

Strategic Bombing and Morale: To what extent did Operation GOMORRAH affect British and German Morale?

By Mr Warren Huggins

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Abstract: Sir Michael Howard said of the bombing offensive that 'there is little doubt that the morale of the German population was one of the major objectives ... [but] another indirect target of Bomber Command was the morale of the British people themselves'.¹ That first objective is clear from documents such as the *Casablanca Directive*, but the second Howard considered not so obvious, 'especially to those who were not alive at the time'.² This article demonstrates how, in the case of Operation GOMORRAH, the British leadership considered those two targets as achievable, and assesses the extent to which they were realised. It argues that in order to assess fairly the impact on morale that British strategic bombing had exerted, the effects on British as well as German populations must be taken into consideration.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors concerned, not necessarily the MOD.

Introduction

The period between the two World Wars proved a breeding ground for ideas and theories concerning future air power and, in particular, the role of the bomber. The principle of attacking the morale of a population through aerial bombardment had been firmly established by inter-war theorists such as Douhet and Trenchard, based on their First World War experiences and unshakeable belief that the bomber would always reach its target.³ Consequently, doctrine was quickly developed on the premise air power would become the decisive force in war, shortening or even preventing, through deterrence, future conflicts. It was therefore unsurprising that with Trenchard as the dominant inter-war patron of the RAF, strategic bombing became intrinsically incorporated into British air power policy.⁴ Yet today, whenever the Combined Bombing Offensive (CBO) against Germany is discussed, its effect on morale is often given less prominence than it deserves. Both Jonathan Fennell and Richard Overy have promoted the importance of the effects of bombing on morale, but such effects are both hard to define and difficult to measure.⁵ When compared to physical destruction, damage caused to morale simply does not have the same measurable impact. Consequently, with the advent of revisionism, large sections of the public, academia (and even some former bomber crewmen) have come to denounce the CBO against Germany as both criminal and ineffective.⁶ The latter accusation is commonly based on assessments of the *physical* damage caused and the reality that it did not single-handedly bring about the fall of Germany.

John Galbraith had reached much the same conclusion in 1945 when he wrote that the bombing of Germany, far from crippling the economy and forcing Germany to surrender actually stimulated greater production and *raised* morale.⁷ There is an implication within Galbraith's reasoning that the ultimate aim was to force surrender on the back of a bombing offensive alone. But was that correct? It was certainly not a view shared by all during the War, especially not Winston Churchill.⁸ Indeed, the *Casablanca Directive* of January 1943, despite being an 'all things to all men' document, clearly stated that the aim of the bombing offensive was to attack the infrastructure and morale in Germany, and to support a *land invasion* 'whenever' it occurred.⁹ It is against that criterion that the CBO must be judged. It is, therefore, not the intention of this article to show that area bombing could, or did, destroy morale to the extent that the war could be won through strategic bombing alone. However, it will show how individual operations could have considerable success in affecting the morale of the people of countries carrying out the bombing as well as those being bombed.

Even when considered as one element within a greater whole, the impact of the CBO on German morale remains an area that some academics continue to consider to have been a failure. In A.C. Grayling's opinion the CBO had 'sought to undermine the morale and weaken the will of the German people, and ... signally failed to do either'.¹⁰ However, Overy has criticised such assessments for being too often based on speculation and unverified data.¹¹ For Overy, the only sure way to assess the success of the CBO would be to consider the actual impact

upon 'German strategy, economic power and morale' – an assessment requiring accurate primary data and testimony from German sources.¹²

Fortunately, when Jörg Friedrich published *The Fire* in 2002, a new phase in the study of the CBO was launched. It emphasized, for the first time since the War, the effect that strategic bombing had made on the morale and well-being of the German population, basing his findings predominantly on German primary sources.¹³ The different ways British and German historians viewed the CBO had been a contentious issue for many years. Hans Rumpf in particular claimed that assessments on the behaviour of German citizens had been too dependent on the opinions of foreign air war historians, whilst evidence from German citizens had been largely ignored.¹⁴ But *The Fire* initiated a new level of intensity in the study of the bombing campaign from the German perspective. With *The Fire's* publication, it became possible to address this issue without incurring shame or accusations of Neo-Nazism.¹⁵ *The Fire* rightly initiated a renewed interest in the wealth of primary source material that had hitherto languished in obscurity. Among these were the wartime letters of Hamburg resident, Mathilde Wolff-Mönckeberg and publications such as *The End* by Hans Nossack, a first-hand account of the Hamburg firestorm raids.¹⁶ Such rediscovered material has made it possible to create assessments of the CBO from the German perspective, for comparison against the established history based on contemporary British information. Indeed, Süß adopted just such a methodology within *Death from the Skies*, published in 2014.¹⁷

Despite a mass of publications on the CBO, omissions in the historiography on the CBO continue to arise. In *The Bombing War: Europe 1935-1945*, Overy lamented on how the dual approach of addressing both the social response and the military realities had rarely featured in histories of Bomber Command.¹⁸ However, the dual approach of considering the social effects on the civilians of the country carrying out the attacks alongside the targeted civilians has received even less scrutiny. Robert MacKay studied the British Government's exploitation of the CBO to reassure the population and emphasise the effectiveness of its bombing policy.¹⁹ Even so, it would surely be useful to consider the effects on both attacked and attacking populations when assessing the success or otherwise of the CBO from a morale perspective. To that end, the article will look at the extent to which morale had been expected to be both breached in Germany and bolstered in Britain, and whether those expectations were met in this case.

The measures used to attribute success or failure and the reception of the raids, by both sides of the conflict, were subject to change throughout the course of the war. Even so, the analysis of a single set of raids against a particular target can be useful in assessing the effect that it had on the morale of the participants at that time, and in its immediate aftermath. Of course, such an exercise can only provide a snapshot in time, as the results will naturally reflect how the area bombing policy affected morale at that specific stage of the war. It therefore follows that the raids selected for examination should be representative of a particular point of the CBO in order to place the results obtained in some context. With these issues in mind, the set of raids

chosen for this exercise is the one directed against Hamburg during July and August 1943, codenamed Operation GOMORRAH.

Operation GOMORRAH was selected for two reasons, the first of which was timing. The raids marked the midpoint of the bombing offensive, by which time Britain had already endured four years under military and economic attack. During that time, the RAF's Bomber Command had provided the only means of attacking Germany itself, making it reasonable to believe that bombing operations against German cities would have had considerable support in Britain. If measured by the level of destruction caused, Operation GOMORRAH was arguably the most successful bombing operation of the entire European war especially when measured against the *Casablanca Directive's* aim of bringing about the 'destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system'.²⁰ The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) estimated the death toll from the bombing and resultant firestorm to be 42,600, with a 64% drop in Hamburg's population resulting from the 973,000 people that were assessed either to have been killed, evacuated or fled the city and its environs.²¹ This was achieved for the loss of only 87 RAF aircraft, a relatively modest rate of attrition.²² If any CBO operation could illustrate the effect of strategic bombing on morale, Operation GOMORRAH would surely be it.

The second reason for selecting Operation GOMORRAH was the abundance of primary source material it generated in both Britain and Germany. There is a wealth of material available from The National Archives (TNA), including Cabinet papers and Bomber Command reports, whilst the success of the operation led to extensive press coverage, which is now accessible online. Together with personal accounts and diaries from the Imperial War Museum (IWM) and the Mass Observation Study (MOS), there is an abundance of information relating to the presentation of Operation GOMORRAH to the British public and its subsequent reception. Of course, the scale of destruction achieved by the raid meant it was a significant physical blow to Germany, where it was also very well documented in official correspondence such as the report from Hamburg's police president. There are also many personal accounts from survivors. These are either accessible directly, such as the letters of Mathilde Wolff-Mönckeberg, or via the excellent research of Süss in *Death from the Skies*, Friedrich in *The Fire*, and Noakes in *Nazism: 1919-1945*.²³

This article will examine the effect of Operation GOMORRAH on German morale then consider its reception in Britain. The evidence will illustrate how the raids, whilst not universally popular in Britain, nevertheless produced unprecedented levels of success in terms of influencing morale in both countries.

Germany's Nightmare

The USSBS report estimated that by the end of 1943, the city's industrial output was back to 82% of its normal capacity and that only 1.8 months of production was lost as a result of Operation GOMORRAH. But statistics fail to tell the full story.²⁴ The USSBS had been commissioned to assess the economic effects of the raids, not the effects on morale, because it did not consider morale to have been the prime purpose of the campaign.²⁵ Nevertheless the importance of morale

had been enshrined in RAF doctrine between the wars with *AP1300*, the official RAF publication, disseminating the belief that the enemy was defeated when the people or Government lost the will to fight.²⁶ Hence, as far as the RAF was concerned, the defeat of civilian morale was a justifiable measure of success for any air campaign. At the start of the Second World War, the British Government hoped that adherence to such doctrine would result in a repeat of the 1918 collapse of the German home front; indeed, it was the fear in Berlin as well.²⁷ However, by late 1943 it was clear that a collapse of Germany without an invasion was unlikely whilst the SS and Gestapo maintained their grip on the population. This was despite a prevailing feeling of hopelessness and general acceptance of defeat permeating German society.²⁸ Overy reasoned that the level of destruction required for such a collapse would leave 'an apathetic, miserable, dispirited population' totally incapable of fighting against a regime 'willing to impose terror on its own population.'²⁹ But Süß proposed another factor for the lack of rebellion. He reasoned that as a result of the State's integration into the system, individual survival had become dependent on cooperating with the Nazi Government. Sir Michael Howard had noted that very same tactic being employed by the authorities through the issuing of replacement ration cards to bombing survivors with their wage packets, thus ensuring people returned to work.³⁰ To survive, people had to eat; to eat, they needed the State; and to get the State's support, they had to work and obey. Somewhat ironically, the devastation benefited the Nazi cause: the more reliant the population became on State aid, the more obedient they were required to be.³¹ Clearly, as with the overall campaign, there was no mass rebellion against the authorities after Operation GOMORRAH, whatever the hopes or expectations of the British Government. The reason why can only be fully determined by examining the state of affairs in Hamburg from the standpoint of German survivors.

Operation GOMORRAH created a new level of destruction and horror due to the generation of the infamous firestorm. If ever such factors were going to generate a revolt, Hamburg must surely have been the most likely candidate. Witness statements testify to the horrors that were encountered, many of them commented on by Friedrich. A fierce critic of the bombing campaign, Friedrich used graphic descriptions of the anatomical damage inflicted on human bodies to support his opinion that the CBO was an act of inhumanity. He actually described Hamburg as a place of annihilation, where for three hours 'life was not possible, where it [could not] exist.'³² The accounts of citizens caught up in the Operation GOMORRAH raids are equally shocking, with their descriptions of debris, mutilated bodies and flames 'a hundred metres long.'³³ Hamburg resident Rosa Todt, for example, recalled the phosphorous burns that 'presented a fearful sight' and spoke of the panic as people clawed to get into shelters already full and secured.³⁴ Of course, such horrors had been experienced in other cities, but Herbert Heinicke, stationed in Hamburg as a member of the Wehrmacht, marked out Hamburg as having descended to a new level of horror. Heinicke recalled *Luftwaffe* personnel assisting during the raids relating how they 'had never seen anything like this, even in Russia.'³⁵ Military personnel were thus equating the devastation and terror of Hamburg with what they had witnessed on arguably the most brutal front of the war.

Civilian survivors of Hamburg could not draw on such comparisons, but perhaps Frau Schwarz's husband made the defining statement on their behalf. On returning to a bunker between bomb blasts, the Hamburg resident simply remarked of his street, 'Es ist alles aus,' it is all gone.³⁶

As well as the unexpected development of the firestorm, what marked out the bombing of Hamburg from other German cities at the time was the scale of the subsequent evacuation. Of course, the flight of people away from cities after air raids had happened before – it was actually a crucial part of the official policy to relieve pressure on areas under threat – but this was at another level.³⁷ Goebbels described it as the 'greatest migration of all time'.³⁸ Hamburg's Police Chief considered the evacuation to be of the highest priority and employed all possible means of transport to ensure an orderly clearing of the city.³⁹ But the reality for some was rather different. Wolff-Mönckeberg found that with no water or power, and with further raids expected, there was chaos everywhere. Everyone wanted to leave the city (in her case to stay with relatives) but there were endless queues to obtain the necessary travel permits. Even once issued with permits, there was no transport available, despite the Police Chief's efforts, and people resorted to using carts, bikes and prams in their attempts to escape the city. In fact, Wolff-Mönckeberg found herself 'very near to despair on account of the general atmosphere of panic'.⁴⁰ Such testimony certainly contradicts the official narrative of an orderly evacuation.

It also appears that enforced evacuations were unpopular and difficult to manage. A 1943 report on the raids on Cologne and Aachen showed that, rather than be relocated with strangers, people preferred to remain in their local area or stay with relatives.⁴¹ In fact, Rumpf considered this desire to remain in what was left of their home (or to be with family) as one of the factors from which the population drew its strength.⁴² In the case of Hamburg, Nossack noted that those evacuated often just went back home, in spite of the notices forbidding them to do so. Like Rumpf, Nossack believed that they returned to the decimated city because it was better to live in a hole than be tolerated by strangers. Above all else, it was still their home and it allowed for an appearance of normality, even if it was only an illusion. Such widespread disobedience led Nossack to believe that, in Hamburg, the authorities were eventually compelled to change the evacuation policy to one of compulsory return in an effort to save face!⁴³ But the survivors returned to a desperate situation with no power or water and 61% of the housing uninhabitable. Most returnees found their homes either destroyed or inhabited by other families with whom they were now obliged to share.⁴⁴ On her return to Hamburg, Wolff-Mönckeberg wrote to her children of the hopelessness of the situation she encountered and of how people were 'filled ... with a dumb kind of passive apathy'.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, over the following weeks people slowly adapted to the situation, accepting the circumstances and making the best of them.⁴⁶

Whilst Operation GOMORRAH was catastrophic for the population of Hamburg, the effects reached far beyond the city limits. The CBO meant that there was now no distinction between

the front line and the home front; indeed, following the raids on 25 August 1943, Luftwaffe Field Marshal Erhard Milch proclaimed that he 'would tell the front that Germany itself is the real front line'.⁴⁷ The German military were well aware that morale on the front line was being affected by the bombing of the homeland. Reports from those who had visited home, combined with poor communications from the *Wehrmacht* on the fate of towns being hit, left a big impression on front line soldiers. It fostered the belief that their personal sacrifice at the front would not be enough to protect their families at home.⁴⁸ Soldiers could accept the miserable conditions they had to endure; it was the situation back home that was intolerable.

Although there was no general uprising in Hamburg following the air raids, there were instances of localised disobedience. Perhaps one of the contributory causes was the general sense of unease that had permeated the city in the preceding months. Wolff-Mönckeberg described Hamburg before Operation GOMORRAH as a city whose people were already in despair. They resented having been taken into war and had no faith in either the press or the government. Following the Battle of Stalingrad, she wrote of how 'one knew too much by now and was completely disgusted'.⁴⁹ Then, after the raids, despair turned to anger. Wolff-Mönckeberg wrote of the dissent and anger defiantly aimed at the Hamburg authorities. She saw people ripping off the badges of Nazi party members and calling them murderers.⁵⁰ Nossack even recalled a woman screaming at police to arrest her for some fictional offence, because at least then she would have a place to stay. On that occasion, the police walked away, but for him it illustrated how the State was now both impotent and being treated with disdain by the people. Nossack believed that it was not apathy or fear of the authorities that prevented civil uprising; rather it was a feeling of utter contempt for the Government. To revolt would have been to acknowledge the Government's relevance.⁵¹

Most survivors were understandably angry or in despair; however, some were surprisingly accepting of the situation. Martin Middlebrook found survivors who believed the firestorm to have been a punishment for the German raids on Coventry and their treatment of the Jewish population of Hamburg. From this it would appear that Operation GOMORRAH forced some to question Germany's role in the war and their own responsibility for their Government's actions. Whilst these might be considered isolated views, Middlebrook still found that many Hamburg citizens were not surprised by the attacks. They just accepted that it had been their turn.⁵²

In the aftermath of the raids, many citizens appeared to be in no doubt that the war would soon be over one way or another.⁵³ As Friedrich put it, 'confidence in victory melted away in the Hamburg firestorm'; all the talk was of defeat at the hands of an unstoppable enemy.⁵⁴ Nossack claimed that Government slogans of revenge were only partly accepted by the public.⁵⁵ But Wolff-Mönckeberg went further. Privately she declared that everyone knew newspaper and radio reports were full of lies with people just ignoring the speeches and declarations of their leaders.⁵⁶ However, even with that air of despondency and defeatism, there was no major rebellion. Nossack believed that 'not only the enemy but also our own authorities had miscalculated on this respect'.⁵⁷

The miscalculation of the German leadership is perhaps understandable. They had also planned to generate large fires with which to destroy London and foment unrest amongst the civilian population.⁵⁸ As they did not succeed in creating a firestorm, or causing destruction on a scale even close to that visited on Hamburg, they had no evidence with which to disprove the concept. Therefore, it is not surprising that many in the upper echelons of the Nazi hierarchy feared for the future after Operation GOMORRAH. Goebbels, for one, dreaded the panic he envisaged invading public life and weakening the will to resist. In both military and political circles, there was an undercurrent of fear that the war might already be lost.⁵⁹ Speer informed Hitler that due to the material damage being caused, just six more attacks akin to Operation GOMORRAH would bring armaments production to a halt.⁶⁰ But, Speer's pessimism lessened upon seeing how quickly Hamburg's industry recovered: a recovery he credited to the survivors. In his opinion their morale had remained 'excellent throughout'. Hamburg's recovery and morale was further aided by a failure to maintain the intense bombing in follow up raids, thus allowing the population to acclimatise to the situation. This led Speer eventually to conclude that area bombing was not so great a threat as previously assumed.⁶¹ Even so, Overy has since claimed that, without bombing, the workforce would have been even more productive. His argument is supported by a 1944 British report on German morale which estimated a 10% drop in production as a result of the bombing campaign. In his opinion, although people continued to work, it was less frequently, willingly or attentively.⁶²

The German authorities were surprised at the resilience of their own people, but were the Allies? It does appear that throughout the campaign, they were presented with conflicting information as to the ongoing success of their strategy. For example, a British report entitled *Allied Attacks and German Morale* noted the compulsion and stern measures being imposed on workers to return to cities. It found an unwillingness to work and level of apathy that had become so pervasive as to consign parts of the civilian population to become 'useless ballast in the war machine.'⁶³ There were even indications of a desire within Germany to pressurise the Government to terminate the war.⁶⁴ These were all symptoms of a successful attack on morale as defined by *AP1300* as well as in the opinion of the *MOS*.⁶⁵ However, the same report also pointed out that the induced apathy made any rebellion unlikely and that 'such unrest as had occurred had remained small and local in character.'⁶⁶ Understandably, the report was non-committal in its conclusion that the 'lack of any uniformity in the views adduced from Germany makes it more than usually difficult to determine the probable course of events.'⁶⁷

To the credit of its people, Hamburg recovered far quicker than even the German authorities had expected.⁶⁸ Perhaps they should not have been so surprised. As Grayling pointed out, Germany had been well prepared. They knew there would be a war. They intended to start one! Therefore from as early as 1935, services, shelters, and systems for dealing with attacks were being put in place; measures that saved lives during the offensive.⁶⁹ As a civil defence officer, Rumpf travelled widely. He recalled the pre-war training and how it had helped lessen the shock when the air assault began.⁷⁰ The authorities knew that, post-attack, food and

accommodation were crucial for morale and so, before the war, they established systems to ensure relief supplies would be available when required. Just as importantly, they ensured the administration systems were able to efficiently process any claims for war damages.⁷¹ Therefore, by the time war arrived, local Gauleiters had clear instructions on rehousing, the registration of claims and reissuing of ration cards to dispossessed citizens. In addition, they were even empowered to increase food rations for those under bombardment.⁷² Although Wolff-Mönckeberg experienced only petty bureaucracy and chaos, the Hamburg Gauleiter, unsurprisingly, commended the efficiency with which all those systems swung into action after Operation GOMORRAH.⁷³ But thanks in part to such measures, Speer found that, much to his surprise, the population adapted to the situation 'from the point of view of morale' far quicker than expected.⁷⁴

Rumpf observed how sporadic bombing allowed people time to acclimatise to its effects and that morale actually strengthened as the raids later stepped up in intensity.⁷⁵ Speer also remarked on the effect of the gradual build up in intensity, considering it one of the major errors of the campaign. He believed that the British failed to take into account 'the fatalistic frame of mind which a civil population finally acquires after numerous air raids'.⁷⁶ The issue was noticed in the subsequent *Battle of Berlin*. A Ministry of Information (MOI) report noted that the expected break in morale had failed to materialise in Berlin because 'the factor of concentration in time which made so significant a contribution to the success of the Hamburg attacks, [had] been absent'.⁷⁷ Although essentially correct, the emphasis is placed on the necessity for continuous bombing during the raids to ensure success. There is no consideration for the necessity of maintaining such intensity in the longer term, or the consequences of failing to do so. Hamburg had already suffered 137 attacks before Operation GOMORRAH. It is clear that with such hard-earned experience and its efficient civil-defence organisation, 'Hamburg was [as] ready as any big town could be to survive further air attack'.⁷⁸ Bad as it was for Hamburg, it could have been far worse.

Personal testimony appears to contradict Süss and Overy in demonstrating a degree of disobedience to the authorities. However, it is only evidence of dissent at a local level and, as proven by Hamburg's recovery, it was of limited duration. It must also be kept in mind that there is a difference between what people thought, wrote and behaved in the immediate aftermath of personal tragedy and how they reacted as a populace to a civil disaster. The former is revealed in personal accounts and memoirs, but the latter is exposed in official documents. The official accounts support Süss' and Overy's viewpoints in that, due to a number of reasons, there was no breakdown in Government. There was State dependence and apathy, of course, but also disgust with the Government and defiance towards the enemy. The journalist Ursula von Kardorff wrote in her diary after a raid on Berlin that 'if the British think they are going to undermine our morale they are barking up the wrong tree'.⁷⁹ Pre-war measures had helped to prepare the population, but the inability of the CBO to maintain the intensity of the raids throughout the campaign was crucial. It allowed the population time to adapt and, to an extent, become inured to city bombing.

Britain's Reaction

Whilst the policy of the CBO set the destruction of the war-making capacity of Hamburg as an aim of Operation GOMORRAH, it was not the only measure of success. In fact, MacKay is convinced that British morale had to have been foremost in the Government's mind when it began the Strategic Bombing Offensive (SBO) in 1942. He reasoned that the ineffectiveness at the time of bomber forces meant that 'bombing was less a strategy for winning the war than a device for maintaining morale at home'.⁸⁰ Consequently, at the lowest periods of the war, the conviction that Britain would not be defeated was

buttressed by the knowledge, assiduously supplied by the press and radio, that offensive operations were being conducted against the enemy. In the early years this meant exclusively the bombing of Germany.⁸¹

As the campaign progressed, Bomber Command became ever more successful in disrupting the military and industrial capabilities of Germany. But still there remained the aim of ensuring that the British public, despite their own privations, were behind the campaign and the war in general. So how did Operation GOMORRAH fare against this measure of success?

Results of RAF raids were passed on to the British War Cabinet through fortnightly reports from Bomber Command with subsequent discussions recorded in the *War Cabinet Weekly Résumé*. Inevitably there would have been a lag within the chain of reporting. Even so, the post-operation reports for Operation GOMORRAH were not as prompt as might have been expected, especially considering the number of aircraft overflying the city. An explanation for the delay is alluded to in the *Immediate Interpretation Report 1640* dated 1 August 1943. Whilst claiming extensive damage had been caused to the North East of Hamburg, it also pointed out that a definitive account was impossible due to the amount of smoke over the city.⁸² The *Summary of Operations of Bomber Command* for the period ending 1 August 1943 concurred, blaming the lack of photographic evidence on excessive smoke and cloud. Even so, the War Cabinet was informed that Hamburg had 'suffered a series of the most devastating attacks ever launched against a great city' in a report that anticipated Hamburg's total annihilation.⁸³ By linking the operation on Hamburg with those on the Ruhr and the Rhineland, it also claimed that the destruction of Hamburg would, 'apart from the obvious results, have the most severe effect on German morale'.⁸⁴ The reasoning being that if the defences had failed on those targets, what hope could the German population have in other cities, especially Berlin. It was another fourteen days before the Cabinet received accurate photographic damage interpretation from reconnaissance flights, and the report was one of complete devastation. It was not just the damage to industry that was made clear but also the physical effects on the surviving population of Hamburg. Utilities and transport had been heavily affected, an estimated half a million people had been bombed out of their homes and an evacuation was being carried out on a vast scale. A further, though erroneous, claim was that systems for emergency feeding had failed due to the destruction of food stockpiles.⁸⁵



Hamburg, 29 July 1943 (RAF Museum)

Of course, British authorities had sources other than just RAF reconnaissance flights and photographic interpretation to rely on – including the German media. One Cabinet report included pronouncements from Josef Goebbels on the significance of morale to the German authorities. In the statement, reproduced from the Nazi newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter*, Goebbels outlined how bombing raids both affected German morale and shaped their responses. In fact he considered that the Allied Air Forces were actively targeting German morale. To his mind ‘the morale of the people [was] a decisive factor for the outcome’ of the war,

an admission that appears to condone area bombing as a legitimate action of war.⁸⁶ The only response that Goebbels could conceive of was to respond in kind, but retaliation at that time was not an option. Hence he could only call for defences to be strengthened and public resolve bolstered with appeals to public duty.⁸⁷ Clearly such reports supported the prevailing view within the British Government that the campaign was having a significant effect on the enemy's morale and causing a diversion of resources away from the frontline. This was a fitting message for the British public and sections of Goebbels' speech were published in the *Daily Mail*. Interestingly, the press ran with the story on 7 August 1943; in other words, before the War Cabinet received their report.⁸⁸ This raises the question of whether the authorities were passing suitable information to the press for publication, or gathering their intelligence from the press for assessment. In the long term, the answer was almost certainly both. The authorities released information about military operations whilst garnering feedback on raids from the press, in a symbiotic relationship that benefited both parties. Whilst the press got in-depth information about military operations, the authorities gained access to a publicity mechanism with which to bolster the public's morale. Unfortunately, the information the War Cabinet received was not always correct and, at times, was subjected to biased interpretations. For instance, it is now clear that the Hamburg authorities did in fact establish effective food distribution and re-housing procedures. Far from failing, as the War Cabinet had believed, those measures were successfully implemented after the Hamburg raids.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the British authorities were obliged to run with the information they had available and so promoted a victorious operation against the city of Hamburg to a British public hungry for news of success.

The British press was fully active in the reassurance of the population during the war and the 'heroic achievements of the RAF were exploited for every last ounce of comfort they afforded – not merely the defence of Britain in the summer of 1940, but also the bombing raids on Germany.'⁹⁰ Reports on Operation GOMORRAH appeared almost daily in the newspapers, as well as in weekly magazines. The press were able to call on staff based overseas and embedded in RAF units, as well as information supplied by the offices of the British Government. They also had access to foreign reporters still active in Germany, and through them, to German sources. Accordingly, the press coverage appeared comprehensive and accurate. Swedish reporters for the *Daily Mail* were able to describe Hamburg as in a state of panic after a bombing campaign considered unparalleled in history. They interviewed survivors arriving in Stockholm who spoke of German authorities unable to cope with the chaos.⁹¹ Meanwhile, Berlin radio stations talked of enforced evacuation, whilst Hamburg radio admitted, 'our well-prepared plans against such an emergency [had] collapsed under this hell.'⁹²

The press were at times guilty of a xenophobic presentation that impacted on the veracity of their reporting. For example, an account from the *Daily Mail* described a German radio reporter, Dr Weininger, as speaking 'with the high-strung emotion typical of a Teuton who is being hit.'⁹³ Such an approach had been considered vital in order to portray the differences in national characters which would promote support for bombing Germany. The intention was to show that, whilst the British could survive bombing offensives such as 'the Blitz', the Germans could

not, due to deficiencies in their national character. To this end, bombing raids were referred to in such military terms as 'counter-offensives' and 'battles' rather than as 'retaliation raids'. In this way, the public could distinguish between the actions of the British 'gentlemen' and the German 'Huns'.⁹⁴ Even so, and despite of the *Daily Mail's* denigration of Dr Weininger, the text of his broadcast was significant enough to be recorded as an accurate and vivid account of events in the magazine *War Illustrated*.⁹⁵

Mark Connelly claimed that coverage of the bombing campaign was 'ambiguous to say the least', for whilst the press lauded the 'righteous retribution brought to all Germans', it constantly stressed the industrial nature of the targets.⁹⁶ Publicly, the British Government denied civilian targets even existed: they were either militarily effective targets or not.⁹⁷ Connelly appears supported by contemporary press reports with their marked tendency to avoid comment on civilian casualty numbers whilst simultaneously emphasizing industrial targets. The accurate reporting of RAF losses suggests that general squeamishness over casualty figures was not the problem, rather a reluctance to dwell on what appears to be the more sensitive issue, namely that of killing civilians.⁹⁸ Air Chief Marshal Harris and Air Secretary Sinclair had actually quarrelled over how to portray area bombing to the public, an argument that Sinclair eventually won.⁹⁹ Sinclair considered that too much information about bombing civilians was bad for public morale, especially for those of a heavily religious persuasion, and he is supported by evidence from the MOI reports. Following Operation GOMORRAH, the *Home Intelligence Weekly Report* noted that although the sounds of RAF bombers on their way to Germany comforted people, 'any sign of gloating [was] resented'.¹⁰⁰ Whilst people accepted the need for the offensive, and even believed that destruction on a similar scale would be required for Berlin, they did not want to be reminded of what they were doing.¹⁰¹ The following week's report claimed that whilst people were impressed with the success of Operation GOMORRAH, there was a level of 'distaste at gloating at the destruction of homes'.¹⁰² Such distaste might well have been due to memories of German raids and the uncomfortable knowledge the British public had of what German civilians were now having to endure.

Although the press had shied away from printing German casualty figures, there were still other angles to explore. *Flight and the Aircraft Engineer* drew their audiences' attention to the effect of the raids on U-boat production. In noting that attacks on U-boat pens had proven ineffective, it applauded the bombing of the production sites, the results of which would 'be seen in a shortage of U-boats in the Atlantic' and safer supply routes.¹⁰³ Of course, more supplies reaching Britain would further boost morale; a conclusion that British MOS diarist, Peter Adamson, had arrived at a few days earlier.¹⁰⁴ *War Illustrated* deliberated on the effects of continuous heavy raids and came to the same conclusion as Speer that piecemeal bombing was totally ineffective. Only 'real hard bombing blows' made a difference. To further illustrate the point, they linked the capitulation of Italy with the commencement of bombing raids on Rome.¹⁰⁵ Whether this causal link was correct or not, the British public appeared to have reached the same conclusion.¹⁰⁶

It was not just the press who disseminated Government doctrine to the public. HM Stationery Office was tasked with producing pamphlets such as *Bomber Command* whilst the MOI sponsored documentary films like *London Can Take it!*¹⁰⁷ That particular film reminded its audience that not only would Britain stand firm, but that 'every night the RAF bombers [would] fly deep into the heart of Germany, bombing munition [sic] works, aeroplane factories, canals, cutting the arteries which keep the heart of Germany alive.'¹⁰⁸ Although such films were understandably less than accurate in their depictions of strategic policy, combat or its aftermath, they nevertheless had a profound effect on their target audience. The diarist Vere Hodgson wrote of her fondness for such films, remarking on what she considered to be the accuracy of the depiction of air raids in the film *In Which We Serve*.¹⁰⁹ Hodgson, who had witnessed air raids herself, saw *The Moon is Down*, which depicted a brutal occupation, just after the Operation GOMORRAH raids, and opined that it was a film all pacifists should see in order to understand what the British bomber offensive had saved them from.¹¹⁰

Clearly the success of Operation GOMORRAH was heavily publicised. But what effect did that have on morale? From the evidence of private individuals, the results of Operation GOMORRAH were considered stunning, with significant consequences for Germany and the war in general. In her diary entries, Hodgson noted how 'damage to Hamburg is colossal – almost wiped off the map' and that 'the Berliners are frantically digging trenches ... they expect to be next.'¹¹¹ That last quote, almost identical to an article published in the *Daily Mail* on the same day, suggests that the press was indeed successfully influencing the public.¹¹² In fact, Adamson might have read the same article. He remarked on the evacuation scheme being employed in Berlin as a result of the raids on Hamburg, a subject of the same *Daily Mail* report.¹¹³ With regards to German casualties, both Adamson and Hodgson acknowledged the suffering of the Germans, but without regret. In remembering her own close encounters with death from German bombs, Hodgson remarked that although it was a terrible thing to be bombed, it was Germany who had started it and it was good that they were receiving the same treatment. It might even help deter future violence.¹¹⁴ Recent events might have influenced Hodgson's opinion as a raid on Eastbourne two months prior to Operation GOMORRAH could only have been viewed as indiscriminate bombing. After all, she wrote, 'one does not know what the Germans think there is in Eastbourne.'¹¹⁵ Adamson was also disturbed by German actions prior to the Hamburg bombing. In noting the sinking of a hospital ship by the Luftwaffe, Adamson considered that the action was indicative of Germany's attitude 'that in war everything is justified.'¹¹⁶ Perhaps it is not surprising that he thought Germany deserved to be fearful after the misery they had inflicted on others.

Adamson made two interesting points on German morale with regards to Operation GOMORRAH. The first referred to the speech by Goebbels, of which he wrote, 'it is astonishing for Gobbels [sic] to admit that the Germans cannot reply to the R.A.F raids ... I think the Gobbels [sic] speech is going to have far reaching consequence on morale.'¹¹⁷ The promise of reprisals had provided encouragement to the German people but with Goebbels' speech that small comfort had been lost. Adamson's second point was on the evacuation of women

and children from the cities, an action of which he approved. To his mind, their deaths would enrage the German population and encourage them to fight harder and for longer. Adamson based his argument on the British reaction to being bombed, aligning the British experience with what Germany was now enduring. In doing so, it appears that Adamson was rejecting the press-promoted – and xenophobic – view of the inferior character traits of the German people.¹¹⁸

It was not just the media reports on successful raids that helped lift British morale. The mere fact that British bombers were fighting back and hitting German cities also gave considerable comfort. Hodgson recalled how the sight of bombers making their way to Germany 'looked fine, and we felt safe beneath them.'¹¹⁹ Of hearing the bombers on their way to Hamburg, she wrote that this 'was a comfortable feeling. I turned lazily in bed and glowed at the thought.'¹²⁰ London resident and policewoman, Dorothy West concurred, claiming that people could determine British bombers from German by their engine noise, thus drawing comfort rather than alarm from the drone of overflying aircraft.¹²¹ In fact, by August 1943 people could take comfort in the knowledge that reprisal raids were now considered unlikely. The reasoning went that if Germany still had the capability, then Hitler would have carried out reprisal raids after Hamburg. The fact that he failed to do so lifted the morale of many.¹²²

While the British Government used air raids, publicised through the media, to boost morale, feedback was needed from the public to be sure the policy was effective. This role was



Avro Lancasters of 467 Squadron ready for take-off (RAF Museum)

assigned to the MOI. The MOI had been monitoring the views of the public towards aerial bombardment throughout the war and had found very little sympathy being felt for the German people. A report on an exhibition on German war damage in February 1943 noted a 'general feeling of "grim satisfaction"' and 'amazement at the extent of the damage done'.¹²³

Following Operation GOMORRAH, the weekly report from the MOI again commented on the lack of sympathy for German bomb victims and credited the operation's success for the general feeling of well-being in the country.¹²⁴ That lack of empathy towards German civilians did not change as further details of the devastation were released to the public. In fact, by October there were calls for even heavier bombing to punish Germany, along with criticism that the promised destruction of German cities had not yet been accomplished.¹²⁵

Along with their own intelligence gathering sources, the MOI utilised the resources of the MOS. This private organisation used questionnaires filled in by members of the public and diaries maintained by volunteers to gauge the general morale of the British public. Their monthly report for July 1943 described a generally positive attitude towards the bombing campaign.¹²⁶ However, by August, after Operation GOMORRAH, it was considered that the public now 'preserved a cautious attitude when passing judgement on the value of air raids on Germany, and in assessing the will and power of the German people to continue with the struggle'.¹²⁷ Although their calculated index of morale on the issue of the bombing of Germany and Italy was recorded that month at an encouraging 97%, the MOS did not believe there to be much confidence in the likelihood of a collapse of German morale.¹²⁸ The findings of the MOS differed from those of the MOI on two major issues. Firstly, the value the British public placed on the CBO and secondly, how they, the public, believed it affected morale, both at home and in Germany.

So why was there a difference in the opinions expressed by the MOI and MOS for the same post-Operation GOMORRAH period? One reason was that the MOI was part of, and beholden to, the Government, whereas the MOS was an independent body. Whilst the MOI were responsible for commissioning the MOS in the first place, it was only one of many sources they used to generate reports. They also had their own regional officers gathering information, access to BBC listener surveys and clandestine sources including the postal censors.¹²⁹ Consequently the MOI could garner information from the public surreptitiously, collating opinions people might not have been prepared to express publicly. As the MOS themselves admitted, the information they gathered only showed what people were prepared to say to a stranger. It was not necessarily what they actually thought or did.¹³⁰ It is also possible that the discrepancies between the two reporting bodies might be explained by their differing objectives. Whilst the MOS was tasked with gauging the morale of the public as affected by the war, the MOI was responsible for maintaining that morale. On that point it was answerable to the Government. This perhaps explains their different understandings on what 'wartime morale' actually was. The MOS defined it to be 'the amount of interest people take in the war, how worthwhile they think it is', later amended to include the 'determination to carry on with the utmost energy'.¹³¹ Meanwhile the Home Intelligence Division, despite never laying down

an actual definition, believed it to revolve around the 'state of conduct and behaviour of an individual or a group'.¹³² It was measured on what they did as opposed to what they said or complained about. Hence, private letters, diaries and even conversations would tend to align more with the Government run MOI reports. The personal views they contained were less likely to be expressed publicly, even in questionnaires, and therefore more likely to reflect their true beliefs.

Overall, the evidence supports the view that the success of Operation GOMORRAH had resulted in acclamation from both press and public. In Connelly's opinion, at that stage of the conflict, 'the British people demanded a German bloody nose and supported the bomber as the only weapon likely to deliver it'.¹³³ Therefore in the summer and autumn of 1943, despite some misgivings over the loss of life, the bombing of Hamburg can justifiably claim to have boosted the morale of the majority of the British public.

Conclusion

Whilst the physical success of Operation GOMORRAH is a matter of historical record, the mental trauma visited on the survivors was also considered 'as great, if not so enduring, as that caused by the most destructive earthquakes of past ages'.¹³⁴ However, if wartime morale was considered as the will to work for the war effort, then although German morale was weakened by the CBO, it was definitely not broken. People carried on 'in a fatalistic and apathetic mood', not because of belief in the cause, but as a result of their reliance on the State and their desire to survive.¹³⁵ However, the German leadership were happy to distinguish between morale and conduct. What their people did, and how they worked, were more important than what they said and how they thought. Hence, personal letters and memoirs show survivors lacking determination to work and questioning Germany's very future, whereas official records document the city's economic revival and commendable civilian conduct.¹³⁶ For Germany, conduct was what mattered. Despite evidence of low morale and local outbreaks of dissent against the authorities, there was no major revolt, just a general acceptance of the situation.

That said, the effect of Operation GOMORRAH extended further than might have been expected. The raids showed that fire could be more effective than blast damage, in the right circumstances, in destroying the homes of workers and affecting production through absenteeism. The fires also had the greatest effect on German morale. The number of deaths caused by the firestorm meant that after Hamburg and for the remainder of the war, all of Germany feared the large area fires.¹³⁷ Finally, on 30 April 1945, with the war lost, Speer went to Hamburg to persuade Gauleiter Kaufmann to defend the city against the oncoming Allied forces. He was unsuccessful. The British forces had informed the city authorities that any attempt to defend Hamburg would result in the 'heaviest bombing the city had ever received' and Kaufmann was not prepared to accept that fate for his city.¹³⁸ He might well have had memories of Operation GOMORRAH in mind. Crucially Admiral Dönitz, as head of state, supported Kaufmann's decision, and so prevented further loss of life on both sides.¹³⁹

Although Grayling claimed that the morale of the German people was not broken until the final months of the war when German defeat was inevitable, it could also be argued that the inevitability of defeat was as a result of the bombing and so the threat of further bombardment was, in this case, just too much.¹⁴⁰ Hamburg could not take another Operation GOMORRAH. Perhaps on this occasion the CBO had ultimately destroyed the will of the Government to fight on, albeit only at a local level, in accordance with British military doctrine.¹⁴¹

How the British public perceived Operation GOMORRAH was dependent on how the Government presented it through the media. To that end, the press – who were willing participants in the campaign to reassure the British population – keenly promoted the exploits of Bomber Command with information supplied from the Government. Consequently, the best possible light was put on the hugely successful bombing raids on Hamburg.¹⁴² Such reporting assured the public that Britain was still in the fight and taking the war to Germany. Although Connelly contested the ambiguous nature of the reporting with regards to targeting, the public seemed to worry very little about the ethics of attacking civilians.¹⁴³ They were aware of that aspect of the bombing campaign, but as long as it was not presented to them in any great detail, they did not complain. The Air Ministry was correct in concluding that too much detail would indeed have a negative effect on the morale of the British public. Süß was to later agree, noting that until the end of the war the British public had not seen many pictures depicting the actual destruction of German cities.¹⁴⁴ He argued that if they had, support for air raids might have wavered. To his mind, public morale in Britain would have been damaged through unease at what was being done on their behalf. However, there were plenty of articles in the press describing the damage visited on German cities, including Hamburg.¹⁴⁵ Detailed photographs of Dresden and Cologne were not published until later in the war and promoted as signs of a military victory, rather than of evidence of the horrors inflicted. Publicly, the subject of morale bombing was rarely mentioned.¹⁴⁶ The British public, of course, had experienced bombing for themselves and, as Friedrich pointed out, 'could figure out on their own the connection between burned-out homes and incinerated inhabitants.'¹⁴⁷ Besides, as Süß stated; the silent consensus in Britain was that the war was not just against Nazism; it was against Germany as a whole. So 'if civilians as a result of their work, were in the end no different from soldiers, why was it necessary to offer them special protection?'¹⁴⁸

Interestingly, as with Germany, there is a contradiction between the personal beliefs expressed in diaries and memoirs, and official documents. The difference in how the MOS and MOI reported the state of morale suggests that what people thought privately and what they were prepared to say and do in public could be different. An individual's morale, good or bad, might not necessarily be reflected in how they expressed themselves in public over the conduct of the Air War. But in the end, for the majority of the British public in August 1943, the need to hit back at Germany overrode any qualms about the morality of civilian casualties. Operation GOMORRAH fulfilled that need and consequently was a positive influence on

the morale of the British public. As an example of what could be achieved with regards to targeting morale, both at home and on the enemy, Operation GOMORRAH if measured against realistic parameters was an unqualified success.

Notes

¹ Sir Michael Howard, "Ethics, Deterrence and Strategic Bombing," *The Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society* (1994), p.15.

² Ibid. See also Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, Vol.IV: Annexes and Appendices* (London: H.M.S.O, 1961b), pp.153-154.

³ For examples see Phillip Meilinger, "Trenchard and "Morale Bombing": The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II," *The Journal of Military History* 60 (1996), p.265; and E. Warner, "Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. E. M. Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p.489.

⁴ For this progression of attacking morale in British strategy see *C.D. 22. Operations Manual, Royal Air Force* (1922), pp.57-58; Meilinger, "Trenchard and "Morale Bombing": The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II," p.265; Richard Overy, *The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2013b), p.3.

⁵ R. Overy, "World War II: The Bombing of Germany," in *The War in the Air 1914-1994*, ed. A. Stephens (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2001), pp.16, 257-258, 263-265; J. Fennell, "In Search of the 'X' Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37 (2014), pp.799-828; J. Fennell, "Air Power and Morale in the North African Campaign of the Second World War," *Air Power Review* 15, No 2 (2012), pp.1-15.

⁶ For examples see A. C. Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006); D. Süß, *Death from the Skies* [Tod aus der Luft], trans. L. Sharp and J. Noakes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.525-525; Arthur Frank Poore, *Interviewed by Wood, C. (29 Mar 2000)*, IWM, 2000.

⁷ John Kenneth Galbraith, *A Life in our Times: Memoirs* (London: Deutsch, 1981), pp.239-240.

⁸ T. D. Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p.202; Peter W. Gray, "The Gloves Will have to Come Off: A Reappraisal of the Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive Against Germany," *RAF Air Power Review* 13, No 3 (Autumn, 2010), p.26.

⁹ Webster and Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945. Vol.IV: Annexes and Appendices*, pp.153-154.

¹⁰ Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities*, p.106.

¹¹ Overy, "World War II: The Bombing of Germany," pp.107-108.

¹² Ibid. p.107.

¹³ J. Friedrich, *The Fire* [Der Brand], trans. A. Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Süß, *Death from the Skies*, p.518.

¹⁴ H. Rumpf, *The Bombing of Germany* [Das War der Bombenkrieg], trans. E. Fitzgerald (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1963), pp.180-181.

¹⁵ Süß, *Death from the Skies*, p.518.

¹⁶ H. E. Nossack, *The End - Hamburg 1943* [Der Untergang: Hamburg 1943], trans. J. Agee (London: University of Chicago, [1948] 2004); M. Wolff- Mönckeberg, *On the Other Side: To My*

Children - from Germany, 1940-45, ed. R. Evans (London: Pan, 1982).

¹⁷ Süß, *Death from the Skies*. Süß made use of German personal testimonies to provide a contrasting account to established histories.

¹⁸ Overy, *The Bombing War Europe 1939-1945*, pp.16-17.

¹⁹ Robert Mackay, *Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War* (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), p.154.

²⁰ Webster and Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945. Vol.IV: Annexes and Appendices*, pp.153-154.

²¹ AIR 48/19 "A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Hamburg Germany," The National Archives (TNA), 1945, pp.6,8.

²² M. Middlebrook, *The Battle of Hamburg: Allied Bomber Forces Against a German City in 1943* (London: Allen Lane, 1980), p.324.

²³ AIR 20/7287 "Report by the Police President on the Large Scale Raids on Hamburg in July and August 1943," TNA, 1946; Wolff- Mönckeberg, *On the Other Side: To My Children - from Germany, 1940-45*; Süß, *Death from the Skies*; Friedrich, *The Fire*; Jeremy Noakes, ed., *Nazism, 1919-1945 Vol.4 The German Home Front in World War II* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1998).

²⁴ AIR 48/19 "A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Hamburg Germany," p.1.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Meilinger, "Trenchard and "Morale Bombing": The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II", p.265.

²⁷ Peter W. Gray, "The Strategic Leadership and Direction of the Royal Air Force Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany from Inception to 1945" (PhD Diss.), p.284.

²⁸ PREM 3/193/6A, The National Archives, a) Italian Consul report and Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee JIC(43) 367 (final) Probabilities of a German Collapse Oct 43.

²⁹ Overy, *World War II: The Bombing of Germany*, p.136.

³⁰ Howard, "Ethics, Deterrence and Strategic Bombing," pp.12-23 p.17.

³¹ Süß, *Death from the Skies*, pp.395-396.

³² Friedrich, *The Fire* pp.166-167.

³³ Middlebrook, *The Battle of Hamburg: Allied Bomber Forces Against a German City in 1943*, p.172.

³⁴ Ibid. p.147.

³⁵ Ibid. p.172.

³⁶ Ibid. pp.148-149.

³⁷ Süß, *Death from the Skies*, p.75.

³⁸ Ibid. p.77.

³⁹ AIR 20/7287 "Report by the Police President on the Large Scale Raids on Hamburg in July and August 1943," p.71.

⁴⁰ Wolff- Mönckeberg, *On the Other Side: To My Children - from Germany, 1940-45*, pp.79-80.

⁴¹ Noakes, *Nazism, 1919-1945 Vol.4, The German Home Front in World War II*, pp.569-570.

⁴² Rumpf, *The Bombing of Germany*, pp.188-189.

⁴³ Nossack, *The End - Hamburg 1943*, pp.59-60.

⁴⁴ K. Lowe, *Inferno: The Devastation of Hamburg, 1943* (London: Penguin, 2012), pp.301-318.

⁴⁵ Wolff- Mönckeberg, *On the Other Side: To My Children - from Germany, 1940-45*, p.85.

- ⁴⁶ Lowe, *Inferno: The Devastation of Hamburg*, 1943, p.301.
- ⁴⁷ Webster and Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945 Vol.IV: Annexes and Appendices*, p.307 Appendix 29.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p.384.
- ⁴⁹ Wolff- Mönckeberg, *On the Other Side: To My Children - from Germany, 1940-45*, pp.69-73.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p.79.
- ⁵¹ Nossack, *The End - Hamburg 1943*, pp.31-33.
- ⁵² Middlebrook, *The Battle of Hamburg: Allied Bomber Forces Against a German City in 1943*, p.352; see also Lowe, *Inferno: The Devastation of Hamburg, 1943*, pp.25-30.
- ⁵³ Nossack, *The End - Hamburg 1943*, pp.31-32.
- ⁵⁴ Friedrich, *The Fire*, p.423.
- ⁵⁵ Nossack, *The End - Hamburg 1943*, pp.31-33.
- ⁵⁶ Wolff- Mönckeberg, *On the Other Side: To My Children - from Germany, 1940-45*, p.85.
- ⁵⁷ Nossack, *The End - Hamburg 1943*, p.32.
- ⁵⁸ Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich : Memoirs by Albert Speer*; trans. Richard and Clara Winston (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), pp.388-389.
- ⁵⁹ Süß, *Death from the Skies*, pp.78-79; S. Read, *The Killing Skies* (Stroud: Spellmount, 2008), p.151.
- ⁶⁰ Speer, *Inside the Third Reich : Memoirs by Albert Speer*, p.389.
- ⁶¹ Webster and Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945 Vol.IV: Annexes and Appendices*, pp.375-378.
- ⁶² Overy, *World War II: The Bombing of Germany*, p.119; INF 1/292 Pt 2 "Home Morale and Public Opinion 22 Sept 1941." TNA, 1941, p.4.
- ⁶³ AIR/40/1494 "Allied Attacks and German Morale," TNA, 1944, p.5.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁵ Meilinger, "Trenchard and "Morale Bombing": The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II", p.265; "MORALE IN GLASGOW [File Report 600]" Mass Observation Archive, University of Sussex, March 1941. <http://www.massobservation.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Details/FileReport-600>; INF 1/292 Pt 2 "Home Morale and Public Opinion 22 Sept 1941".
- ⁶⁶ AIR/40/1494 "Allied Attacks and German Morale," p.4.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.* pp.9-10.
- ⁶⁸ Webster and Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945 Vol.IV: Annexes and Appendices*, pp.375-376.
- ⁶⁹ Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities*, pp.93-95.
- ⁷⁰ Rumpf, *The Bombing of Germany*, pp.182-183.
- ⁷¹ Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities*, pp.93-95.
- ⁷² Noakes, *Nazism, 1919-1945 Vol.4, The German Home Front in World War II*, pp.558-560.
- ⁷³ AIR 20/7287 "Report by the Police President on the Large Scale Raids on Hamburg in July and August 1943," p.71; Wolff- Mönckeberg, *On the Other Side: To My Children - from Germany, 1940-45*, p.79.
- ⁷⁴ Webster and Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945 Vol.IV: Annexes and Appendices*, p.378.
- ⁷⁵ Rumpf, *The Bombing of Germany*, pp.182-183.

- ⁷⁶ Webster and Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945 Vol.IV: Annexes and Appendices*, p.383.
- ⁷⁷ AIR/40/1494 "Allied Attacks and German Morale," p.7.
- ⁷⁸ Rumpf, *The Bombing of Germany*, pp.86-87.
- ⁷⁹ Noakes, *Nazism, 1919-1945 Vol.4, The German Home Front in World War II*, p.565.
- ⁸⁰ Mackay, *Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War*, p.257.
- ⁸¹ Ibid.
- ⁸² AIR/24/258 "Immediate Interpretation Report no. 1640," TNA, 1943a.
- ⁸³ CAB/66/40/16 "War Cabinet Summary of Operations 1 August 1943,"(Cabinet Papers, TNA, 1943b).
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- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ Special Correspondent, "Berlin in Grip of 'Hamburg Panic'," *Daily Mail*, August 7, 1943.
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- ⁹⁰ Mackay, *Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War*, p.154.
- ⁹¹ Special Correspondent, "Evacuation of Hamburg," *The Times*, August 2, 1943; C. Bednall, "Berlin: 11th-Hour Bit to Save Herself," *Daily Mail*, August 3, 1943.
- ⁹² Ralph Hewins, "Berlin a City of Fear: 'Our Turn Next'," *Daily Mail*, August 2, 1943.
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- ⁹⁴ Süß, *Death from the Skies*, pp. 93-94.
- ⁹⁵ Dr Weininger, "My Night of Terror in Bomb-Battered Hamburg," *The War Illustrated*, 1943, p.190.
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- ⁹⁸ For examples see Daily Mail Reporter, "Six Raids Pounded Hamburg into Vast Heap of Rubble," *Daily Mail*, September 20, 1943; and Daily Mail Air Correspondent, "Seven Days of Fire at Hamburg," *Daily Mail*, July 31, 1943.
- ⁹⁹ Süß, *Death from the Skies*, p.95.
- ¹⁰⁰ INF 1/292 "Home Intelligence Weekly Report 19 Aug 1943," TNA, 1943e; Vere Hodgson also noted how the sound of bombers on the way to Hamburg gave her comfort see V. Hodgson, *Few Eggs and no Oranges* (London: Persephone, 1999).
- ¹⁰¹ INF 1/292 "Home Intelligence Weekly Report 19 Aug 1943".
- ¹⁰² INF 1/292 "Home Intelligence Weekly Report 26 Aug 1943," TNA, 1943f.
- ¹⁰³ "The Outlook," *Flight and the Aircraft Engineer*, 5 August, 1943i.
- ¹⁰⁴ "Diarist 5004," Mass Observation Archive, University of Sussex, July 1941-March 1945.
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- ¹⁰⁸ Commentary from the film "London Can Take It" taken from A. Marwick and W. Simpson, eds., *Primary Sources 2: Interwar and World War II* (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2001), p.144.
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