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THE LOCATION AND STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE OF ANGLO - AMERICAN
BASES IN 1943.

A Study prepared by the German Air Historical Branch
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CONTENTS

I. General Observations on the Significance and Purpose of Bases

- (a) What is a base?
- (b) The various types of military bases
- (c) The purposes served by bases
 - 1. Bases for land-fighting
 - 2. Bases for naval warfare
 - 3. Base for aerial warfare
 - 4. The importance of a signals network
- (d) Policy regarding the establishment of new bases
 - 1. Continental Bases
 - 2. Maritime Bases

II. Location and Strategic Importance of the Anglo-American Bases at the Outbreak of War

- (a) Bases of the British Empire
 - 1. Naval bases in the British Isles
 - 2. Air Bases in the British Isles
 - 3. Shipping route from England to India via South Africa
 - 4. Routes: Great Britain - Mediterranean - India - Australia
 - 5. Routes: Great Britain - North America
 - 6. Routes: Great Britain - South America
- (b) U.S. Bases
 - 1. U.S. policy regarding the establishment of bases
 - 2. Bases situated on the American Coast
 - 3. Bases in the Panama Canal zone
 - 4. Location and strategic importance of the bases in the Pacific

III. Location and Strategic Importance of the Anglo-American Sea Bases in 1941 and their effect on British Defence Strategy

- (a) The importance of the Anglo-American bases
- (b) Changes brought about in the course of the war
 - 1. England's position in relation to Europe
 - 2. Position in the Atlantic
 - 3. Position in the Mediterranean
 - 4. Position in the Pacific
 - 5. Conclusive observations on sea bases

IV. Location and Strategic Importance of Land Bases, with particular reference to British Defence Strategy

V. Summary

I. General Observations on the Significance and Purpose of Bases

(a) What is a Base?

Bases serve primarily to establish a nation's communications in distant parts of the world. Bases can, however, also be a source of protection and defense against foreign influence, and generally are bases serve many purposes.

(b) The various types of Military Bases.

Military bases can be divided into categories, depending either on the purpose which they serve or the type of forces that will be based on them. We know certain land, sea and air bases each of which exists for a specific purpose, such as to facilitate communications, to disrupt enemy communications or as a jumping off point for military operations; in addition, they frequently serve as supply depots.

In his "Theorie Strategique", dealing with extremely strategic principles, the French Admiral Danton distinguishes between bases and positions. According to Danton, the positions are points from which an advance into enemy territory is planned and they are, therefore, closely connected with military operations.

Bases, on the other hand, are depots where supplies can be stored or repairs carried out. In the same work, Danton states that the strategic value of a position depends on its geographical position, on its capacity to withstand enemy attack, and also on its usefulness as a reserve depot. Positions and fighting forces form an integral whole and must supplement one another if full advantage is to be taken of naval supremacy.

(c) The purposes served by Bases

A base must have sufficient space for the deployment of troops and must provide facilities for training and equipping troops. As far as possible, protection must be afforded against enemy attack, either by actual defensive measures or by the most advantageous use of the terrain.

1. Bases for land-fighting

Sufficient space and a favorable terrain for offensive and defensive fighting. Suitable provisions for food and supplies.

2. Bases for naval warfare

If the term "land influence" may be used in connection with the actions of naval warfare, coastal areas can perhaps be said to possess this influence.

A sea base, or position as Danton calls it, has to fulfill a number of conditions. It must afford protection from wind and sun, good anchorage and a water level remaining fairly constant at all tides. It must have facilities for re-fueling and provisioning ships with drinking water and food. Other essential requisites are adequate landing and unloading and repair dock facilities. All these installations should be well defended and camouflaged against enemy aerial reconnaissance.

In the age of sailing ships the very minimum base facilities were necessary. Given favorable winds, ships could sail practically unlimited distances. Individual bases could therefore be at great distances from each other and there was no need for supply or repair bases.

/Thus

Thus it was possible for England to wage a sea war in the 16th Century against the world powers of Spain and Portugal with no fortified sea bases. Under these favourable conditions, England was able to turn her back on the Continent of Europe and devote herself to overseas expansion.

With the advent of the steam engine, shipping movements came to depend on fuel supplies. The distances between bases were determined by the distances a ship could travel without refuelling. Thanks to her monopoly of coal supplies, England was able during this period to strengthen her position as a world power to the detriment of other nations with no overseas bases.

When petrol took the place of coal, the change was an unfavourable one for England. The range of shipping movements was curtailed. Bases became of less importance as it became less necessary to stick in them, and England's control of the world's sea traffic lessened.

Bases with coal reserves had now to be equipped, in addition, with oil depots. The English coal monopoly was supplemented by an Anglo-American oil monopoly, in which the U.S.A. became the chief partner. Increased shipping tonnage necessitated increased repair facilities. Only a few bases could be equipped with wharves and docks large enough for battleships and aircraft carriers. These, the most important bases, are termed "First Class" bases.

With the development of aviation, land and sea bases need strong flank and fighter defences and continual defensive patrols by reconnaissance aircraft.

3. Bases for aerial warfare

An air base should not only be a jumping off ground for air operations, but also a point from which other arms can be guarded against enemy attack. The airfield must be suitable for air forces ground personnel. In addition, it should be situated as near as possible to the enemy lines so that maximum fighter penetration and escort can be attained.

Although the use of oil as fuel for shipping made it possible for bases to be more widely dispersed than before, aircraft bases have to be reasonably close to each other. For patrolling and communications purposes, the distance between bases should, at the present time, not exceed 1000 to 1500 kms.

4. Importance of signals network

With the development of signals technique, particularly radar, patrol areas in the vicinity of air and sea bases have been greatly increased.

(a) Policies regarding the establishment of new bases

Trends of foreign policy are often shown by the position and construction of a country's bases and by the order in which these are acquired. A clear distinction can be drawn between nations confining their interests to Europe, and those which plan in terms of sea and world power.

1. Continental Powers

A purely continental power will build bases only in its own country, or in its immediate vicinity, for the protection of specific areas, e.g. the German use of Heligoland and Crete. Such a power might, in the course of long term planning, or during a war, try to acquire some jumping off points for operations against enemy encirclement, e.g. the use of German bases in Norway and France against

/England.

England. As a general rule, a continental power will not establish bases too far away from the homeland. It has no need of supply and communication bases and will, in consequence, often tend to underestimate the value of such bases to others. Germany has been guilty of this fault with regard to Malta.

Both continental and sea powers can build bases to obstruct enemy operations. Such bases serve to check the power of an enemy or of an unreliable neutral; the most vital areas in enemy territory such as lines of communication, can be attacked, or political pressure can be applied. Any attempt on the part of the enemy to seize the same base must be resisted. Examples of such spheres of influence include the German use of the Balcans as a threat to Turkey, and the Russian occupation of Hongkong against Finland, Sweden and Germany.

2. Maritime Powers

A nation aspiring towards sea power must first of all set up and control lines of communication. The role of bases situated along these lines is similar to that played by the arteries in the human blood system.

II. Location and Strategic Importance of the Indo-American Bases at the Outbreak of War

(a) Bases of the British Empire

England's development into a great maritime power was a lengthy process. It began in 1588 with the destruction of the Spanish Armada, and between then and the Declaration of War in 1939, only one serious setback was suffered, the American War of Independence.

On the map are shown 5 main lines of communication:-

- (1) England - West Africa - South Africa - India - Australia (extending to Japan and China).
- (11) England - Mediterranean - India - Australia
- (111) England - North America
- (12) England - South America
- (v) West Coast of North America - Japan - Australia - India

The first four of these lines of communication are vital to the running of two-way traffic within the Empire.

The loss of, or even a serious threat to these routes would rob the Empire of its importance. To patrol and rule the seas, the Fleet must have a system of sea bases. Their location, number and construction are determined by the purpose they have to serve.

1. Naval bases in the British Isles

Scapa Flow, with the fortified harbour of George V, lying to the North, is an important base for operations in the North West Atlantic and North Sea; also for the blockade of Germany and escort of convoys to Russia.

Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth exist mainly as bases for operations in the Channel and against the Continent. Apart from these "first class" naval bases, many secondary harbours are dispersed along the coast.

2. Air bases in the British Isles

These are scattered over the entire island, but are rather more concentrated in Central and S.W. England. They serve for defence

and as bases for air operations against Europe.

3. Shipping route from England to India via South Africa

This route is safeguarded by the following bases: Gibraltar, Freetown, St. Helena, Capetown, Simonstown, Durban, Port Louis, Trincomali and Singapore. Gibraltar, Simonstown, Trincomali and Singapore are also valuable jumping off points for operations as follows:

Gibraltar: For operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the central part of the Eastern Atlantic. It dominates the western approaches to the Mediterranean and is therefore at all times in a position to prevent a fusion of the Spanish and French Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets. Combined operation of these two powers is therefore impossible. Owing to lack of space and unfavorable terrain, Gibraltar is of little value as an air base. It has only a medium sized airfield.

Simonstown: Base for operations in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic; serves as a strongpoint on the route round the Cape of Good Hope.

Trincomali: After Singapore the most important base for operations in the Indian Ocean and against the Dutch East Indies, but owing to its geographical position is of less use than Singapore as a barrier to Japanese expansion.

Singapore was in a position to dominate the straits of Malacca, the most important connecting link between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Singapore was thus able to control, obstruct or throttle the traffic between the oceans. Fifty percent of all Japanese and Chinese foreign trade passed along this route.

Since foreign trade is as important to Japan as a ^{MARITIME} power, as it is to England, Singapore in British hands was a potential threat to the Japanese. Singapore and Hongkong in combination controlled the southern approaches of the China sea and safeguarded British and Chinese trade. In the course of the war Japan has succeeded in eliminating this danger.

The route to the East via South Africa is, however, of only secondary importance as long as the shorter route to India, via the Mediterranean, remains unthreatened. Danger spot on this route is N.W. Africa with the French base of Dakar. The greater part of this area is practically undefended, but in mid-ocean there is little danger of attacks from the coast.

4. Routes: Great Britain - Mediterranean - India - Australia

The map shows the following bases: Gibraltar - Malta, Alexandria - Aden - Trincomali - Malakke - Melbourne - Sydney.

Malta: Like Gibraltar, Malta is a "first class" base and serves mainly to safeguard convoys and communications on this route; it is also a base for operations in the central Mediterranean. Its special strategic importance is due to its position on the sea route from Italy to the Italian North African colonies. It flanks the narrow between Sicily and Cap Bon and the Straits of Messina.

Alexandria and Aden guard the Suez Canal and are bases for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Both are equally important as land and air bases for the safeguarding of British interests in the Near East.

Trincomali, Malakke, Melbourne and Sydney serve to protect and safeguard the sea route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.

Other strategically important bases shown on the map are:

Cyprus, in the Eastern Mediterranean, from which Turkish naval traffic can be disrupted, the Bahrain Islands with their vast oil resources which, together with Aden and Bombay help to safeguard the Persian Gulf from Russian influence.

Penang, the most important terminal for British troop transports and the largest harbour available to Anglo-Indian Fleet.

Longest route: The entire Mediterranean route is threatened from the coasts of Spain, France and Italy. The Northern part of the Indian Ocean and Iran are threatened by Russian influence. A conflict between British and Japanese or U.S. interests, in the area between the Dutch East Indies and New Zealand, could jeopardize British interests in this area.

5. Route: Great Britain - North America

Newfoundland and St. John's. Numerous well protected bays provide good harbours.

Halifax: A useful supply and defence base lying at the mouth of the St. Lawrence river, with harbour ice-free all the whole year. It is the starting point for convoys heading North. The Bahamas serve as a communications link and safeguard the route from Great Britain to the West Indies. Together with Kingston they are a potential threat to the U.S.A.

Kingston is in a position to control traffic to the Panama Canal.

6. Route: Great Britain - South America

This route is the least protected of all. It has only two supply bases: Freetown and Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands. Freetown is also in a position to influence French West Africa. The Falklands might possibly serve as a defence point for the approaches to the Magellan Straits and the latter can be used as an alternative route to the Pacific if the Panama Canal should be closed. The Falklands are a powerful block confronting the Eastern States of South America.

The Falklands are also a potential danger to South America.

The map of the world shows more bases in New Zealand and along the West Coast of Canada. In the N.E. Pacific there are scattered British possessions but no bases.

Conclusion:

At the outbreak of war, England had an almost uninterrupted chain of strategically important bases stretching round the world. The American declaration of independence at the end of the 18th century caused the most serious break in this global chain of bases.

(b) U.S. Bases

Before we explore in greater detail the development of English bases during the present war and their effect on the defence of the Empire, mention must be made of the development of U.S. bases. England and America are so closely allied that they cannot be separated when discussing the defence of the Empire. Illustration 3 (Translator's note: Illustration missing) shows the United States with their overseas possessions and their bases in 1939.

1. U.S. policy regarding the establishment of bases

Up to the middle of the 19th Century the U.S. sphere of interest remained confined to the American Continent, and the American attitude during that period is epitomized by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.

Not until 1853, the year of the first U.S. Naval expedition to Japan, did America make her first attempt at overseas expansion. The basic conception underlying England's development into a world power was that bases were a means of holding together the various parts of her Empire. First of all these parts had to be conquered and made as strong and self-sufficient as possible and then the bases constructed. The building of these bases coincided closely with economic or political territorial expansion. The same tendency is to be seen in the disposition of U.S. bases in the Panama Canal area. In the Pacific and in S. America the sequence is reversed: the bases were established first and the economic and political expansion followed. Castro warns against the establishment by one power of bases at points of the globe outside that power's sphere of influence or even within the sphere of influence of another nation.

Danger zones are areas in which rival interests confront each other, for such a situation often leads to war.

The case of the U.S.A. and Japan may be cited in proof of Admiral Castro's theory.

In South America such conflicts rarely arise because of the weakness of the Latin-American States. British policy regarding her bases is clearly controlled on Castro's theories. As soon as Hong Kong entered into the Japanese sphere of influence, England's interests in it as a base flourished.

2. Bases situated on the American Coast

American defences are concentrated in the Pacific. Here the sea routes are safeguarded and protected by Seattle, three island near San Francisco, San Pedro and San Diego; these ports serve also as bases for operations on the West Pacific. The Atlantic sea routes are safeguarded by Boston, New York and Norfolk. There are no weak points in this chain of bases which lie at regular intervals along the length of the coastline.

3. Bases in the Panama Canal area

With the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean sea became vital links in one of the most important of world trading routes. To the west the Canal is protected by a line of bases stretching from Florida to Port au Prince in Haiti. Potential danger points were neighbouring English bases and in particular Kingston in Jamaica.

During the war these were voluntarily ceded to the U.S.A., and the area was further strengthened by the occupation of French bases on the Antilles. This meant an expansion of the chain of bases protecting the waters between N. and S. America, from the Virgin Islands via the Antilles as far as Trinidad. To the east, the Panama Canal is defended by strong fortifications and locks. For easier patrolling of the approaches to the Canal the Galapagos Islands were also occupied during the war.

A. Position and strategic importance of the bases in the Pacific

The sea route from America through the Pacific to Japan, Australia, India is, from an Anglo-American point of view, the most vulnerable of all. In the Eastern Pacific there is one important base, Pearl Harbour in the Hawaiian Islands. Whoever possesses this group of islands dominates the entire Eastern Pacific. They are the only base for supply and protective purposes in this area, and serve also as a jumping off point for offensive operations. Midway and Wake Islands are primarily communications bases, but serve also to defend the Hawaiians. Pago Pago on Samoa is steadily gaining in importance as a supply base on the route from the U.S.A. or the Hawaiians to Australia, the Philippines and Dutch East Indies.

The Philippines, in the Western Pacific, are of great economic importance. They are however situated within the Japanese sphere of influence, and must therefore be regarded as a potential danger area. They are too far distant from the American mainland to be of any use as operational bases. The present war has shown that, although fortified, they could not be held owing to supply difficulties.

III. Location and Strategic Importance of the Anglo-American Sea Bases in 1941 and their effect on Empire Defence Strategy

(a) The Importance of the Anglo-American bloc

The first part of this lecture has shown how England tried, even in peacetime, to establish an ever increasing number of bases. Well aware of the fact that the flow of supplies to and from the various parts of the Empire must remain uninterrupted, if the Empire is to be held together, England has constantly tried to gain added protection for her sea routes. The Anglo-American bloc eases the strain on the defence policy of the Empire. Areas in which conflicts between Britain and the U.S.A. might have arisen have been eliminated by the ceding or leasing of individual bases. While U.S. troops took over the defence of these bases, English forces became free to defend the Empire at other points. The future effect of these concessions to the U.S.A. on the British Empire cannot yet be assessed.

Map 4 (Translator's note: missing) shows the Anglo-American bloc at the time of the American entry into the war. The following critical appreciation of the role played by bases in the defence policy of the Empire, will point out those bases which serve not only for defence purposes but can also be used as starting points for offensive operations.

The present localized American offensive in the Pacific proves the truth of the motto "Attack is the best form of defence". This offensive is pinning the Japanese forces down to such an extent that Japan is now not in a position to attack India or any other part of the British Empire. An exhaustive treatise on operational bases must therefore not limit itself solely to a discussion on the suitability of bases for defensive purposes.

(b) Changes brought about in the course of the war

A comparison between Maps 4 and 5 shows the changes which have come about during the war. Map 5 shows the present position.

1. England's position in relation to Germany

Since the occupation of Norway and France a complete blockade of Germany has been technically impossible. Through the development of war weapons - especially those used by the U.S.A. - the entire British Isles are now threatened. Bases on the British Isles serve primarily as a protection against air attacks; in the second place as fortifications against enemy landings. They are also starting points for landing and air operations against the Continent.

bases on Iceland and Greenland serve to protect the Northern supply route from submarines. Japan is isolated and is handicapped - in particular by maintaining constant anti-submarine patrols. The independence movement - aided by Japan - now aims to pick up any ships leaving the control of Northern waters of the N. Sea. Iceland is also a potential base for operations against North or Central Europe.

2. Position in the Atlantic

The following basic strategic conditions must be fulfilled in all cases. Firstly, supply routes must be kept open and enemy interference with these routes checked. Secondly, a stronghold must be maintained on German overseas shipping. To achieve this, England needs not only a force based on the coast but also friendly co-operation or tolerance from other maritime nations.

In this war, with the possible exception of German occupied France, there is no possibility of the Atlantic being threatened from the Northern shore. There is little fear of any danger from Spain because of that country's economic servitude and military weakness. Portugal also will remain in British sphere of influence, particularly since the occupation of the Azores.

With the landing over by Britain of some of her bases in the U.S.A. the American in the West Indies has become considerably. The U.S. are already spreading their influence over the entire N. American continent. Under cover of a propaganda campaign concerning suspected threats to the N. American countries from the Axis powers, the U.S. have acquired various bases there. These are applied from those bases during 1942 and 1943 until the N. American States broke off relations with the Axis powers. These bases were of little or very little military importance. They can be regarded as advanced points for the economic expansion of the U.S.A.

The sea channel

The map of 1943 shows the possibility of patrolling the whole of the Northern route from bases in Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland and Canada. The establishment of bases in the Azores, in the same way as the occupation of Iceland and Greenland, brought with it an improvement in the strategic position with regard to Allied sea-lanes. Aircraft based on the Azores can close the gap in air reconnaissance system between the British Isles, Newfoundland, the Azores, Gibraltar and N.W. Africa. The overlapping of air reconnaissance patrols thus achieved has a significant effect on the long distance blockade against Germany. As a collecting point for large convoys, the Azores facilitates the handling of traffic passing through the Central Atlantic, and this in spite of the fact that there are no well equipped harbours in the Azores.

3. Position in the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean is primarily important as a through-route to Italy; in addition it is a base for operations against Europe. The sea route through the Mediterranean has become such a factor for British shipping - especially during 1943. The threat from N. Africa has been removed by the occupation of the N. African coastal regions. Sicily, Sardinia, Italy, Northern Italy, Sardinia and Corsica, in British hands, form a defensive wall against the North and also create a threat to any operation from Southern France directed against Allied shipping in the Mediterranean. Britain need today no longer consider the Western and Central Mediterranean as a danger zone. On the other hand Greece and Crete still threaten the Southern Mediterranean. Turkey is being a particular danger zone. In Turkey, more so than in any other part of the world, German, Anglo-German and Russian interests meet.

From the German side, Turkey-in-Europe is threatened through the Balkans, from the British side through Egypt and the canal zone bordering on the Eastern Mediterranean. Russian influence is becoming stronger, especially since the Russian entrance into Iran and their reoccupation of areas along the North coast of the Black Sea. From the French point of view the Mediterranean has shifted in the center of the war from the Gibraltar-Lisbon area to the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey. The success of the Italian campaign to date has shown the importance of the battle in the Mediterranean as jumping off grounds for operations against Europe.

In the Central Mediterranean area, England has driven a wedge into Europe which can be used for air operations either against Germany itself or against other occupied territories.

For land operations against the Balkans and Southern France, England can use her bases in N. Africa and Italy. Operations against Russia can also be conducted out of a considerable strike area over the Black-Sea-Georgia. Spain and Portugal's own military weakness and their economic dependence on England would seem to deter this move, but against it must be weighed the unfavorable nature of the Turkish.

The road to the Balkans through Turkey has been opened special consideration for the following two reasons -

1. England has already set up in Turkey an up to date ground staff organization and flying operations could therefore be carried out at short notice.
2. In the Balkans and more particularly in Turkey, Anglo-American and British interests are conflicting and, should this area become of front line importance, the question will arise of how much friction the Anglo-American-Russian alliance can stand without breaking down.

4. Position in the Pacific

Illustration 6 (Translator's notes missing) shows Japanese expansion in 1941 via the Philippines to the Gilbert Islands, the Iolians in the East and as far as Singapore in the South. It also shows the gradual Japanese advance since the beginning of the Japanese counter-offensive in the summer of 1942.

British, American and French territorial losses in the Pacific have been outweighed by severe economic losses.

From a military point of view the present Anglo-American position looks more stable than in 1939-1941. At that time the Philippines were a comparatively large but in other respects weak wedge in the Japanese sphere of influence; they were difficult to supply from other parts of the Empire or from America. In spite of strong Pacific Fleet bases, the Philippines could not be held because of the great distances separating the Islands from any other Anglo-American bases, an obvious factor was possibly that the Philippines had been severely shaken by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Today the losses at Pearl Harbor have been outweighed by the economic offensive is supported by a well planned network of bases. The Japanese occupation of Singapore, a base which like Ceylon has also straddled a sea route, has limited the scope of the Anglo-American campaign against Japan. As long as Singapore is in her hands, Japan need fear no danger from that direction. This does not apply to the threat from the North East. Here the situation has developed in favor of the U.S.A.

Japan can, since (even) the building of the Suez Highway, no longer be regarded as isolated from the U.S.A. In Atlantic as well as

In Northern Canada, important bases, particularly air bases, have been built for operations in the Northern part of the Pacific. Apart from this, the movement of the Alaskan Islands has supplied facilities for establishing advanced bases, a task which the U.S. Government has already begun. In the North Pacific the U.S. are now in a position to safeguard and protect the supply route to Russia and they may, in time, launch an offensive from this direction against Japan or even against Russia.

5. Conclusive observations on sea bases

To meet existing Empire defense needs, threatened by the development of the German U-boat and air force, the British network of bases had to be extended considerably.

Aircraft carriers, used as floating air bases, provided a temporary solution. During the course of the war, England and America have succeeded in establishing their influence over all maritime nations with the exception of Japan, France, Norway and Greece.

Several danger areas were eliminated, i.e. the S. Mediterranean, N.W. Africa, Central America and S. America, by the setting up of well established coastal bases for which more complete reconstructions were possible. This facilitated convoy protection and was also of value to air operations generally. It also eased the strain put on aircraft carriers and other naval escort vessels. The former could then be concentrated in areas which had few bases to protect them or could assist in landing operations.

England need not fear ^{the} German fleet since her own fleet is superior in numbers and tonnage. Battleships and armed raiders used to attack cruisers, present no great danger, since Germany, having few bases, has to confine her operations to ocean convoys, which are usually heavily escorted.

Since the broad-front expansion of Italy, the Italian fleet is no longer a factor to be taken into consideration.

To what extent allied bases will, in the future, be threatened by Japan cannot yet be assessed. At the moment there seems to be no danger since the bulk of the Japanese fighting strength is pinned down by the American offensive.

IV. Location and Strategic Importance of Land Bases, with particular reference to Empire Defense Strategy.

The construction and use of land bases and land routes has so far only been lightly touched on in this lecture.

The British think of lines of communication in terms of the sea. Due to the fact that Britain is an island, she could concentrate the greater part of her fighting strength and armament in her fleet. In order to exercise world domination by means of this fleet and to protect her Empire, Britain's primary aim has been to encourage world traffic to confine itself to sea routes and to close all land routes leading to various parts of the Empire.

History shows how England tried to sabotage the building of all other lines and means of world communication. In the course of the present war, England was forced to forsake this basic principle of her policy, and in order to find a way out of a temporarily unfavorable military situation and to minimize the effect of new enemy weapons, land routes had to be constructed. In Africa, the supply route from West Africa to the Upper Nile; in Iran, the supply route to Russia; in Central Asia the link with China across Burma.

Individual land bases are not strong enough to safeguard and protect these land routes, and it is doubtful whether England will in the future be able to defend these land routes as well as her sea communications.

England must reduce her armament industry if she is to maintain her land and sea power and her land and sea bases and at the same time meet the demands of a growing air force. While these land routes with their bases at the moment help to ease the strain on the defenses of the Empire, they must inevitably also endanger its future existence.

V. Sources.

A mass of literary material has been at our disposal. A short survey follows of the principal sources from which this lecture has been drawn.

1. British and American Staff Officers' Handbooks - Details on individual bases, their construction and fortifications. Contains statistics on world commerce, world lines of communications and density of traffic during the last years of peace; information on the importance of supply routes.

2. Contar's "Theories of Strategy", treated as a German naval instructional handbook (H.M.V. - Marine Fach Fachschrift). Dealing with geographical factors in chapter on bases and positions, Contar states some opinions on the value of bases, explains the dependence of naval warfare on these bases and quotes historical examples in support of his theories.

3. "The changes in policy and strategy in the establishment of bases necessitated by the changing conditions of warfare", by Admiral Jellicoe, in the 1943 issue of "Nautica". Jellicoe questions whether, in the light of modern developments in warfare, it is possible for an Empire to be held together by a network of bases. He asks to what extent modern naval fighting forces are dependent on naval bases.

4. Admiral Mahan's "Naval bases in modern sea warfare" in the 1941 issue of "Nautica". He describes the varied purposes which naval bases have served through the course of history and the role played by bases in modern sea warfare.

SCHULDEKOPF

5. Schuldekopf: "British naval policy 1880-1910": Shows the fundamental principles underlying the establishment of British bases.

6. Hewitt: "U.S. Policy with regard to bases" - Deals with the history of American expansion.

7. Hofmiller: "U.S. policy with regard to bases" in Volume 3 of the 1942 issue of the "Militarwissenschaftliche Rundschau". A criticism of American imperialism, tending to underestimate the importance of the Pacific Empire.