

# **Airpower in the Mau Mau Conflict: The Government's chief weapon**

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The efficacy of airpower in counter insurgencies is the subject of fierce debate. This paper will examine the contribution of the RAF to the Mau Mau conflict in Kenya between 1953 and 1956. This is a subject which has been shrouded in mystery and inaccurately reported in some areas. The paper makes the case that the RAF's involvement in this conflict was considerable and in many respects, was viewed as the Government's chief weapon for tackling the insurgents. As such, although it occurred almost sixty years ago, the RAF's involvement reveals a number of lessons for airpower's use in counter insurgencies today.

## Introduction

In October 1952 Sir Evelyn Baring, Kenya's Governor, declared a state of emergency and requested the deployment of a Battalion of British soldiers to help stop the rising attacks on loyalist Kenyans and European settlers. Although more soldiers soon arrived amidst claims the emergency would be over by Christmas,<sup>1</sup> it was clear more security forces were required as the situation rapidly deteriorated into civil war. Ultimately, it took further deployments of British troops and a considerable RAF presence before the Mau Mau insurgency was militarily defeated in October 1956. However, although many accounts exist of the British Army's contribution to this counterinsurgency - the most recent claiming that a culture of barbarism was all-pervasive,<sup>2</sup> little is known of the RAF's involvement. Indeed, of the few accounts available, many contain inaccuracies; one claims 'Lancasters' bombed the Mau Mau<sup>3</sup> and another that four RAF Harvards, fourteen light aircraft of the Kenya Police Reserve Air Wing (KPRAW) and a Squadron of Lincoln bombers were already in Kenya when the emergency began.<sup>4</sup> However, evidence in the National Archives reveals that Lancaster bombers were not used in this conflict, the Harvards did not arrive until March 1953, the KPRAW had only five aircraft in late 1952 and the Lincolns did not deploy to Kenya until one year after the emergency began; flying their first mission on 18<sup>th</sup> November 1953.<sup>5</sup>

At the start of the emergency, the RAF presence in Kenya was one Proctor, two Ansons and a Valetta based at RAF Eastleigh. The Proctor

was underpowered for operations at altitude and the Ansons, old and unreliable.<sup>6</sup> The only other aircraft in Kenya at this time were five Piper-Pacers in the KPRAW which were not under RAF command and although they were later modified to carry four 20lb bombs, had no offensive capability in the early stages of the emergency. As the security situation deteriorated, it became clear airpower could make a contribution and four Harvard aircraft arrived at the end of March 1953, to be increased to eight on 1<sup>st</sup> July. By early 1955, the RAF's presence had swelled to eight Lincoln bombers, eight Harvards, two Austers (used for sky-shouting tasks), one Sycamore helicopter and two Pembrokes. A detachment of two Meteor PR10s from No. 13 Squadron undertook photographic reconnaissance (PR) from August 1954 onwards and up to six Vampires from No. 8 Squadron, Aden were regularly detached from April 1954 to the Colony.<sup>7</sup>

Further inaccuracies exist regarding airpower's impact in Kenya; with Waters claiming the RAF's presence alienated the local population and also had little influence on the Mau Mau.<sup>8</sup> However, between June 1953 and October 1955, the RAF provided a significant contribution to the conflict and, because the Army was preoccupied with providing security in the reserves, it was the only Service capable of both psychologically influencing and inflicting considerable casualties on the Mau Mau in the vast, inaccessible forests around Mount Kenya and the Aberdare Mountains.<sup>9</sup> This proved crucial and, as the Government noted; '... whilst ground forces are being

primarily directed against targets in the Reserves, heavy bombers and Harvards represent the chief weapon in our hands for attacking terrorists in the forest.<sup>10</sup> Their success was fully recognised by General Erskine,<sup>11</sup> who expressed his appreciation when he addressed a parade at RAF Eastleigh in April 1955, stating the alternative would have been the employment of three Regiments of Artillery and another Infantry Brigade, neither of which: '... would have been a good answer and both considerably more expensive.'<sup>12</sup>

This essay reveals the truth about how airpower was employed in the Mau Mau conflict – a subject that has, until now, been shrouded in mystery and inaccurately reported. It finds that the RAF's contribution to a conflict occurring almost sixty years ago proffers a number of lessons for airpower's employment today in counterinsurgency conflicts. Of

course, many argue whether airpower can be used against an insurgency which, unlike an industrialised state, is an element of resistance that Clausewitz noted exists everywhere and nowhere - being nebulous and elusive, never materialising as a concrete body, avoiding major actions and preferring to adopt a policy of scattered resistance where: 'Like smouldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the enemy forces ... [trying not] to pulverise the core, but nibble at the shell and around the edges.'<sup>13</sup>

Figure one shows how airpower was used against the Mau Mau. Of the four fundamental air and space power roles, only 'Attack' (particularly counter-land and influence operations) and 'Intelligence and Situational Awareness' (more commonly known as ISTAR) were used. Elements of the 'Mobility' role were used but 'Control of the Air' was

Leadership	Key production	Infrastructure	Population	Fielded forces
Kenyatta and key political officials: (Op JOCK SCOTT)  C2 elements in Nairobi (Op ANVIL)  Gang leaders in forests	Political & Financial network in Nairobi (Op ANVIL)	Stocks of food deep in forests  Supply routes to and from forests  Mau Mau supporters transporting food supplies	Kikuyu loyalists  European settlers  Kikuyu 'undecided'	Gangs in the forests  Gangs in the reserves (after 1 <sup>st</sup> June 1954; Op MUSHROOM)
<b>Targeted by:</b> Gang leaders only by Kinetic and ISTAR  <b>Aircraft Used:</b> Harvard, Meteor, Lincoln, Vampire, Piper-Pacer	Not targeted by air - no ISTAR used	Both only indirectly targeted by Bombing gangs  Some ISTAR  <b>Aircraft Used:</b> Lincolns Piper-Pacer, Vampire, Harvard	<b>Targeted by:</b> Leaflet drops/Air presence, avoidance of Civilian Casualties  <b>Aircraft Used:</b> Lincoln, Valettea, Harvards	<b>Targeted by:</b> <b>Kinetic:</b> pre-planned bombing, close air support, <b>PSYOPS:</b> Shows of force, leaflet drops, Sky-shouting, <b>ISTAR</b> in forests and the reserves to help Home Guard and Land forces  <b>Aircraft Used:</b> Harvard, Lincoln, Vampire, Auster (PSYOPS), Meteor, Pipers (ISTAR)

Figure One: How airpower was used in the Mau Mau conflict 1953-55.

not, as the insurgents were unable to effectively challenge the RAF's air superiority.<sup>14</sup>

### Leadership

The Mau Mau leadership ring comprised its political figures, the command and control (C2) elements in Nairobi and the gang leaders in the forests. The political leadership was imprisoned before the RAF deployed to Kenya and interestingly, the movement then became more radical as younger and more militant Mau Mau, whose extremist ideas had been previously suppressed by the old leadership, were now free to adopt a more revolutionary course.<sup>15</sup> Likewise, air played no role in targeting those leaders based in Nairobi that provided the movement's C2 and political direction as this was eliminated during Operation ANVIL in April 1954 when over 30,000 suspected Mau Mau operatives were evicted from Nairobi to detention camps. This was undertaken entirely by the Army and although the RAF could have assisted with ISTAR duties, it was not involved.<sup>16</sup>

Gang leaders in the forests were the only element of this ring targeted by air and included key figures like Stanley Mathenge, Samuel Mwangi and Dedan Kimathi. Due to the thick forest canopies, it was difficult to track gangs by air and, in the 1950s, the RAF only had a limited ISTAR capability with which to find, fix, and strike<sup>17</sup> the gang leaders. Therefore, no specific leadership strikes were mounted. Instead, pre-planned bombing missions were conducted on areas where it was believed key leaders were thought to be present.<sup>18</sup>

This policy was successful and undoubtedly accounted for the disappearance of Stanley Mathenge in 1955.

### Key Production and infrastructure

The Mau Mau's key production target was its political network in Nairobi which provided a rich source of recruits, arms, ammunition and money and this was eliminated by the Army during Operation ANVIL as previously mentioned. The Mau Mau's infrastructure targets were the fixed supply dumps of food and ammunition located deep in the forests. Insurgents venturing outside the forests to collect food were targeted; mostly when they grouped together and waited on the forest fringes for dusk to arrive before venturing out.<sup>19</sup>

Warden noted the Mau Mau conflict was an example of where interdiction may well prove difficult to achieve against forces that do not require the same supply lines as nations, stating: 'Obviously, a force that needs little or nothing to exist or fight does not require the kind of supply lines that make interdiction worthwhile.'<sup>20</sup> Targeting this infrastructure ring indirectly by bombing the area where it was believed the gangs were operating, achieved results. Interrogation reports of surrendered insurgents revealed continuous air bombing forced them to stay on the move and severely disrupted their food supplies. Indeed, many cited hunger and the threat of being killed by bombing as the two main reasons for surrendering.<sup>21</sup>

### Population

Examining how airpower 'targeted'

the population reveals an important lesson for its use in counterinsurgencies; it can help secure the population from the insurgent's influence and thereby achieves the most important objective; winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous people.<sup>22</sup> Airpower helped to achieve this by targeting the loyalist Kikuyu, the European Settlers and those Kikuyu defined as the 'undecided'.<sup>23</sup> Both the loyalist and the 'undecided' Kikuyu were targeted by direct psychological operations (PSYOPS). Leaflets depicting the Government's victories over the Mau Mau were dropped across the reserves and this reassured the loyalists the Government was winning, thereby emboldening their spirit. The 'undecided' were also influenced by leaflets dropped showing graphic pictures of Kikuyu women and children hacked to death in incidents like the Lari massacre in March 1953; where 97 loyalists were murdered. This had a profound effect on the 'undecided' group, with many openly ceasing their support for the Mau Mau and some deciding to fight them by joining the Government's loyalist Home Guard.

Equally, the presence of Lincoln, Harvard and Vampire aircraft had the psychological effect of convincing all three population groups they would be protected and that the Government was committed to defeating the insurgency. As the Chief Inspector of Police in Kangema stated: '...the presence of aircraft proved the power of the Government more than anything else'<sup>24</sup> and although the importance of maintaining a continuous and effective presence on the ground in counterinsurgencies is

clear, a dominating aerial presence was equally effective in Kenya given the Kikuyu were unaccustomed to seeing aircraft. Indeed, considering that the 'undecided' group will usually wait to see which side is likely to prevail before declaring its support, airpower's presence arguably persuaded many in this group that the Mau Mau, armed with home-made weapons, could not win against the Government's military power.

However, the fundamental lesson arising from the use of airpower in the Mau Mau conflict was how crucial it is to apply and then enforce a strict policy of avoiding civilian casualties. Bennett argues that in the early stages, repression and violence were encouraged from Cabinet level down and the Army's approach was to crush the insurgency heavily. Indiscriminate targeting was commonplace and top-level Commanders exercised a loose grip on Soldiers' behaviour.<sup>25</sup> Whilst this may have been true for the Army, the archival evidence reveals that senior RAF Officers and members of the Cabinet were fully attuned to the need to avoid civilian casualties from air action. This was first seen when the rules concerning the use of Harvard aircraft were issued: '... [aircraft] will not take armed offensive action against any target outside the prohibited areas. It is emphasised that it is of the greatest importance that our own forces and loyal Africans should not be subjected to offensive action from the air.'<sup>26</sup> Likewise, another report reveals that both Erskine and the Kenyan Government did not support indiscriminate bombing of

Position	Name	Dates in post
Prime Minister	Sir Winston Churchill	26 <sup>th</sup> October 1951 - 7 <sup>th</sup> April 1955
	Sir Anthony Eden	7 <sup>th</sup> April 1955 - 10 <sup>th</sup> January 1957
Secretary of State for the Colonies (aka The Colonial Secretary)	Rt Hon Oliver Lyttelton	28 <sup>th</sup> October 1951 - 28 <sup>th</sup> July 1954
	Sir Alan Lennox-Boyd	28 <sup>th</sup> July 1954 - 14 <sup>th</sup> October 1959
Governor of Kenya	Sir Evelyn Baring	31 <sup>st</sup> September 1952 - 10 <sup>th</sup> October 1959
Deputy Governor	Sir Frederick Crawford	7 <sup>th</sup> June 1953 - 1958
GOC-in-C East Africa Command (The Commander of all British Forces in Kenya - known as the Director of Operations before Erskine arrived).	Gen Sir William Hinde	1 <sup>st</sup> Feb 1953 - 7 <sup>th</sup> June 1953
	Gen Sir George Erskine	7 <sup>th</sup> June 1953 - 2 <sup>nd</sup> May 1955
	Gen Sir Gerald Lathbury	2 <sup>nd</sup> May 1955 - 1957
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS)	Gen Sir John Harding	1 <sup>st</sup> November 1952 - 26 <sup>th</sup> September 1955
	Gen Sir Gerald Templer	29 <sup>th</sup> September 1955 - 1958
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS)	ACM Sir William Dickson	1 <sup>st</sup> January 1953 - 1 <sup>st</sup> January 1956
Vice Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS)	AM Sir Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman	9 <sup>th</sup> November 1953 - 9 <sup>th</sup> November 1953
	AM Sir Thomas Pike	9 <sup>th</sup> November 1953 - 4 <sup>th</sup> July 1956
Air Member for Supply and Organisation	ACM Sir John Whitworth-Jones	1 <sup>st</sup> September 1952 - 1 <sup>st</sup> May 1954
Air Member for Personnel	AM Sir Francis Fogarty	1 <sup>st</sup> November 1952 - 1 <sup>st</sup> January 1957
C-in-C HQ Middle East Air Force (MEAF)	AM Sir Arthur Sanders	19 <sup>th</sup> May 1952 - 25 <sup>th</sup> October 1953
	AM Sir Claude Pelly	25 <sup>th</sup> October 1953 - 10 <sup>th</sup> September 1956
Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) MEAF	AVM JNT Stephenson	15 <sup>th</sup> June 1954 - 1 <sup>st</sup> May 1957
AOC British Forces Aden	AVM Sidney Bufton	12 <sup>th</sup> October 1953 - 15 <sup>th</sup> October 1955
Asst Chief of the Air Staff (Operations)	AVM Sir Laurence Sinclair	4 <sup>th</sup> November 1953 - 17 <sup>th</sup> September 1955
S.R.A.F.O. in Kenya	Gp Capt Eayres (CO Eastleigh)	20 <sup>th</sup> June 1953 - 27 <sup>th</sup> May 1954
	Air Commodore W K Beisiegel	27 <sup>th</sup> May 1954 - 28 <sup>th</sup> September 1955

Figure Two: List of key personalities involved in the use of airpower in Kenya.

the Kikuyu as it stated offensive air operations would only occur in those areas prohibited to civilians, where only the Mau Mau were known to operate.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) (figure four shows the key personalities involved in the use of airpower in this conflict) also directed the C-in-C Middle East Air Force (MEAF) to ensure the Senior RAF Officer (SRAFO) in Kenya was fully aware of the need to avoid civilian casualties,<sup>28</sup> thereby refuting claims that Erskine and others in authority had a policy of indiscriminately bombing civilians.<sup>29</sup>

The RAF not only instigated a policy of avoiding civilian casualties; they rigorously enforced it. Air Operations

Orders (AirOpsO) highlighted forest boundaries and the edges of the prohibited areas to ensure no bombing occurred outside of them - some specifically stated every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary damage.<sup>30</sup> Proposals to change aerial bombing practices were also rigorously scrutinised. In April 1954, it was proposed extending RAF operations into the reserves because it was clear the Mau Mau had realised the restrictions placed on aerial operations and were openly walking around in large gangs firing at passing aircraft, safe in the knowledge they could not be attacked.<sup>31</sup> The VCAS first scrutinised the request and stated such targets

should only be prosecuted if gangs could be clearly identified, if no danger of killing innocent civilians existed and in all cases, the principal of minimum force was to be used to achieve the effect desired. Therefore, only the Harvard's 20lb bombs were authorised and its machine gun was not. The CAS supported the proposal, but only if the Army Commander who would originate the request was in close contact with the target to ensure no danger to civilians existed. Lyttelton then sought Churchill's authorisation noting that although permitting bombing outside of the prohibited areas would undoubtedly be attacked by some in Parliament, it was known from interrogating such key Mau Mau leaders like General China that many insurgents knew the air restrictions and deliberately took refuge in the reserves to avoid being bombed. Following discussion by Churchill and the Cabinet on 26<sup>th</sup> May 1954 (with CAS present), permission was granted for such air strikes to occur.<sup>32</sup> Lyttelton then tasked Erskine to introduce procedures to ensure only reliable pilots were chosen for these tasks – now to be termed 'Operation MUSHROOM'.<sup>33</sup>

The RAF's determination to use airpower proportionally was also seen by how it reacted following the use of the Harvard's machine guns and bombs on a large gang near Mount Logonot on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1954.<sup>34</sup> The CAS asked Erskine to explain why machine guns were used when all orders specifically forbade their use outside prohibited areas. After investigation it was revealed the Chief of Staff (COS) in the Joint Operations Centre (JOC)

who had authorised their use had acted appropriately, as the area was isolated and the risk to civilians low. However, the CAS directed that in future, before any RAF action was undertaken which departed from existing policy, the SRAFO's authority was to be obtained.<sup>35</sup>

In January 1955, Churchill's approval was sought to continue Operation MUSHROOM activity. The matter would be kept under constant review and such operations would: '... not be permitted to continue for longer than they are really necessary.'<sup>36</sup> This shows the most senior members of the RAF and the Government understood that the contest for the support of the population in counterinsurgencies is based on moulding the population's perceptions;<sup>37</sup> clearly something which civilian casualties would have a detrimental effect on. With evidence of a proposal to use 4000lb bombs against the Mau Mau also being declined for 'political considerations',<sup>38</sup> it is clear RAF Commanders appeared to have had a better understanding of weapons effect and the type of war they were engaged in than their Army counterparts - a reference to Clausewitz' warning that: '... the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.'<sup>39</sup> A number of atrocities such as torture, rapes and illegal killings were committed by British troops, including incidents where a detachment of the 7<sup>th</sup> Kings African

Rifles robbed, beat and then killed four Kikuyu labourers after they ran when challenged.<sup>40</sup> These created a deep resentment amongst the Kikuyu 'undecided' population and rightly frustrated Erskine who made considerable attempts to rectify the situation; not long after his arrival he ordered his Officers to '... stamp on at once any conduct which he would be ashamed to see used against his own people.'<sup>41</sup> However, despite this, some atrocities continued to be committed by his soldiers.

The avoidance of civilian casualties from air action is vital in ensuring the hearts and minds of the civilian population are won in counterinsurgencies. In Afghanistan, civilian casualties from airstrikes trebled from 2006 to 2007 and, although the Human Rights Watch stated most of these occurred during rapid-response airstrikes when troops were in contact,<sup>42</sup> incidents such as the Kunduz airstrike in September 2009 (a planned strike with no 'troops in contact' which was requested by a German Commander against Taliban insurgents who had stolen two fuel trucks and led to 142 civilians killed), demonstrate how quickly air action can turn the population against the authorities. Not only did this lead to Germany's highest ranking soldier resigning over allegations that the German Defence Ministry concealed information about civilian deaths in the incident's aftermath, but it also caused outrage in the international community.<sup>43</sup> Such events have the ability to undermine the whole campaign in conflicts like Afghanistan; a fact acknowledged by General McChrystal when he stated '... the objective is the will of

the people ... protecting the people means shielding them from all threats'<sup>44</sup> adding that:

*'A focus by ISAF intelligence on kinetic targeting...[has] hindered ISAF's comprehension of the critical aspects of Afghan society ... Civilian casualties and collateral damage to homes and property resulting from an over-reliance on firepower ... have severely damaged ISAF's legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.'*<sup>45</sup>

### Fielded forces

The Mau Mau gangs in the forests of Mount Kenya and the Aberdares comprised the 'fielded forces' ring in the model and were predominantly targeted by kinetic action (pre-planned bombings and close air support) and PSYOPS; consisting of shows of force (SOF), leaflet drops and sky broadcasts aimed at persuading the fighters to surrender. PSYOPS were regarded by the Colonial Office as one of the main ways of solving the emergency and the RAF played a key role in this by undertaking sky-shouting duties and by dropping propaganda leaflets designed to persuade the Mau Mau to surrender. The Lincolns dropped over 100,000 leaflets during Operation HAMMER in January 1955 and over five million in June 1955. Likewise, many pre-planned missions were coordinated with the Auster sky-shouting aircraft from the end of February 1954 and AirOpsO show this was usually undertaken for three days following a mission.<sup>46</sup>

The Lincolns also regularly distributed leaflets during their bombing sorties and, as the conflict progressed, the importance of PSYOPS increased; Pembroke aircraft



were modified to undertake sky-shouting duties and to assist the two Austers and, in June 1955, General Lathbury urgently requested two more aircraft for this role, judging them to be more useful at this time than the Lincolns.<sup>47</sup> Although SRAFO requested the transfer of two Dakotas from Malaya, the Air Ministry rejected this as these were considered: '... essential to operations ... having a large impact on facilitating surrenders.'<sup>48</sup> By July 1955 over 800 Mau Mau had surrendered<sup>49</sup> and, although many did so because of hunger and a realisation victory could not be achieved, it is clear the leaflet drops and sky-broadcasts undoubtedly contributed.

The last part of the PSYOPS campaign was SOF. Undertaken from June 1953 onwards, Churchill stressed the importance of making a display of airpower over the heads of the Mau Mau, stating: 'The more they saw an aircraft overhead, the more they would feel that all their movements were under observation.'<sup>50</sup> It was clear SOF certainly influenced the insurgents; reports from prisoners revealed that when two Vampires flew over them, their speed terrified them so much they decided to surrender immediately.<sup>51</sup>

Notwithstanding this, it was still necessary to kinetically target those who could not be reconciled. This was firstly conducted by the Harvards in June 1953 (although a rather rudimentary form of offensive action had been undertaken by the KPRAW pilots before this consisting of dropping home-made bombs and grenades on gangs),<sup>52</sup> however, by October it was clear an aircraft

capable of delivering more firepower was required. Consequently, the CAS offered the Lincolns to C-in-C MEAF based on the glowing reports General Templer gave on their use in Malaya.<sup>53</sup> The CAS noted:

*'... the main gangs, which are your principal tactical objective, may, like those in Malaya, be getting accustomed to the 20lb bomb and be getting trained to avoid casualties from its small blast effect in the forest. It is possible you may need a heavier bomb for occasional use so as to maintain the morale effect of air action which otherwise may decrease ... a reinforcement which may make all the difference in turning the scale in your operations and by showing the tribes the power of the Government.'*<sup>54</sup>

Churchill gave permission for the deployment on 5<sup>th</sup> November and eight Lincolns arrived six days later with 24 air and 37 ground crew from 49 Squadron, Wittering. Based at Eastleigh and carrying a standard bomb load for each mission of nine 500lbs and five 1000lb bombs, they began operations on 18<sup>th</sup> November dropping in sticks between 300 and 3000 yards. They were to operate for an undefined period in order to test the psychological effect of heavy bombing on the Mau Mau.<sup>55</sup>

Although some have claimed the Lincoln's contribution to the conflict was negligible,<sup>56</sup> the archival evidence reveals almost 900 insurgents were killed or wounded as a direct result of air attacks between November 1953 and June 1954 alone.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, airpower's objectives of breaking the insurgents' morale, spreading disaffection, driving insurgents out of the forests and breaking up the gangs<sup>58</sup> were all achieved by: '... not only killing terrorists, but by imposing

on them such intolerable conditions that they will elect to come out of the prohibited areas.<sup>59</sup> Reports compiled from prisoner interrogations revealed considerable success was achieved in inducing psychological terror on the insurgents. For example, a Mau Mau gang leader called Gitonga Karame surrendered in September 1954 after twenty of his gang were killed in an air strike.<sup>60</sup>

In a report for Churchill, Erskine argued how important airpower was to operations in Kenya; stating the threat of attack had caused the gangs to disband, had lowered their morale and a pronounced move of them from the forests to the reserves was witnessed after the Lincolns arrived. Moreover, air action in general also boosted the morale of friendly forces because it took the fight to the Mau Mau in the deepest areas of the forests where Erskine's ground forces were unable to operate in strength. In some places it was virtually impossible for ground troops to surround and destroy all gang hideouts and the Lincolns proved ideal for attacking them – thereby supporting Pape's theory that airpower is best used as a substitute for ground power when the latter is unable to reach the insurgent.<sup>61</sup> Additionally, given that in the early stages, the Army was pre-occupied with combating the unrest in the reserves and soldiers could simply not be spared to conduct operations in the forests on a large scale, the Lincolns and the Harvards represented the only way to attack the insurgents and it is clear that without their contribution, the Mau Mau would have been able to escape into the deepest areas of the forests and

live in safety. Erskine said he was: '... convinced that the air effort prepared the way for ground action in the forest – without it, the ground troops would have had a tougher and more difficult job to do.'<sup>62</sup> The Lincolns remained in Kenya until 28<sup>th</sup> July 1955 and during their deployment, they dropped nearly six million bombs and conducted over 900 sorties.<sup>63</sup>

The Harvards proved the most adept at close air support; able to operate in all weathers; dropping bombs within 300 yards of friendly forces. They were however constrained by the KPRAW Piper-Pacers who had to first mark the target with smoke before it could be attacked. This lost the element of surprise.<sup>64</sup> Notwithstanding this, one incident on 6<sup>th</sup> August 1953 highlighted the need for quick communications for air operations to be effective in such fluid environments. Over 1000 Mau Mau were seen by an Army patrol and although the information was passed to Fort Hall Army HQ at 1600, a request for air support was not received by the RAF signals unit at Mweiga until 1725; during which time, the cloud base had lowered so much that bombing could not be undertaken.<sup>65</sup> Likewise, on another occasion it was reported that the Lincolns dropped their bombs over 4500 yards from the target<sup>66</sup> and on another, there was a 30 minute delay between the Piper-Pacers dropping their target markers on a gang and the Lincolns arriving; thereby allowing the gang to disperse.<sup>67</sup> After these initial problems, close air support procedures improved in Kenya and led to Erskine thanking the RAF for its tremendous efforts in helping to capture General China

and a large number of his supporters in April 1954, adding that he was very impressed by the excellent co-operation he had witnessed between the RAF and other security forces.<sup>68</sup>

In the early stages of the conflict the ISTAR functions of *find, fix, strike* and *exploit*; now viewed as so critical to the success of air operations, were not all satisfactorily undertaken. Whilst the RAF was able to comprehensively 'strike' targets, it struggled to undertake the 'find' and 'fix' functions because it lacked a timely and accurate source of intelligence. Air operations were planned almost exclusively on information received from Army patrols or prisoner interrogation reports highlighting where gangs were believed to be operating in the forests. This often took eight weeks to arrive and was therefore usually inaccurate as the gang had invariably moved from the area by the time a bombing mission occurred. Moreover, due to a lack of capability, no high quality photographs of target areas existed from which air operations could be planned.<sup>69</sup>

To address this, C-in-C MEAF ordered the Lincolns to be modified for PR duties in March 1954 until a more permanent solution was found. They undertook 42 successful PR sorties providing valuable information for planning air strikes before two Meteor PR 10s from 13 Squadron were permanently detached to Kenya in August 1954 (after demonstrating their superior capabilities on a three-week detachment in April).<sup>70</sup> Operating from Eastleigh, the Meteors undertook 234 sorties before leaving Kenya in July 1955. Air staffs

acknowledged that they '... proved invaluable for planning large scale bombing operations and for passing intelligence to ground forces – without them we would have been groping in the dark.'<sup>71</sup>

### Airpower in supporting roles

Discussing the utility of airpower in 1944, Slessor wrote: 'The moral is that we should continue to exploit the peculiar qualities of the air as the weapon of pursuit, to give the enemy no respite or opportunity ...'<sup>72</sup> Whilst his view still holds, what is clear is that targeting the insurgent will only achieve so much in counterinsurgencies. To be completely successful, air must also be used to support friendly forces and also aim to deprive the insurgents of those essentials they depend on for survival - thereby making it impossible for them to fight on.<sup>73</sup> This is why an insurgent's supplies, bases and the local population's support are sometimes more important targets than the insurgents themselves. After all, there is, only so much utility kinetic airpower can provide. As Gray notes, if airpower is used to: '... combat a highly irregular and ... part-time enemy who hides amongst quite densely packed civilians ... [it] ... cannot be at the leading edge of effectiveness.'<sup>74</sup> Moreover, although today the aspiration is for surgical strikes: '... even a surgeon's knife lets blood and creates scars.'<sup>75</sup> In Kenya, strict policies of avoiding civilian casualties, in conjunction with undertaking influence operations such as leaflet drops or just providing an aerial presence to convince the indigenous population the insurgents were not worth supporting, helped

to separate the population from the Mau Mau's influence.

The softer elements of airpower are arguably more important in contemporary operations and the role Air mobility plays in directly influencing the population's hearts and minds should not be underestimated. Such influence operations as transporting thousands of Iraqis from Basrah to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage provide contemporary examples. Equally, the ability to move friendly forces rapidly into an area can deliver an immediate strategic effect. As JFC Fuller said: '... a handful of men at a certain spot at a certain hour is frequently a far more powerful instrument of war than ten times the number on the same spot twenty-four hours later.'<sup>76</sup> When one Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers was flown to Eastleigh the day after the emergency was declared, an immediate security presence on the streets of Nairobi was created and with it, a clear strategic effect. Five months later, RAF Transport Command organised the move of 1254 men and 54 tons of equipment from Lyneham and Stanstead to Nairobi in just nine days. Codenamed Operation NICOTINE, this large-scale movement between 30<sup>th</sup> March and 7<sup>th</sup> April 1953 used a combination of RAF Hastings along with chartered Tudor and York aircraft and provided a significant strategic impact.<sup>77</sup>

Air also supplied troops in the forests (planning for the 18480lbs of supplies dropped per week in the Aberdares during Operation HAMMER began five months beforehand and the Piper-Pacers, capable of carrying

enough rations to supply 25 men at a time, were often used to resupply two patrols on a single sortie. A large number of supply drops were also made by Valettas; capable of dropping 5900lbs by parachute on one sortie and even the Lincolns dropped 320 packages during December 1953 to Soldiers around Mount Kenya from altitudes as high as 14000ft.<sup>78</sup> As Erskine said: 'The Air effort is of great importance ... Supply dropping and recce by the KPR Air Wing is essential and is carried out with great efficiency.'<sup>79</sup>

Media also plays a crucial role in the use of airpower in counterinsurgencies and the military needs to ensure that it works as closely as it can with it, so that the overall mission is not undermined by the mis-reporting of events. When the Lincolns deployed to Kenya, the CAS anticipated a media backlash and was very keen to ensure the deployment was not referred to as a bombing 'experiment' which the Mau Mau were being subjected to.<sup>80</sup> Despite these efforts, the press claimed the Lincolns were undertaking 'trials of pattern bombing' on the Kikuyu.<sup>81</sup> Lyttelton had to refute similar accusations in Parliament and Erskine wrote to the CAS apologising for how the situation was handled;<sup>82</sup> despite Erskine's comments it appears an Army Officer in Nairobi used the phrase "pattern bombing" rather too frequently when briefing the press.<sup>83</sup> Another article claiming that air attacks on the Mau Mau were 'wasteful,'<sup>84</sup> also caused a furore and resulted in Churchill asking for a report from Erskine on the efficacy of air action in Kenya.<sup>85</sup> The Media has the potential to influence the will

of the home population to support the conflict and is therefore key in upsetting Clausewitz' remarkable trinity of the balance between the People, the Government and the Military. Maintaining: '... a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets'<sup>86</sup> is critical to ensuring success and a careful management of the media will certainly help achieve this. Indeed, Clodfelter noted that: 'Airmen who fail to appreciate that these relationships exist – and *how* they bond together for a specific enemy or ally, as well as for his or her own nation – stand on very shaky ground ...'<sup>87</sup>

For air to be effective in counterinsurgencies, senior Commanders must realise the efficacy it can provide from the outset. In the early stages in Kenya, little thought was given to how air could be used and there was a lack of senior RAF representation in the Colony. The Military Command consisted almost entirely of Army Officers who possibly believed the insurgency could be quickly resolved by ground forces alone and they perhaps thought there was no need for an RAF deployment in what was primarily a land-based operation. Despite the CAS offering the use of four Harvard aircraft which had become available following the disbandment of the Rhodesian Air Training Scheme on 13<sup>th</sup> February 1953, following advice from General Hinde,<sup>88</sup> this offer was declined.<sup>89</sup> Indeed, it wasn't until the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) visited Kenya in late two weeks later and viewed the deteriorating security situation for himself, that it was finally decided to

use RAF aircraft in Kenya along with one Infantry Brigade Headquarters and two Infantry Battalions; a move which would, he argued, restore security quickly.<sup>90</sup>

Churchill and the Cabinet endorsed this on 10<sup>th</sup> March and within a week, RAF Transport Command was arranging the movement of the Harvards and all associated munitions and support equipment to Kenya. By the end of the month, formal approval was given to establish No. 1340 Flight to operate the Harvards, which all arrived on the 27<sup>th</sup>.<sup>91</sup> However, given the degree of importance that was attached to ensuring these aircraft were hurriedly despatched to Kenya and that Churchill and the Cabinet were keen to see airpower used in the conflict, the archival evidence remarkably reveals they were not used during their first two months in the Colony because Hinde: '... was not convinced that offensive air operations could be effective in the heavily wooded area of operations'.<sup>92</sup> This discovery demonstrates that even the best intentions of the Cabinet can be thwarted by the decision of one local Commander.

The lack of senior RAF representation undoubtedly contributed. No. 1340 Flight was commanded by a Squadron Leader, who may well have struggled to voice his opinion. Equally, the SRAFO in Kenya; Group Captain Eayres, the Station Commander of RAF Eastleigh, was not involved in advising Hinde and only became Erskine's advisor on 30<sup>th</sup> June 1953 on CAS' insistence.<sup>93</sup> As the operation progressed, the CAS realised an Officer of Air rank was needed in Kenya to advise Erskine

because: 'In operations of this kind, one error of judgement in the use of the RAF can lead to political embarrassment,'<sup>94</sup> adding that an Air Commodore would be better placed to improve the control and coordination of air operations with ground forces.<sup>95</sup> Notwithstanding this, it still took until May 1954 for Air Commodore Beisiegel to arrive as the new SRAFO. He stayed until September 1955 and made a considerable impact; improving the coordination process between target-marking by the Piper-Pacers and the bombing of the Mau Mau by the Harvards and Lincolns. He also instigated a bombing strategy; where specific areas were focussed on by all air assets one stage at a time, as opposed to the previously sub-optimal policy of bombing all areas simultaneously. As an accolade, the Air Member for Personnel noted that: 'The presence of an Air Commodore in Kenya has justified itself in many ways and the present S.R.A.F.O. has done admirable work in establishing a better relationship with the Kenyan Government and in planning and controlling air operations.'<sup>96</sup>

However, whilst an Air Commodore in Kenya was certainly beneficial, unfortunately, the establishment of an efficient, joint and coordinated system in which air operations were a fundamental part took far too long to establish and this led to inefficiencies in the early stages. It was recognised in 1953 for example that no unity of command existed over the KPRAW and little coordination occurred between the Army, the Police and the RAF.<sup>97</sup> To resolve this, six RAF pilots were sent to augment the KPRAW in October as considerable

issues had been encountered with the organisation failing to provide aircraft when asked – an obstinate attitude to any tasking from the RAF also appeared all-pervasive. Indeed, the C-in-C MEAF called the KPRAW '... something of an embarrassment ... [where] ... although the pilots are very skilful, they are under no discernible level of discipline and they tend to come and go as they please.'<sup>98</sup> On the insistence of CAS, this organisation was brought under RAF command in March 1954 and the situation improved dramatically.

### Conclusion

Although it occurred almost sixty years ago, the use of airpower in the Mau Mau conflict does reveal some lessons for its use in counterinsurgencies today. Through the careful use of kinetic airpower, civilian casualties were avoided in Kenya and the RAF strived to ensure it operated within the rule of law. However, air's kinetic role must be used sparingly in counterinsurgencies if the ramifications of its failures, fuelled by media frenzies, are not to undermine the entire support for the conflict itself. As Clodfelter notes: 'In the amorphous conflicts ... in the future, firepower, no matter how precise, is unlikely to yield the success necessary to secure the war aims sought – and in some cases it may well produce the antithesis of the desired effects.'<sup>99</sup> Not forgetting the fundamental goal in counterinsurgencies is to win the population's hearts and minds, because it is: '... in men's minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided,'<sup>100</sup> success will mainly be achieved through the 'softer' airpower tasks. Air mobility

will play a key role in supporting friendly forces, thereby improving morale, providing a strategic effect and positively influencing the local population through the delivery of humanitarian aid or by transporting people to religious events. Equally, ISTAR will continue to play an increasing role by both protecting friendly forces from insurgent attacks and by increasing the situational awareness of commanders. Excellent results were also obtained in Kenya by using air to influence the population through leaflet drops, sky-shouting and SOF. These, along with a policy of destroying the insurgents' food supplies and adopting an approach where the threat of bombing increased the psychological pressure, paved the way for military victory and ultimately helped to drive the insurgents out of the forests.

Crucially however, Commanders still have to realise the efficacy airpower can provide to such conflicts from the outset: '... air and space power isn't an optional luxury that can be added to an erstwhile military operation on the ground or at sea; rather, it provides the essential foundation for any sort of military endeavour.'<sup>101</sup> Kenya shows that air operations must be brought into the conflict from the start and be properly coordinated in a joint manner to be truly effective. Perhaps if the RAF had been deployed in greater numbers and been properly integrated with all other security forces earlier, then what the Government described as its chief weapon, could well have delivered success much sooner than 1955.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The National Archives [hereafter TNA] CAB:129/55: Memorandum,

Baring to Lyttelton, 13/10/1952.

<sup>2</sup> C Elkins, *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal end of Empire* (London: Pimlico, 2005).

<sup>3</sup> D Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, creating Kenya: counterinsurgencies, civil war and decolonization*, (Cambridge: University Press, 2009), 1.

<sup>4</sup> A Mumford & C Kennedy - Pipe, "Unnecessary or unsung? The Strategic Role of Air Power in Britain's Colonial Counterinsurgencies," in *Air Power, Insurgency and the "War on Terror."* ed. J Hayward, (Cranwell: RAF Centre for Air Power studies, 2009), 73.

<sup>5</sup> TNA AIR 14/4496: Report on 49 Squadron's Mau Mau operations, 20/1/1954.

<sup>6</sup> Air:20/9530: Report on RAF Operations in Kenya 1953-1955, 3-4.

<sup>7</sup> Air:20/9530: Report on RAF operations in Kenya, 4-7.

<sup>8</sup> A Waters, "The Cost of Air Support in Counter-Insurgency Operations: The case of the Mau Mau in Kenya," *Military Affairs*, (1973): 99.

<sup>9</sup> Areas each approximately 800 miles<sup>2</sup> declared 'prohibited' to all civilians in December 1952. The Mau Mau consisted mainly of Kikuyu natives and they operated almost exclusively in these 2 areas although they did also venture into areas known as the reserves which were where the peaceful native Kenyans resided.

<sup>10</sup> TNA AIR 2/12668: Report on the role of Air Power in Mau Mau Operations 14/8/1954, 5.

<sup>11</sup> The GOC-in-C East Africa Command 7/6/1953-2/5/1955, commanding all forces in Kenya including the RAF.

<sup>12</sup> TNA AIR 14/4073: Weekly intelligence report, 27/4/1955.

<sup>13</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (London: David Campbell Publishers, 1993), 580.

<sup>14</sup> Whilst the Mau Mau lacked

the capability to shoot down RAF aircraft, it did not stop them trying [see 'population' section]. At least two Lincolns were lost during the conflict - crashing in poor visibility on night bombing sorties and killing all crew members; one crashed in the Aberdares on 29<sup>th</sup> March 1954 and another near Mount Kinangop on 7<sup>th</sup> April 1954. Examination of the wreckage revealed enemy action was not responsible. See TNA AIR 20/9516.

<sup>15</sup> The Mau Mau's supposed political leader, Jomo Kenyatta, and 180 other political figures were arrested in Operation JOCK SCOTT on 21/10/1952. See Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, 35-36.

<sup>16</sup> Over 1400 Army personnel including four Companies each of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, Royal Inniskillings, the Black Watch, 600 police and no RAF participated in Op ANVIL. See: TNA CO:822/796: Report on Operation ANVIL, 5/3/1954.

<sup>17</sup> The functions of 'find, fix, strike and exploit' are given in AP3000, fourth edition, 46.

<sup>18</sup> Examples included the pre-planned Lincoln bombings on an area where the gang leaders Kahau Karichu and Samuel Mwangi were thought to be present and the strike of 13/5/1955 when a gang of 300 Mau Mau under 'Generals' Wariungi and Kiarri Manuthia was attacked. See TNA WO 276/458: (AirOpsO 11/54, para 4 and 20/55, paras 2-3. respectively).

<sup>19</sup> TNA WO 276/458: AirOpsO 11/54.

<sup>20</sup> Warden III, J. *The Air Campaign; planning for combat*, (New York: to Excel, 1998), 80.

<sup>21</sup> TNA AIR 14/4073: RAF interrogation report of 'General' Mugo, leader of the Kibira Ngatu

gang, captured 11/12/1954 in Nyeri.

<sup>22</sup> British Army, *Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 10: Countering Insurgency* (Land Warfare Centre: 2009), 1-2.

<sup>23</sup> So called in this analysis because they were unsure as to where their allegiances lay. JDP 3-40 defines this element of the population as 'neutrals' and notes that their passive acquiescence plays a critical role in a Government's success in counterinsurgencies. See MoD, *JDP 3-40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*. (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2009): 5-3.

<sup>24</sup> TNA AIR 20/9530: Report on the use of air bombing as a morale weapon, 2.

<sup>25</sup> H Bennett, "The Other Side of the Coin: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2007): 640-657.

<sup>26</sup> TNA WO 276/233: Royal Air Force bombing raids: Emergency Directive No.6, 3/5/1953, 4.

<sup>27</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Note on RAF support to Mau Mau Operations by Air Commodore Graham. 20/6/1953, 4.

<sup>28</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Signal CAS to C-in-C MEAF, 30/6/1953.

<sup>29</sup> R Edgerton, *Mau Mau: An African Crucible* (London: IB Tauris, 1990), 86.

<sup>30</sup> TNA WO 276/458.

<sup>31</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Signal Crawford to Lyttelton, 24/4/1954.

<sup>32</sup> TNA CAB 128/27: Minutes of Cabinet meeting of 26/5/1954.

<sup>33</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Letter Lyttelton to Erskine, 28/5/1954.

<sup>34</sup> Approximately 20 miles outside of the Aberdares prohibited area.

<sup>35</sup> TNA AIR 8/1886: Letter SRAFO to OC Eastleigh and Tactical Air Commander in the JOC, 26/11/1954.

<sup>36</sup> TNA AIR 8/1886: Letter seeking Churchill's permission to continue Op MUSHROOM activity 24/1/1955.



- <sup>37</sup> British Army, *Countering Insurgency*, 1-7.
- <sup>38</sup> TNA AIR 8/1886: Signal CAS to C-in-C MEAF 12/10/54.
- <sup>39</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 100.
- <sup>40</sup> Bennett, *The other side of the Coin*, 649.
- <sup>41</sup> Bennett, "The British Army and Controlling Barbarization during the Kenya Emergency," in *Warrior's dishonour: barbarity, morality and torture in modern warfare*, ed. G. Kassimeris (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 61.
- <sup>42</sup> 116 Afghan civilians were killed in 2006 by NATO airstrikes. In 2007 this increased to 321; more than the number killed by ground fire that year. See "*Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan*," Human Rights Watch (USA: 2008). Available at: <http://www.sipri.org/blogs/Afghanistan/airstrikes-and-civilian-casualties-in-afghanistan> (accessed May 4, 2010).
- <sup>43</sup> <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,663582,00.html> (accessed April 4, 2010).
- <sup>44</sup> McChrystal, S. *Commander's Initial Assessment*, (August 2009): 1-3. Available at [http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment\\_Redacted\\_092109.pdf?hpid=topnews](http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?hpid=topnews) (accessed May 10, 2010).
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-10.
- <sup>46</sup> TNA AIR 14/4073: Intelligence reports 1954-55.
- <sup>47</sup> TNA AIR 8/1886: Signal Lathbury to C-in-C MEAF, 3/6/1955.
- <sup>48</sup> TNA AIR 8/1886: Signal Director of Operations to Lathbury, 7/6/1955.
- <sup>49</sup> TNA AIR 20/9517: Signal Eastleigh to HQBF Aden, 21/7/55.
- <sup>50</sup> TNA AIR 2/12268: Extract from minutes of the Defence Committee(53) 4<sup>th</sup> meeting, 7/3/1953.
- <sup>51</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Brief for the War Council on the effects of bombing the Mau Mau, 5/7/1954, 2.
- <sup>52</sup> TNA AIR 20/9530: Report on RAF operations in Kenya 1953-1955, 4.
- <sup>53</sup> The Lincolns were requested by Templer on 9/6/1953 and, under Operation BOLD, eight were sent to Tengah and began operations with 83 Sqn at a planned rate of effort of 35 hours per month. They remained in Malaya until April 1954. See TNA AIR 20/9271: Bombers Malaya: Air support for operations by Lincoln aircraft.
- <sup>54</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Signal CAS to C-in-C MEAF, 26/10/53.
- <sup>55</sup> TNA AIR 14/4496: Report on 49 Sqn in Kenya.
- <sup>56</sup> Waters, *The Cost of Air Support*, 98.
- <sup>57</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Brief for the War Council on the effects of Mau Mau bombing, 5/7/1954, 2.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>59</sup> TNA WO 276/233: RAF bombing raids: Report on the use and value of heavy bombing, 1.
- <sup>60</sup> TNA AIR 14/4073: Extracts from interrogations of Mau Mau prisoners about the effects of bombing, 15/11/1954.
- <sup>61</sup> Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 79.
- <sup>62</sup> G Erskine, *The Mau Mau Rebellion*, A lecture by General Erskine to the Camberley Staff College (1955).
- <sup>63</sup> TNA AIR 20/9517: Operations summary reports.
- <sup>64</sup> TNA AIR 2/12668: Future air staff policy: Report on Air matters, 14/8/1954.
- <sup>65</sup> TNA AIR 20/9530: Report on Delay of clearance of targets by Army formations.
- <sup>66</sup> TNA AIR 23/8615: Mau Mau operations 1953-1954. Directive from SRAFO highlighting Lincolns missing targets, 23/12/1953.
- <sup>67</sup> TNA AIR 23/8615: Report on the effectiveness of RAF bombing

during Operation BLAST from OC C Company, Kenya Regiment, 25/3/1954; 1.

<sup>68</sup> TNA AIR 23/8615: Letter to all security forces from Erskine, 16/4/1954.

<sup>69</sup> TNA AIR 23/8617: Air Operations Policy: Report from Wg Cdr Newman to DirOfOps(3) entitled 'Air Force operations in support of cold or limited wars', 17/5/1954.

<sup>70</sup> TNA AIR 20/9530: Report on RAF Operations 1953-1955, 6.

<sup>71</sup> TNA AIR 20/9517: Report on Photo Reconnaissance, 2.

<sup>72</sup> TNA AIR 75/69: Slessor's report on the effect of Air Power in a Land Offensive to General Arnold, Commander US Army Air Forces, 18/6/1944, 6.

<sup>73</sup> J Paget, *Counter-insurgency campaigning* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 167-168.

<sup>74</sup> C Gray, "Understanding Airpower: Bonfire of Fallacies," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, (Winter 2008): 60.

<sup>75</sup> P Colley, "Soldiers are from Mars and Airmen from Venus: Does airpower do what it says on the tin?" *Air Power Review*, Vol.11, No.2 (Summer 2008): 111.

<sup>76</sup> JFC Fuller, cited in *AP3002: Air and Space Warfare, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*, (Waddington: Air Warfare Centre, 2010), 8-1.

<sup>77</sup> TNA AIR 2/12268: Op NICOTINE: Airlift of reinforcements to Kenya: Letter DofOps(3) to SofS for Air, 10/4/1953.

<sup>78</sup> TNA AIR 14/4496: Report on 49 Squadron's Mau Mau Operations in Kenya, 1/1954.

<sup>79</sup> TNA WO 216/861: Report by Erskine to Lyttelton, 3/10/1953, 4.

<sup>80</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Signal CAS to SRAFO 27/11/53.

<sup>81</sup> "Kenya Pattern Bombing," *The Daily*

*Telegraph*, November 19 (1953): 9.

<sup>82</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Letter Erskine to CAS 23/11/1953.

<sup>83</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Signal Chief Information Officer, Eastleigh to C-in-C MEAF, 25/11/1953.

<sup>84</sup> H Ziman, "Wasteful air attacks on Mau Mau," *Daily Telegraph*, December 21 (1953): 6.

<sup>85</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Minutes of Chiefs of Staff(53)144th Committee meeting, 22/12/1953.

<sup>86</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 101.

<sup>87</sup> M Clodfelter, "Back from the Future: The Impact of change on Airpower in the Decades Ahead," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Fall 2009): 106.

<sup>88</sup> All military operations in Kenya were commanded by Major-General Hinde at this time.

<sup>89</sup> TNA AIR 20/9530: Report on RAF operations in Kenya 1953-1955, 4-5.

<sup>90</sup> TNA AIR 2/12268: Op NICOTINE: Airlift of reinforcements to Kenya: Minutes of the Defence Committee(53) 4<sup>th</sup> meeting 6/3/1953.

<sup>91</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Telegram ACAS(Ops) to SASO MEAF, 28/3/1953.

<sup>92</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Note from DirOfOps(3) to CAS, 20/6/1953, 2.

<sup>93</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Signal CAS to C-in-C MEAF, 30/6/1953.

<sup>94</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Letter CAS to Lyttelton, 28/4/1954.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> TNA AIR 8/1886: Letter AMP to CAS, 27/6/1955.

<sup>97</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Note from DirOfOps(3) to CAS, 20/6/1953.

<sup>98</sup> TNA AIR 20/9041: Report from C-in-C MEAF to CAS 8/1/54

<sup>99</sup> Clodfelter, *Back from the Future*, 111.

<sup>100</sup> F Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 31.

<sup>101</sup> Dalton, *Dominant Airpower*.

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