

# Selected Chronology of the RAF and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

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Date	Occurrences as Recorded in Official Papers held at The National Archives of the UK, Kew	Occurrences from Other Sources and Survivors' Memories
1959 1 January		Batista government in Cuba overthrown by Fidel Castro - recognised by UK on 7 January.
1961 20 January		John F Kennedy inaugurated as President of US
1961 Mid – August		Berlin wall erected
1961 19 September	AOC-in-C Coastal Command (Sir Edward Chilton) seeks advice from VCAS on including an additional form of precautionary alert. He was advised that '... there was no need for formal Air Ministry authority ... [but] do take such steps as you can to prevent leakage...it is extraordinary how very many crises appear to occur on Fridays – do talk to 'Bing' Cross about avoiding publicity ...'(Air20/11118)	
1962 1 February	RAF Bomber Command adopts Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) posture – one aircraft weapon system and crew per V-bomber squadron at 15 mins readiness. (Air2/16435)	
1962 15 April		Abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles sponsored by the CIA. Of the 5 merchant ships carrying 1,400 Cuban exiles that arrived at the Bay of Pigs, two were sunk, including the ship that was carrying most of the supplies.
1962 July		Mr Khrushchev orders deployment of SAMs in Cuba

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1962 20-21 September	Exercise MICKY FINN II, a no notice dispersal exercise, in which all units of Bomber Command participated with the exception of the QRA Aircraft, the Canberra OCU, the Tanker Squadrons and No 617 Squadron (on Blue Steel Trials): At the beginning of the exercise, a total of 166 weapon-carrying aircraft were present in Bomber Command. (Various including AIR28/1638)	
1962 3 October	General Curtis Le May (Chief of Staff, USAF) sees a four Vulcan Scramble demonstration at RAF Scampton... (Air27/2926)	
1962 4 October	AOC-in-C Bomber Command [AM Cross] departed Lyneham in Comet 4 for tour of SAC in USA [route Goose Bay, Offutt, Norton, Vandenberg, Los Angeles, Elgin, Bermuda, Lajes] (Air24/2720)	
1962 Tuesday 9 October	<p>0930 Cabinet: The Foreign Secretary said that current Russian activities in Cuba had caused intense feeling in the United States. President Kennedy had been placed in a difficult personal position because of the pledges he had given during the Presidential Election and there would be increasing pressure upon him to intervene. ... the Soviet Government were deliberately increasing the scale of Russian activity in Cuba in order to provoke such intervention which they would then use as a pretext for the forcible occupation of West Berlin. CAB128/36 CC(62) 59th Meeting</p> <p>Hosted by AVM Menaul (SASO), General Powers, (Commander SAC), witnessed a four Vulcan Scramble demonstration at RAF Scampton... (Air27/2926)</p>	
1962 Wednesday 14 October	AOC-in-C Bomber Command returns from his tour of SAC (Air20/2720)	
1962 Friday 19 October	Sec of State for Air (Hugh Fraser MP) witnessed a four Vulcan Scramble from RAF Scampton (Air27/2960)	

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1962 Sunday 21 October	Evening - Prime Minister Harold Macmillan warned by the United States Ambassador to expect a personal message from President Kennedy. This was the first intimation to PM of the chain of events which had led to the imposition of the United States blockade of Cuba.	
1962 Monday 22 October	'A more detailed letter from President Kennedy was received and the US Ambassador provided information, but not in great detail, about the extent of the Soviet build-up. The most disturbing feature of this had been the identification of 21 medium-range ballistic missile sites and eight intermediate-range ballistic missile sites capable between them of covering the whole of the United States. The presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba had not been definitely established.' CAB128/36 CC(62) 61st Meeting	Gen Norstad (SACEUR) continues to push the replacement of medium bombers by ground and submarine launched missiles. On this, his farewell visit to London, he is dined out that evening by PM who warns Norstad of the dangers of mobilisation as seen in August 1914.
1962 Tuesday 23 October	0930. 'HQ 19 Group ordered all [of its] flying to cease. Orders were received to prepare for an immediate squadron (Shackletons, No 201 Sqn) move to the Bahamas, front guns to be fitted, tropical kit to be collected etc. By 1700 hours the last (6th) aircraft was ready and pack ups, war load etc. stored in the aircraft. However, the squadron was held on the ground at six hours readiness until the morning to the 26th. ... once again the situation changed ... and one aircraft of the squadron went to one hour's readiness for operations; the remainder of the squadron at two. The reason for these hectic changes in plans were all caused by the discovery of Russian missiles in Cuba, and the announcement by President Kennedy of a blockade of Cuba. ... Had the squadron been ordered off to Nassau the intention would have been to establish a British presence in the area.' (Air 28/1636)  1030 <i>Cabinet</i> : 'The Prime Minister said that in his first message, President Kennedy had reported evidence of the build-up of a Soviet missile capability in Cuba, and had said that on his own responsibility he had decided to prevent any further build-up by sea and to	At the 2001 Seminar, Sir Michael Beetham, (in 1962 Gp Capt Operations at Bomber Command), stated 'As soon as the missile crisis began to develop we got the message from the Government, from Macmillan, that no overt action was to be taken. So, anything that we did decide to do had to be done quietly. We couldn't, for instance, use the BBC to recall people from leave as we would have liked to have done. In fact, we were so successful that nothing ever seemed to appear in the Press, despite the fact that we had generated the entire V-Force to a very high state of readiness. We even put the crews in their cockpits at one stage but basically they were held at 15 minutes' notice'.

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	<p>demand the removal of this threat to the Western hemisphere. He recognised the seriousness of this step and that action to contain the Cuban situation might have repercussions in Berlin. He had however, felt it essential to demonstrate to the Soviet Government that if they counted on weakness or irresolution, they were mistaken. President Kennedy added that he regretted any lack of consultation, which had been due to the lack of firm evidence of the Soviet capability had come to light only in the preceding week, and he had judged that speed of decision had been essential. He hoped however, that in the further development of the crisis the United States and United Kingdom Governments would act closely together.'</p> <p>CAB128/36 CC(62) 61st Meeting</p> <p>Afternoon: <i>Chiefs of Staffs Meetings with the Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Cuba. 8. The situation arising from the intended American blockade of Cuba was discussed. It was stated that we were likely to support the American resolution in UNO. It was therefore desirable that we should assist the Americans as much as possible ... the Ministry of Transport and British Chamber of Shipping should be able to give considerable assistance ... and could give instructions to British ships to co-operate with the United States authorities.</p> <p>9. Although it would be practicable to reinforce the Caribbean with ships and aircraft (Shackletons) and to integrate them with the U S forces, it was considered that it would be wiser to wait and see what the Russian reactions were likely to be so that they might well start counter-blockades in say Turkey and Norway. Under these circumstances we would require all the force we had available in the European area to deal with such a reaction. ... it would be necessary to ensure that the Americans curbed their naval activities and make sure that they did not molest British shipping ... [and] .... to deal with questions as to</p>	<p>At the Seminar, Sir Michael Quinlan recalled: 'I was in Tom Pike's office as his Private Secretary at the time of Cuba and I would offer the thought that, in those days, ministers were far less apt to micro-manage affairs than they are today. ... In the 1960s ministers did not expect to be involved in the fine detail. The political guidance was <i>'Nothing overt, please' and the military were largely left to get on with it.</i></p> <p>AVM George Chesworth, (then B Flt Cdr, 201 Sqn) clearly remembers the excitement when all his Shackleton aircraft were fitted with guns, 'we really thought we were going to war'</p>

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	<p>why the Royal Navy were allowing British merchant ships to be 'pushed around'. (DEFE13/212)</p> <p>1730 No 201 Sqn (Shackletons) held at St Mawgan. (Air27/2978 and DEFE13/212)</p>	
<p><b>1962</b> Wednesday 24 October</p>	<p><i>Cabinet Defence Committee</i> R A Butler in the Chair. Others attending included: Maudling, Thorneycroft, Carrington, Amery, Profumo and Hugh Fraser. In attendance: Lord Mountbatten (CDS), Adm Sir Caspar John (FSL), Gen Sir Richard Hull (CIGS), MRAF Sir Thomas Pike (CAS) and Sir Charles Cunningham (PUS Home Office) ... [but no mention at all of Cuba in the Minutes]. (CAB131/27)</p>	<p>DEFCON 2 was ordered by SAC and widely publicised.</p> <p>US naval quarantine of Cuba enforced.</p> <p>At the 2001 Seminar, Gp Capt Ian Madelin (Former Head of the Air Historical Branch) stated 'Astonishingly, there was no reference to Cuba at all, and it does not appear anywhere in the subject index for the Committee's minutes of that year. The retained Item 3 was released in 2008 and refers not to Cuba but to 'UK Strategic Assumptions on Civil Emergency Planning'.</p>
<p><b>1962</b> Thursday 25 October</p>	<p>1415: <i>Cabinet: Cuba.</i> 'The Foreign Secretary informed the Cabinet of the latest developments in the situation arising from the imposition by the US Government of a partial blockage of Cuba designed to prevent the transport to the island of offensive military equipment. A number of Russian ships had been known to have been carrying military supplies had been diverted or had been ordered to return home. Others believed to have been carrying grain, oil and other civilian supplies were still on course. The US naval commanders were under orders to intercept them using minimum force, but no interceptions had taken place so far. In the Security Council the debate on a US resolution calling for the withdrawal of offensive missiles from Cuba and the dismantling of missile sites under UN supervision had been adjourned in consequence of an intervention by the Acting Secretary General, who had called on President Kennedy and Mr Khrushchev and the Dr Castro, to accept a truce for two or three weeks so that discussions could take place. No replies to the appeal had yet been received.'</p> <p>CAB128/36 CC(62) 62nd Meeting</p>	

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<p>1962 Friday 26 October</p>	<p>The sole relevant entry in the Bomber Command ORB for October is that for this Friday evening 'Bomber Command Annual Ball – attended by AOCs 1 and 3 Groups and the senior officers of Bomber Command'. (Air24/ 2688)</p> <p>[Comment: The holding of this major social event cannot be taken as evidence of 'normality' as not only did the AOC-in-C have his senior officers on hand at High Wycombe but cancelling the annual ball, a major social event in the locality, would hardly have been an 'unobtrusive' measure].</p>	<p>Wg Cdr Peter West, (then 12 Sqn at RAF Coningsby), remembered 'I was called early morning by RAF Police Cpl at my OMQ (I have 26th Oct in my Log Book). [and next day] we were definitely brought to cockpit readiness.</p> <p>SASO Bomber Command, AVM Menaul, wrote ('Countdown' 1980) that '... as tension mounted, SAC increased its readiness state from alert [defence] condition 3 to 2. Fortunately, Bomber Command Stations ... were able to take certain preliminary measures as a matter of routine, in case the situation got worse. On the evening of 26 October, the C-in-C decided to allow an [allegedly existing but unrecorded] exercise to proceed and to retain the existing readiness state for the time being in Bomber Command...'</p>
<p>1962 Saturday 27 October</p>	<p>1100 CAS (MRAF Sir Thomas Pike) met the Prime Minister at Admiralty House. (DEFE 32/7)</p> <p><b>1300 HQ 1 Group ORB, Para 11. (Air 25/1703) 'a. As a result of the Cuban crisis and the political situation BCOC initiated Alert Condition 3 (Precautionary Alert) at 1300Z on 27th October. All key personnel were required to remain on station and Operations Room staff to be available at short notice. Although no generation of aircraft was ordered, some preparations were made to ensure rapid generation if necessary. All measures were unobtrusive.</b></p> <p>1307: HQ 3 Group ORB merely states 'The AOC-in-C declared Alert Condition3 at 1307'. (Air28/1612)</p> <p>1430 CAS reported his meeting to First Sea Lord and CIGS stating 'The Prime Minister had been adamant that he did not consider the time was appropriate for any overt preparatory steps to be taken such as mobilisation. However he did not wish Bomber Command to be alerted although he wished the force to be ready to take the appropriate steps should this become</p>	<p>AVM Menaul: 'In the early hours of Saturday, at about 2 a.m., the C-in-C went to the operations room to discuss the exercises with senior staff ....then decided to increase the readiness state of the force, purely as part of the training exercise...'</p> <p>Sqn Ldr Jock Connolly recalled 'At about 1100 on the Saturday a civilian policeman knocked on my caravan door and said that I was required immediately at the squadron [No 617 at RAF Scampton] .. we were there locked in for a few days. We collected our 'go bags' and, after a station briefing, we spent the day on target study and in taking over a loaded aircraft. We spent the next day or so mostly at 15 minutes readiness .. I remember being at cockpit readiness [5 minutes] at one period'.</p> <p>The late ACM Sir John Willis recalled in 2008 'I was captain of a Vulcan B2 crew on IX Squadron at Coningsby ... The whole crisis was most surreal as I was hoping to properly celebrate my 25th birthday on the Saturday, 27th October 1962 but I actually spent the whole time on duty, standing by with my crew in flying suits and ready to go and deliver nuclear weapon on a target in the Soviet Union.</p>

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	<p>necessary. If the situation deteriorated further, the Prime Minister intended calling a Cabinet Meeting on the next afternoon, however he did not wish the CDS to be brought back to London, since his intention was that matters should be played in as low a key as possible. .... as a result of his conversation with the Prime Minister, CAS had warned the AOC-in-C Bomber Command that he should be on the alert and that his key personnel should be available on station. There were ten bombers overseas at the moment but he felt that it was not desirable to recall these aircraft at the moment'. (DEFE 32/7)</p> <p>1810 UK <i>Coastal Command Stations</i>  'A Coastal Command State of Vigilance was declared and the [Shackletons and Hastings] squadrons prepared themselves for possible action. Everyone was relieved, however, when the Vigilance was relaxed on 29th October.'  [for the Shackleton squadrons, full war loads were fitted]  (AIR28/1543)</p>	<p>At the 2001 Seminar, AVM Michael Robinson recalled: 'For me, as a V-Force Squadron Commander [100 Sqn], a peak of the RAF's nuclear story was reached on the afternoon of Saturday 27th October 1962 when all available Victor aircraft and crews at RAF Wittering were brought to cockpit Readiness 05. Each aircraft was loaded with one free-fall thermonuclear weapon, the crews had their Go-Bags with all of the necessary route and target information and authorisation codes. ... we remained in our cockpits for several hours before being ordered to revert to Readiness 15... It had been a long afternoon.</p>
<p>1962  Sunday  28 October</p>	<p>1015 HQ 1 Group ORB 'A recall of aircraft overseas on a <i>Sunspot</i> detachment was ordered by signal at 1015Z on 28th October' [ All except one aircraft returned to base 29th October. The remaining aircraft (which was Cat. 3) returned on 1st November].  (Air 25/1703)</p> <p><i>Lunchtime: Senior Ministers lunching with PM hear the BBC news of Mr Khrushchev's statement on his intention to withdraw his missiles.</i></p> <p><i>Afternoon: Chiefs of Staff Meeting with the Minister of Defence.</i> [in place of the planned evening Cabinet Meeting] ... 'CUBA The Minister said that President Kennedy had made it plain on Friday 26th October 1962, that unless he received assurances regarding the disarming of Russian missiles in Cuba, the cessation of further construction work, and a halt to the shipping of further offensive weapons, he would have to consider what</p>	<p>AVM Menaul (SASO) later wrote:  The Command maintained a high state of readiness throughout Saturday and Sunday, listening to the 'Voice of America' on radio sets in their homes, in offices or in dispersal platforms. ... [on Sunday 28 October].. It was all over. The crisis had passed. The exercise was finished and the C-in-C quietly ordered the force to be relaxed to a lower state of readiness. It is doubtful if more than a handful of people outside Bomber Command had any idea of what had happened.</p>

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	<p>action should be taken to gain those ends. In the light of this it would have been prudent to consider what precautionary measures the United Kingdom should take; dispersal of the V-Force and possibly even mobilisation represented possible solutions. He had therefore invited the Chiefs of Staff to meet him before his meeting with the Prime Minister later in the evening. In the event tension had eased following Mr Khrushchev's Message to President Kennedy which they had just received, and which, at first sight, appeared to offer the assurances which President Kennedy had demanded. The Minister of Defence did not therefore consider that any immediate precautionary measures were necessary. (DEFE13/212)</p> <p>1547: HQ 1 Group ORB para 11c. An increase in the number of QRA aircraft from 6 to 12 aircraft was ordered by HQBC, to be in effect at 0800Z on 29th. (Air 25/1703)</p> <p><i>RAF Coningsby Station Commander's Remarks in ORB</i> 'The Cuban Crisis made its impact on Coningsby during this month. The station was <b>called upon to take certain precautionary measures to ensure a high state of readiness.</b> As these measures had to be carried out unobtrusively, only some 50 men were called back to duty during the weekend 27th/28th and they succeeded in generating all the station aircraft by midnight on Sunday' (AIR28/1563)</p>	<p><i>12 (B) Sqn ORB - at Coningsby:</i> 'As a result of the Cuban crisis, the station was brought to Alert Condition 3 on Saturday 27th October. This involved the squadron in providing double its normal Quick Reaction Alert quota of aircraft, and the remaining crews on the squadron moved up to two hours readiness. As the month closed the squadron had generated all of its available aircraft and the aircrew had settled into a workable QRA routine.' Air27/2903</p>
<p>1962 Monday 29 October</p>	<p>0900: QRA force doubled across 1 Group stations. (Air 25/1703)</p> <p>1008 Coastal Command State of Vigilance relaxed.</p> <p>1030: Cabinet: 'The PM said that during the preceding days he had been in close consultation with President Kennedy about the development of the Cuban situation.</p>	<p>There is no references in Home Office files to alerting its 300,00 Civil Defence Corps and, in 2007, Lord (Philip) Allen of Abbeydale (later PUS Home Office) recalled that 'the Cuban</p>



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	<p>In retrospect it was evident that the President had played his hand with great skill; he had in fact turned the usual Communist methods against themselves by observing to the full the proprieties of international consultation e.g. in the UN, but by showing at the same time an unwavering determination to attain his objective of securing the removal of offensive missiles from Cuba, with the implication that he would not shrink from the use of force in the last resort. He had also dealt effectively with the pressures which had been brought to bear upon him within the US, where a strong body of opinion had been calling for violent measures. President Kennedy had steered a difficult course between being driven into a premature use of force and appearing to waver in his determination'. CAB128/36 CC(62) 63rd Meeting</p>	<p>crisis was treated by Home Office with complete indifference ... I have no recollection of the HO taking any action in response to the rising international crisis in October 1962 .... we had faith in Lord Harlech at the time - the Government's reaction to the Cuban crisis was the very British one of hoping that it would go away - and it did.</p>
<p><b>1962</b> Friday 2 November</p>	<p><i>Revised Operation Order for Exercise Mick issued by HQBC to HQs Nos 1 and 3 Groups</i></p> <p>1. SITUATION Alert Condition 3 of Bomber Command Alert and Readiness Procedures (Aircraft) enables the AOC-in-C Bomber Command, during a period of political tension, to take certain precautionary measures short of the full and specific measures involved in the calling of higher Alert Conditions. <i>Exercise MICK</i> is designed to test, in peacetime, measures to be taken under Alert Condition 3. This may involve the generation of all, or a proportion, of the Force as specified in the exercise alert message. The exercise may be held conjointly with any one of the no-notice readiness exercises for the Missile Force.</p> <p>2. MISSION To exercise the operational readiness of all or a proportion of the Medium Bomber, Reconnaissance and Saceur assigned Forces with measures appropriate to an Alert Condition 3.</p> <p>3. EXECUTION <i>Outline Plan.</i> The exercise will be ordered without warning by signal from B C O C. <i>Command and Control.</i> Ordered at any time by AOC-in-C ...</p>	

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	<p><i>Duration</i> .... at discretion of AOC-in-C ...</p> <p><i>Dispersal</i> Aircraft will not be ordered to disperse. They should be fuelled for take off to dispersal or for operational take off from main base ...</p> <p><i>Readiness States</i> On generation, aircraft are to the readiness state ordered which will normally be Readiness State 15. ... Crews are to be prepared at all times to advance from an Exercise to an Operational Alert Condition/ Readiness State but no exercise measures taken are to prejudice this capability.</p> <p><i>Quick Reaction Alert Force (QRA)</i> The permanent QRA Force are to remain fully operational at their normal Readiness State 15 but are to react on an exercise basis to higher readiness states called under Exercise 'MICK'. The SACEUR assigned QRA aircraft will be exempt from Exercise readiness states higher than Readiness State 05.</p> <p><i>Armament:</i> Live weapons are to be loaded ... and are to remain on the aircraft for the duration of the exercise. ... This Operation Order is effective immediately .. (Air2/16435).</p>	
<p><b>1962</b> Monday 5 November</p>	<p>0909: HQ 1 Group ORB 'Alert Condition 3 was cancelled.' (Air 25/1703)</p>	
<p><b>1962</b> Tuesday 6 November</p>	<p>1030 <i>Cabinet ... Cuba. The Foreign Secretary</i> said that the dismantling and withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba appeared to be proceeding smoothly. It had been accepted that the International Red Cross should exercise some form of general supervision over this process. CAB128/36 CC(62) 66th Meeting</p>	
<p><b>1962</b> 14 / 15 November</p>	<p><i>C-in-C Bomber Command's Conference</i> held at RAF North Luffenham, was attended by C-in-C, SASO, AOA, STSO, AOCs 1 and 3 Gp, their SASOs, Cmndt CRE, 5 other Air Cdres, 36 Gp Capts, 27 Wg Cdrs (including 20 Sqn Cdrs) and 2 Civilian Officers (C Res O and CE HQBC) 'In his review of the events of the past year, AOC-in-C said that on the Operational side, the introduction of QRA on 1st February had led</p>	

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	<p>to an integration with SAC rather than mere co-ordination. During the year, Operational Readiness Platforms had become available and by the end of 1963 there will be ORPs for 100 aircraft at 36 airfields. Medium Bombers now carried Yellow Sun Mk II, whilst Blue Steel would be in service at Scampton in December, it was depressing to note that Victor Blue Steel programmes had slipped some 6 to 9 months. Valiants in the low level role would be fully operational by March 1963.</p> <p><b>Turning to the Cuban Crisis</b>, AOC-in-C said that it had been amply demonstrated that what really counted was the number of aircraft at readiness. SAC maintained a 50% readiness and although it was unlikely that Bomber Command could achieve this figure there ought to be a method by which the percentage of aircraft at readiness on main bases could be changed as necessary. With this in mind, <b>'Exercise MICK' had been redesigned so that readiness percentages could be changed unobtrusively.</b> [see above <i>Friday 2 November</i>]</p> <p>Speaking about <i>Thor</i>, the AOC-in-C said that the Cuban crisis had really shown the value of this missile; without visible change 59 of the 60 missiles had been made serviceable simply by use of the telephone. It was regrettable that, starting on 1st April 1963, <i>Thor</i> was to be withdrawn.</p> <p>As to the future, the AOC-in-C regarded it as inevitable that there would be a progressive increase in the readiness state over the years to come, but he thought that whatever was done in the years before <i>Skybolt</i> arrived would be against an unfavourable financial background': (Air2/16435)</p>	<p>The experienced Vulcan pilot (now a retired Air Commodore) who took the conference minutes recalled that, as an Air Staff Officer at HQBC and not on the Operations Staff, he 'was not aware of what the Ops people were doing down the hole during the crisis'.</p> <p>[The next <i>Exercise MICK</i> (increased alert states with aircraft remaining on main bases and not dispersing) was called on 11 December]. (Various sources including AIR28/1563)</p>
<p>1962 20 November</p>		<p>US naval blockade of Cuba lifted.</p>
<p>1962 30 November</p>	<p>Letter from AOC-in-C to CAS 'The phase out of <i>Thor</i> commencing in April 1963 will progressively reduce the number of</p>	

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	<p>weapons systems normally held at immediate readiness (15 minutes) from 68 (54 <i>Thor</i> and 14 aircraft), unless measures are taken to increase the number of aircraft at immediate readiness in the meantime ... I think you will agree that in the deterrent role it is systems at readiness that count, and if this needed emphasising then undoubtedly the Cuba crisis did it. We have therefore been examining ways and means of increasing the number of aircraft at readiness as from next April ... I will shortly be submitting proposals to the Air Ministry ...'(Air2/16435)</p> <p>Follow up letter from AOC-in-C BC to CAS, 10 January 1963: Detailed studies have now been completed and from April 1st I propose increasing the QRA force to 17 Victors and Vulcans (plus the four Valiants of the SACEUR force) raising to 20 Victors and Vulcans from 1st July when the Blue Steel squadrons will be able to make their contribution. This plan will enable me to maintain approximately 20 per cent of the force at permanent readiness and will go some way to compensate for the run-down of the Thor. (Air2/16435)</p>	<p>In reply to AOC-in-C Bomber Command's proposal to increase the QRA (force), ACAS (Ops) (Smallwood) wrote on 10 June 1963 'VCAS decided that for the time being, no further action should be taken on this matter and that the QRA arrangements written for the V-force should remain as currently planned.' (Air2/16435)</p>

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