'inter-state, trans-state and non-state modes – or as a combination of these'.¹⁹ Nonetheless, it is worth considering two competing alternatives to the broad question posed by the title of this paper. Helpfully, these alternatives have been illuminatingly described by Michael Codner as the Land focused, manpower intensive 'Global Guardian' model, consistent with contemporary COIN doctrine; and the technology enabled, globally mobile 'Strategic Raider' model, consistent with more discretionary offshore balancing.²⁰

Global Guardians

Proponents of 'new war' theory, and the term is as widely inconsistent as it is deeply contentious, see little role for technological solutions to political problems.²¹ This is axiomatic, however the corresponding argument that manpower intensive, COIN focused 'global guardians' are an efficacious alternative is not as sound a premise as some have suggested.²² Whilst the political nature of the Afghan insurgency is enduring, its post Maoist character may well be an unsuitable structure for neo-classical COIN forces to counter.²³ The post-modern difficulties encountered by 'modern warriors' in such profoundly pre-modern environments are well documented. Indeed recent commentary has identified the irreconcilable 'trilemma' of Western COIN approaches as a theoretical flaw at the heart of contemporary doctrine.²⁴ There is, it is argued, an intractable inability to reconcile

force protection with discrimination between non combatants who need to be protected and combatant insurgents who need to be eliminated. This is compounded by the effects of necessarily short tour lengths, the inherent difficulty of large and unwieldy coalitions to operate with any sense of conceptual and physical manoeuvre, and a fundamental domestic aversion to a continual flow of blood and treasure in the direction of what is regarded in some circles as a 'residual problem'.²⁵ Naturally, the lack of tangible progress in Afghanistan and the prospect of an unravelling security situation in Iraq serve to augment such perceptions. Indeed they serve to make the prospect of future intervention along similar lines in say Somalia or Yemen, not to mention Pakistan, as unpalatable as they are unlikely.

Moreover, as the doyens of COIN theory and practice contend military force can only succeed in creating the space and providing the time for a political solution to emerge.²⁶ Afghanistan, like Iraq before it, lacks security because it lacks consensus. The critical problem in Afghanistan is fundamentally political but an inclusive solution remains elusive. The ineluctable reality remains that President Karzai is perceived to be little more than an emasculated 'unicorn' of Kabul.²⁷ In Iraq, the central reality of power was that Baghdad mattered, not least for control of oil revenues, the life blood of the economy. Without it there was no incentive for Sunni involvement in an inclusive, if fragile, accommodation. In contrast, Kabul represents a bureaucratic obstacle at best and rubber stamp

at worst to generally illicit economic activity predominantly associated with opium production and trafficking. Against such a reality, any investment in political 'solutions' in the Afghan capital run the risk of being peripheral to real centres of regional power in the country. Furthermore, hopes for reconciliation and reintegration appear to be a non starter, in strategic terms at least. Sensing that the political clock ticks ever faster in Washington the Taliban have no interest in negotiating from a position of relative weakness.²⁸

In any case, returning to the example of Iraq, it is clear that COIN centric ground forces are, like their antithesis in the guise of the Revolution in Military Affairs, no 'magic bullet'.²⁹ The old Iraq hand Tom Ricks identifies the de facto ethnic partition of Baghdad, a cease fire with radical Shia militias, increased US military unity of effort and the critical 'Sunni awakening' as being at least as significant as the 'surge' in troop numbers.³⁰ This is not to underplay the utility of force demonstrated by the 18 month surge in 2007/2008, quite the opposite. However it is to remind ourselves that force can only have utility if it is conformal with the context in which it is employed. Indeed in the absence of an achievable and identifiable political solution in Afghanistan, or a truly broad based and sizeable International coalition, a strategy of containment might make strategic sense as well as offering a default solution.³¹ Even more critically the external financial and internal political constraints that afflict the West may render the mere concept of 'global guardianship' as deeply hubristic. This is a moot point, of course, if such hegemony is

simply unaffordable.

Strategic Raiders

Whilst this phrase may purloin strategy's core meaning it conveys an ability to be fast on ones feet, able to respond to rapidly unfolding scenarios on a global scale. The comfortable criticism of it will point to Clintonian attempts to 'rearrange rubble' or run away from a fight as was arguably the case with responses to security dilemmas in Afghanistan and Somalia during the 1990s. Similarly, isolationist responses that glibly talk of 'fortress Britain' are vulnerable to the inescapable reality of a globalised, connected and deeply multicultural Britain. Indeed these criticisms are valid and deserve to be incorporated into what must amount to a more harmonious form of 'selective engagement' or 'offshore balancing' to coin the popular phrase. Heeding such criticisms, and respecting the enduring quest for answers, even if only partial answers, to political problems such a strategy must amount to much more than provision of long range, precision guided kinetic effects. Media images of the 'Jolly Rodger' flying on returning submarines with empty TLAM tubes simply won't suffice. Diplomatic savvy, supported by discrete and realistic deployed military advisors, flexible bilateral partnerships and global reach will be the key enablers. Military capability, people and equipment, that is truly expeditionary and focused on being able to contribute to aiding understanding, rather than more traditional functions of force, will be critical. In this respect the ubiquity of the air and space environment will place significant demands upon the

RAF of the 21st Century.

An immediate advantage of such a posture lies in the smaller deployed footprint. This not only reduces the burden on hard pressed ground units but allows for a longer term commitment. Whilst the future of 10,000 troops in Afghanistan is already subject to vociferous cries of 'bring them home', a more selective approach will potentially allow for an enduring and dispersed commitment measured in decades rather than years. Indeed progress will similarly have to be framed in generations rather than electoral cycles. Above all such a strategy embraces the fact that realistic, persistent and meaningful change will only emerge from within a society. And it won't emerge overnight. However well intentioned they are cosmopolitan, pluralistic, perhaps even post modern normative values and models of governance are often resisted by fiercely conservative societies precisely because they appear to be neo-Imperial. This can have the kind of counter productive response that leads to perpetual and self defeating cycles of violence in which force becomes synonymous with both means and ends. With notes from several fields of conflict, Kilcullen emphatically associates these second and third order effects with the 'accidental guerrilla' syndrome.³² More radically, according to John MacKinlay there is even the danger that a corollary effect involves the cultivation and radicalisation of a global 'insurgent archipelago', able to strike at will wherever it chooses.³³

Whilst the threat posed by such a theoretical global web of terror is difficult to quantify, it demonstrates

two critical requirements that reflect our increasingly problematic global (in)security environment. First the flip side of the economically attractive aspects of globalisation, the tangible and virtual, transparent and opaque connections between Britain and the wider world presents policy makers with a geographical challenge. Second, the varied disposition of such adversaries and their reluctance to confront Western militaries on our own terms poses significant limitations on our ability to accurately assess and identify the fundamental intelligence requirements of 'who, what, where, when and why'. This water is muddied further when we consider the requirement in contemporary COIN to provide accurate answers to these questions on potential adversaries as well as local populations and indigenous security forces. Indeed attempting to understand the complexity associated with such an operational environment in an increasingly uncertain world reflects the broader challenge posed to all elements of the 21st century UK military. Nonetheless, whilst the demands placed by Government and consequent responsibility to deliver will be high, such a requirement to 'understand' presents a significant opportunity to the RAF specifically and the wider UK air and space component in general. Unsurprisingly this is reflected in doctrine and in word at the highest level within the service. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) reflects this with his emphasis on:

'Using air power to dominate the timely acquisition of the information, the knowledge of every aspect of the operational environment that is increasingly becoming the 'vital ground'

*in twenty-first century conflict.'*³⁴

Moreover, the 4th edition of AP 3000 elucidates that:

'The challenge is to develop situational understanding from the situational awareness created by the technological exploitation of the intelligence provided by air and space capabilities.'

Naturally there remain significant challenges. Not least with respect to the 'requirement to integrate and synchronise' the vast amounts of multi spectral information collected in order to produce meaningful intelligence product.³⁶ Indeed the key will be the integration of air breathing SIGINT and IMINT with judiciously gathered HUMINT from military and security agencies. Technology can help us, but human interaction and the value of our people will remain the critical ingredient. Nonetheless, the challenge is indicative of the centrality of the air and space component in future joint endeavours and undoubtedly offers opportunity.

If it is to succeed, such a strategy must answer the criticisms fairly levelled at earlier manifestations of it. Lawrence Freedman reminds us of the pitfalls associated with long range, time delayed, limited payloads launched on the basis of uncorroborated intelligence that lacks veracity and exhibits the limits of western 'understanding'.³⁷ Indeed we could do worse than invest in the political and military agents so evocatively described by Winston Churchill in his account of the Malakand Field Force, quoted at the top of this paper. Such expertise will enable air power which in turn will offer exploitable capability to the deployed experts with their

unparalleled understanding of the 'ground truth'. As Paddy Ashdown suggests, the services work best when they work together.³⁸

A Third Way?

In reality, and embracing the logic of Lord Ashdown, both approaches are not mutually exclusive. In our non linear strategic experience there will be occasions where containment will not only follow COIN, but will perhaps even run parallel to it Nonetheless given the practical constraints outlined above and the looming fiscal constraints over the horizon it appears to be self evident that the West will have to prioritise qualitative over quantitative capabilities. This applies to well educated, broadened and 'invested in' Army officers and flexible multi-role maritime platforms as much as it does to cutting edge SIGINT technology in the latest UCAVs. As Trevor Taylor reminds us the wider and indeed perennial question remains geo-strategic.³⁹ In order to retain a degree of access to the full spectrum of expeditionary requirements do we swap the 'special relationship' with a more binding commitment as a client '51st state' in spite of drifting trans Atlantic geo-strategic priorities? Alternatively, does the UK risk ignominy in becoming another piece of the, increasingly peripheral, European jigsaw? Or do we indeed wave goodbye to memories of empire and global status becoming in the process 'little Britain'? Arguably elements of all 3 options have been evident in the past 20 years, but how long this can remain the case for is an open question.

Where does this leave the RAF? Air remains a central component of both

strategic options and AP 3000 is as adaptable and flexible as it should be in this respect. As 'global guardians' the air component is required to enable the necessarily land heavy joint force, via the four air and space power roles, as is in evidence in contemporary Afghanistan.⁴⁰ As 'strategic raiders' it offers the same functional utility but with different emphasis and priorities at the heart of a more discretionary, patient and selective strategy. It is true, as some will counter, that capability offering 'asymmetric advantage' one day can 'contain the seeds of our own destruction the next.'⁴¹ Of course utility can only be derived from military force if the capability deployed is harmonious with the context in which it is employed. This paper suggests that a future predicated on contemporary COIN doctrine is contextually inappropriate and in itself nurtures and feeds the very seeds of our own destruction. The redoubtable Edward Lucas has taken this argument to the core of his theorising on future US grand strategy. Better, he contends, for Pax America to resemble a cerebrally active and discerningly committed Byzantium than a bone-crushing and over-extended Rome.⁴² Indeed as the consequences of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan become increasingly evident, it is clear that the International order of the future may be based less on 'unipolar fantasies' or 'multipolar rhetoric' than on 'prudent interest' and an understanding that Western ideas and ideals are not necessarily universally aspired to.⁴³

Returning to the question of Afghanistan, Luttwack would find a Byzantine legacy in Churchill's

remark that 'silver made a better weapon than steel' in the frontier provinces.⁴⁴ The current strategic outlay in the country could fairly be described as a costly combination of both silver and steel. Such a profligate policy option appears to be both unaffordable and of questionable utility.⁴⁵ Our national silver deserves to be used to more advantageous effect. In deciding on what to invest it in the words of Clausewitz are typically adroit when he reminds us that 'the maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of intellect'.⁴⁶ Investing in Combat ISTAR at the heart not just of future RAF capability, but also as an integral part of the UK's future military contribution in Afghanistan offers to combine force and intellect in line with the national interest. In the realm of security we cannot be selective about *where we* engage, but we have to be judicious in selecting *how we* engage. Such selective engagement may not turn Helmand into Hyde Park, but it represents reality and reflects the contextual limitations on what is achievable. Particularly if we consider the wider context in which Afghanistan sits. The combined population of the Af-Pak region is dwarfed by the 'bottom billion' from which security challenges emerge across the global commons.⁴⁷ The requirement has therefore never been greater to access, understand and generate positive influence over global and diverse security challenges. Combat ISTAR, within a mobile joint force, will be central to this and will offer a policy option for challenges, like Afghanistan, that are too costly to fully resource but too

important to abandon.

Notes

¹ Winston Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force*, Ark Manor, Rockeville, 2008, p.195.

² General Sir Richard Dannatt, 'Afghanistan, can the war be won?', *The Telegraph*, 13 Jun 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/7823555/Afghanistan-can-the-war-be-won.html>; Farrell, T, 'Appraising Moshtarak: The Campaign in Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand', RUSI Briefing Note, 24 June 2010.

³ Most recently see, Warren Chin, 'Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State: British Military Operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan', *Defence Studies*, 10: 1, 2010, pp.215-247

⁴ Huw Strachan, Closing Address to 'Afghanistan's Next Crossroads: Ten Years of International Intervention 2001-2011' Conference, Glasgow University, 16 Mar 2010. Available at: <http://130.209.8.65/tcs/?id=03606F37-F4BC-402A-8F3B-CE4B0090056D>

⁵ For a succinct account see, Charles Krauthammer, 'Afghanistan: The 7/11 Problem', *The Washington Post*, 25 June 2010. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/24/AR2010062404870.html>

⁶ David Hastings Dunn and Andrew Futter, 'Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq', *Defence Studies*, 10: 1, 2010, pp.195-214.

⁷ For example see: MoD Green Paper, 'Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review', TSO, Feb 2010, p.5.

⁸ This question is at the heart of the

contemporary debate on defence. See 'Defence Review Doesn't Add up', BBC Radio 4, Today Programme, 21 June 2010, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8751000/8751063.stm

⁹ Air Chief Marshall Sir Stephen Dalton, 'The Future of British Air and Space Power: a Personal Perspective', *Air Power Review*, 12:3, 2009.

¹⁰ Robert Gates, 'Helping Others Defend Themselves', *Foreign Affairs*, 89:3, May/June 2010, pp.2-6. The widely respected US SECDEF is regularly quoted about his desire for a 'balanced' US military. His most recent article reminds us of the limits of US power and of what COIN can realistically achieve; sensibly proposing 'strong doses of modesty and realism' across the spectrum of defence and foreign policy.

¹¹ David Kilcullen himself contends that COIN is a game the West should 'avoid if possible'. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, Hurst & Co, London, 2009, p.268.

¹² Alex Marshall, 'Imperial Nostalgia, the liberal lie and the perils of postmodern counterinsurgency', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 21:2, June 2010, p.244.

¹³ Ibid, p.250.

¹⁴ Sir John Kiszely, 'Post Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors', *The Shrivenham Papers*, number 5, 2007.

¹⁵ On the disputatious but forcefully argued linkages between disparate global insurgencies see John MacKinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago*, Hurst, London, 2009.

¹⁶ On the question of strategy, relative power and 'victory' see Lawrence Freedman, 'Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power', in Mahnken ed, *Strategic Studies a Reader*, Routledge, New York, 2008.

¹⁷ General Sir David Richards, 'Future Conflict and Its Prevention: People and the Information Age', address to IISS, 18 Jan 2010.

¹⁸ Robert Gates, 'A Balanced Strategy', *Foreign Affairs*, 88:1, 2009, p.31.

¹⁹ Michael Evans, 'From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War', in Mahnken & Maiolo ed, *Strategic Studies a Reader*, Routledge, London, 2008, p.385.

²⁰ Michael Codner, 'A Force for Honour?' RUSI Future Defence Review Working Paper No.2, 2009.

²¹ On 'New Wars' see Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 2nd ed, Polity, Stanford, 2007. For a broad critique see essays contained in Isabelle Duyvesteyn, & Jan Angstrom ed, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, Frank Cass, London, 2005.

²² A major and commendable proponent is John Nagl, See Nagl, J, 'Lets Win the Wars We're In', *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 52:1, 2009, pp.20-26.

²³ Frank Hoffman, 'Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?', *Parameters*, 37:2, 2007.

²⁴ Lorenzo Zambernardi, 'Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma', *The Washington Quarterly*, 33:3, 2010, pp.21-34.

²⁵ Of course a 6 month tour in Helmand is perceived as anything but 'short' by the average infantryman. Even if doubled, tour lengths would do little to counter ineluctable cultural differences and may serve to significantly undermine the overall effectiveness of soldiers. On coalition warfare and its limitations see Wg Cdr Alistair Monkman, *The Manoeuvrist Approach and Coalition Warfare: a Re-examination*, *Air Power Review*, 5:2 (Summer 2002) pp 12-41. On Afghanistan as a 'residual problem' see, Steven Simon

& Jonathan Stevenson, 'Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?', *Survival*, 51:5, 47 – 67.

²⁶ 'Assessing the Surge: a RUSI Interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker', in Terrence McNamee, ed, *War Without Consequences*, RUSI, London, 2008, pp.39-44.

²⁷ George Will, 'Unicorns in Kabul', *The Washington Post*, 29 Nov 2009. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/03/AR2009110302925.html>

²⁸ On the likelihood of reconciliation with the Taliban, see Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, 'Flipping the Taliban', *Foreign Affairs*, 88: 4, 2009, pp.34-45 and the online response by Barbara Elias, 'Know Thine Enemy: Why the Taliban Cannot be Flipped', 2 Nov 09, available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65639/barbara-elias/know-thine-enemy>

²⁹ Tim Benbow, *The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs*, Brassey's, London, 2004.

³⁰ Tom Ricks, *The Gamble*, Allen Lane, London, 2009, pp.200-202.

³¹ Steven Metz, 'New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency', *Parameters*, 37:4, 2007-2008, pp.20-32.

³² Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerrilla*, p.xiv. 'The local fighter is therefore often an accidental guerrilla – fighting us because we are in his space, not because he wishes to invade ours'.

³³ John MacKinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago*, Hurst & Co, London, pp.221-236.

³⁴ Air Chief Marshall Sir Stephen Dalton, 'Dominant Air Power in the Information Age: The Comparative Advantage of Air and Space Power in Future Conflict', IISS Address, 15 Feb 2010.

³⁵ AP 3000 4th ed, p.46.

³⁶ *Ibid.* p.47

³⁷ Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, pp.368-9.

³⁸ Comments made by Air Chief Marshall Sir Stephen Dalton, 'Dominant Air Power in the Information Age: The Comparative Advantage of Air and Space Power in Future Conflict', IISS Address, 15 Feb 2010.

³⁹ Trevor Taylor, 'The Essential Choice: Options for Future British Defence', *RUSI Journal*, 155:2, 2010 pp.14-19.

⁴⁰ See comments made by Air Commodore Stuart Atha, 'Operations in Afghanistan: the contribution of UK Air Power', address to IISS, 21 May 2010. Available at: <http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afghanistan-security/events/operations-in-afghanistan-the-contribution-of-uk-air-power/>

⁴¹ 'US Tightens Airstrike Policy in Afghanistan', *New York Times*, 21 June 2009, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world/asia/22airstrikes.html>

⁴² 'What would Byzantium do?', *Prospect Magazine*, 27 Jan 2010. Available at: <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/01/what-would-byzantium-do/>

⁴³ Adam Roberts, 'Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan', *Survival*, 51:1, 2009, p.51.

⁴⁴ Winston Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force*, Ark Manor, Rockeville, 2008, p.196.

⁴⁵ Most recently see Steven Metz, 'America's Flawed Afghanistan Strategy', *Strategic Studies Institute*, op-ed, August 2010.

⁴⁶ Quoted in David Lonsdale, 'Strategy' in Jordan et al, *Understanding Modern*

Warfare, Cambridge, 2009, p.28.

⁴⁷ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion*,
Oxford, OUP, pp.124-134.

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